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Abstract
The central research puzzle of this thesis relates to new opportunities for political  
organisations  due  to  technological  change  and  non-electoral  forms  of  creating 
democratic  legitimacy.  In  particular,  the  thesis  asks  if  new  Information  and 
communication  technologies  can  address  democratic  legitimacy  issues  of  the 
European Union. Without doubt, the European Union already has mechanisms for 
creating democratic legitimacy. However, does political participation based on new 
information  and  communication  technologies  offer  an  avenue  for  enhancing 
democratic  legitimacy besides elections for  the European Parliament and indirect 
democratic  legitimacy provided by national  governments in the European Council 
and the Council of Ministers? If we accept the assumption that technology offers new 
opportunities for the development of democratic legitimacy providing institutions then 
what are these new opportunities for the European Union? 
The methods used for this thesis are based on a qualitative case study design. 
The first case study is an online consultations for the directive on 'Harmonisation of 
legislation  on  industrial  products',  the  second  consultation  is  for  the  'Community 
Action  Plan  on  the  Protection  and  Welfare  of  Animals  2006-  2010'. The  main 
phenomenon, around which the research is built, is the input legitimacy potential of 
the Commission's  online consultation regime. The unit  of  analysis  are two online 
consultations of the Commission. The thesis uses three hypotheses to examine the 
input legitimacy potential dealing  with  accessibility  of  the  participation  arena,  the 
meaningful  transformation of  inputs and participation patterns of  participants.  The 
gathered original data comes from four primary sources, semi-structured interviews 
with Commission officials directly related to case studies, semi structured interviews 
with consultation participants, interviews with so-called case study outsiders and a 
document analysis concerning the EU's communication strategies in connection with 
participation in policy-making.
The  key  finding  of  this  study  is  that the input  legitimacy potential of the 
Commission's online consultation in its current form is negligible. Input legitimacy is 
not a prime concern, either for the citizens or for the Commission. There is no culture 
of inclusive participation aimed at individual citizens from within the Commission . 
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Introduction 
Elections are of paramount importance as a device for creating legitimacy in 
Western democracies. They are currently the single most important mechanism that 
meaningfully connects the ruled with the rulers.  On a basic level,  elections are 
communication mechanisms that link the preferences of the ruled to those who rule. 
Yet, not only theoretically but also in historical and contemporary practice, it is not the 
only mechanism to create democratic legitimacy (also called 'input legitimacy' for the 
purpose of this thesis) for a polity. Thus, elections were of marginal importance in the 
Athenian democracy. They were regarded as the least democratic method used for 
selecting political personnel. Elections were seen as an instrument that advantaged 
wealthy and well-known citizens as they had more means to influence the masses. In 
contrast, assemblies open to all citizens were regarded as more democratic, as were 
rotation of office and random selection of political personnel (also called allotment). 
This preference for open democratic processes is also reflected in voting on 
ostracism,  a non-judicial and inherently democratic procedure under which any 
citizen could be exiled from the state for up to ten years (Bonner, 1933, p. 7); clearly, 
an election an Athenian did not want to win. 
While in ancient Greece citizenship was limited mainly to male,  property-owning 
members of the city-state,  today’s democracies work on much larger scales.  Still 
democratic legitimacy only occurs where mechanisms are in place that  both 
empower the citizens to influence their polity and let them acknowledge that the 
development of the polity and the fate of the individual are interwoven on many levels 
(King,  2006,  p.  17).  Developing,  communicating and adapting political needs are 
therefore linked to the development of communication possibilities in terms of both 
communication technology and the personal abilities of citizens to use this 
technology.  Therefore,  technology influences how institutions are shaped which 
provide democratic legitimacy. 
Aims and objectives 
In his seminal work 'Information and American Democracy:  Technology in the 
Evolution of Political Power'  Bruce Bimber (2003) suggests five historical phases in 
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the development of modern mass democracy which are linked to the development of 
communication technology.  His analysis is based on the USA,  yet Bimber's 
framework can be adapted to other polities.  Bimber argues that before the 
proliferation of national postal services and cheap newspapers, i.e. in the first phase 
(in the USA before the 1820s), both the political personnel and the citizenry had little 
means to understand the polity as a whole.  Without doubt,  political communication 
was considerably boosted by postal services and the new press. Defining the second 
phase,  these technologies allowed the development of a common political identity, 
led to the increase of voter turnout and above all the rise of political parties (Bimber, 
2003, p. 18). The third phase is linked not so much to a single technology. Ever more 
specialised knowledge was needed to master a wide range of technologies invented 
and popularised after around 1880,  which gave rise to a new intermediary in the 
polity – organised groups dedicated to lobbying for their particular interests (Bimber, 
2003, p. 19). Then, in the first half of the 20th century, a fourth phase, characterised 
by the development and spread of radio and TV broadcasting,  gave rise to mass 
audiences on a national scale.  Bimber argues that this technology led to a new 
system for political communication, which was adapted to explore changes of mass 
communication via radio and TV,  such as electoral campaigning focussed on TV 
appearances or institutions devoted to influencing media news businesses via 'spin'.
Bimber characterises the fifth phase beginning with the late 1990s as dominated 
by 'information abundance'  (Bimber,  2003,  p.  29). New information and 
communication technology (ICT) and in particular the internet have enabled people in 
the western world to easily and cheaply produce information,  including highly 
specialised information.  Information provision and distribution has become virtually 
free and has the chance to reach mass audiences.  Both specialised and mass 
political communication can happen without a formal organisation. While the features 
of this process that currently takes place are not fully understood, it is clear that new 
ICTs are creating new opportunities for the adaptation of political institutions. Clearly, 
elections and the infrastructure around them are scrutinised in the context of new 
ICTs.  New ICTs also appear to have potential for alternative ways of providing 
democratic legitimacy.  Beyond voting on political personnel,  the question arises if 
new ICTs provide mechanisms for widespread participation (or short 'e-participation') 
in policy-making and thereby can offer an alternative or additional mechanism for 
creating democratic legitimacy. 
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The central question of this thesis relates to new opportunities for political 
organisations due to technological change and non-electoral forms of creating 
democratic legitimacy.  In particular,  can new ICTs address democratic legitimacy 
issues of the European Union (EU)? Without doubt, the EU already has mechanisms 
for creating democratic legitimacy.  However,  does political participation based on 
new ICTs offer an avenue for enhancing democratic legitimacy besides elections for 
the European  Parliament (EP)  and indirect democratic legitimacy provided by 
national governments in the European Council and the Council of Ministers?  If we 
accept the assumption that technology offers new opportunities for the development 
of democratic legitimacy providing institutions then what are these new opportunities 
for the EU?
In particular,  the thesis aims to shed light on the impact of e-participation on EU 
policy-making within the Commission.  Especially EU policy-making and the 
involvement of civil society actors have produced a considerable research output, 
also with regard to legitimacy issues. However, this field of research has hardly taken 
into consideration the (potential) role of new ICTs. Thus, under which circumstances 
is it plausible to claim that e-participation contributes to the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy?  If due to the particular features of the EU polity,  classic institutional 
arrangements to improve democratic legitimacy have proven less feasible and 
effective than in the nation state context,  has internet based participation the 
potential to overcome some obstacles for creating democratic legitimacy at the 
supranational level? 
If we follow Bimber's analysis that new communication technology offers 
possibilities to adapt existing institutions, the question in the case of the EU is which 
institution should be adapted?  Clearly,  chances of real world improvements of the 
EU's legitimacy are considerably higher if they are implemented within existing 
structures and programmes. After all, this is certainly not the best of all worlds but 
arguably the most significant. With regard to participation in policy-making, the most 
promising environment appears to be the EU  Commission's consultation regime, 
which officially made contact with the internet in the early 2000s.  Two technologies 
are at the heart of the Commission's online consultation regime. First, consultations 
can be reached via the Commission's internet site 'Your Voice in Europe'.  Second, 
the Commission operates the Interactive Policy Making Initiative (IPM), which is not 
only a Commission initiative but also a piece of technology for managing online 
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consultations. The Commission regards the 'Your Voice in Europe' portal as the 'one-
stop-shop' for citizens' (EU Commission, 2003a, p. 4) participation which is basically 
a collection of links provided by,  and pointing to,  different DG websites and 
consultations hosted there.  Thus,  this thesis identifies the Commission's online 
consultation regime as the most promising candidate for adapting an existing 
institution.
It  is also worth noting in this context that the Commission's online consultation 
regime is not technology rich. It is based on internet communication technology of the 
1990s and is not sophisticated on the front-end (the part that participants and the 
policy  officers  see  and  use).  It  combines  functionality  of  an  online  poll  with  a 
comment function. Moreover, additional comments can be sent via email. And finally, 
there is a website for publishing calls for participation, accompanying materials and 
results of consultations. 
Literature review
The effects of ICTs on parliaments and in turn political parties and governments 
have attracted a great deal of academic attention (see amongst others: Gibson & 
Ward, 2000; Coleman, 2001; Gibson, Nixon, & Ward, 2003; Gibson, 2004; Vicente-
Merino, 2007; Dai & Norton, 2007; Leston-Bandeira, 2007; Zittel,  2009). Also,  the 
question whether direct involvement of citizens in the policy process via new ICTs is 
desirable and feasible has provoked a  considerable research output in the  last 15 
years (Anttiroiko,  2003;  Bannister  &  Walsh,  2002;  Barabas,  2004;  Barber,  2000; 
Barney,  2000;  Beierle,  2003;  Bentivegna,  2006;  Bingham,  Nabatchi,  &  O’Leary, 
2005; Bohman, 2004; Brothers, 2000; Castells, 2001; Chadwick, 2003; Coglianese, 
2007; DG Research, 2008; Dyson, 1996; Elmer, 2002; Engström, 2002; Froomkin, 
2003; Griffiths, 2004; Hacker & Van Dijk, 2001; Hofkirchner, 2007; T. Jordan, 2000; 
Kampen & Snijkers, 2003; McCullagh, 2003, 2003; Negroponte, 1996; Schlosberg, 
Zavestoski, & Shulman, 2007; Selnow, 2000; Shulman, Schlosberg, Zavestoski, & 
Courard-Hauri,  2003). In the context of the EU,  research since the 1990s has 
focussed on participatory governance and European civil society as instruments for 
enhancing the quality of EU governance and for addressing the EU’s alleged 
democratic deficit. This literature will help to frame this thesis’ empirical research. It is 
discussed predominately in chapter 2 and 3.
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However,  empirically guided research that combines the development of ICTs, 
participation in policy-making and EU legitimacy remains at an embryonic stage.  At 
the time of writing, only four works directly and substantially address the issue of EU 
e-participation in the Commission's consultation regime and input legitimacy. In 2005, 
a study on EU online consultations was published by the Institute of Technology 
Assessment of the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Winkler  & Kozeluh,  2005).  In 
2008,  Asmina Michailidou (2008a) published her PhD thesis 'The European Union 
online'.  Although addressing EU e-participation in a broader context than the EU's 
consultation regime,  her work provided some useful insights particularly regarding 
the rhetoric of participation in the EU's public communication. 
So far the biggest advancements  emerged out of the Connecting Excellence on 
European Governance (CONNEX)  research consortium. From 2007-11,  the three 
researchers Barbara Finke, Christine Quittkat and Thorsten Hüller published a string 
of articles on online consultation (Finke, 2007; Hüller, 2008; Quittkat & Finke, 2008; 
Hüller,  2010a;  Quittkat,  2011). Their overriding interest was the tension between 
governance and legitimacy in its various aspects across the EU.  Compared to 
Michailidou and Winkler and Kozeluh,  they took a more quantitative approach. 
Finally,  Thorsten Hüller (2010b) has published a book on EU democracy,  which 
includes an empirical analysis of some online consultations conducted by the EU 
Commission. 
Apart from those four works, a few other publications suggest in general terms that 
e-participation may contribute to the EU's input legitimacy, including Paul Timmers 
(2005),  Forcella  (2006), Curtin  and  Meijer  (2006) Nixon and Koutrakou (2007), 
Baskoy (2009) and Drakopoulou and Xenakis  (2010).  However, this literature does 
not  significantly  address e-participation mechanisms either empirically or 
theoretically. Abels grey paper (2009) is a special case as she indeed advances the 
field  theoretically  by  comparing  different  forms  participation  in  EU  policy-making 
including online consultations. Chapter 3 appreciates her contribution a bit more. It is 
also worth noting that the phenomenon of online consultations has recently been 
warranted a comprehensive and very insightful edited book by Coleman and Shane 
(2012). 
The earliest of the four core  publications mentioned above,  the Austrian report 
from 2005  arguably bears the most similarities in terms of research interest and 
design to this thesis.  The study stresses the issue of policy impact and deliberative 
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design to assess the online consultation regime.  Regarding policy impact,  the 
authors conclude: 'Online consultations do not provide a space for inclusive public 
deliberation in a strong sense,  since access depends on being already involved in 
the consultation topic,  to belong to interest networks or to be invited to take part. 
Experts criticise that there is not enough promotion on (on-going or intended) online 
consultations. The consultations are also more relevant for public bodies, NGOs and 
other institutional players than for the single citizen' (Winkler & Kozeluh, 2005, p. IV). 
Lack of accessibility, awareness and inclusiveness appear as the main shortcomings 
for this deliberative democracy setting.  However,  based on content analysis,  the 
authors regard the quality of the policy discussions,  which they see as an indicator 
for 'democratic potential',  as good.  They conclude 'that about two third of postings 
included well-formulated and rational arguments (…)'  (Winkler & Kozeluh, 2005, p. 
VI).  Yet,  the major shortcoming of this report is that it does not address the 
consultation process within the Commission as interview data was largely gathered 
from personnel who did not implement the consultations.  Moreover,  its findings are 
somewhat outdated, too. 
Contrasting 'rhetoric and reality', Quittkat and Finke ask if after the Commission's 
White Paper on Governance of 2001  the EU Commission’s consultation regime 
succeeded in broadening participation.  They based their analysis on data on the 
Commission's online consultations. In contrast to Winkler and Kozeluh, they conclude 
that 'the Commission’s efforts to achieve inclusiveness through online consultations 
have been quite successful.  Online consultations have not only attracted 
representatives of different types of interest groups; they have also lowered the 
threshold for individual citizens to access EU level consultation processes' (Quittkat & 
Finke,  2008,  p.  218).  However,  their yardstick is not deliberative democracy,  the 
conceptual approach used in this thesis and introduced in the next part  of this 
introduction. Rather, they reach their conclusion by comparing historically older forms 
of consultation, which were indeed less inclusive. Whether they are inclusive enough 
by the standards of deliberative democracy is not the central concern of their work. 
Generally,  they see online consultations in a positive light,  arguing that 'especially 
consultations with open,  albeit structured questions offer real possibilities of 
participation (...)' (Quittkat & Finke, 2008, p. 218). The importance of their work lies in 
the fact that Quittkat and Finke explore for the first time the area of EU online 
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consultations in quantitative terms. Yet again, the implementation of the consultations 
is largely omitted.
Michailidou (2008a) in her work also addresses the tension between the stated 
official policy on public participation and the reality.  She argues that while 'the 
Commission has repeatedly expressed its commitment to promoting dialogue with 
the general public and civil society and recognises that public communication is a key 
factor for improving openness,  transparency and citizens’  participation in the EU 
decision-making process (…), the actions proposed to address the issue of the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy are focused on public perception rather than institutional 
reform'  (Michailidou, 2008b, p. 361).  Based on opinions expressed by Commission 
officials in interviews,  she suggests that they do not regard the internet as a 'new 
propaganda machine' (Michailidou, 2008b, p. 361). Rather their view is that citizens 
need more information first and foremost, which they see as the main prerequisite for 
the emergence of a deliberative EU policy-process.
Based on his work within CONNEX,  Hüller (2010b),  finally,  discusses the 
democratic potential of online consultations in a monograph.  In essence,  he uses 
online consultation as a possible means for what he calls 'associative democracy', 
which  is broadly based on the idea that Civil  Society Organisations (CSOs) have 
democratisation potential for the EU. His work criticises the general inaccessibility of 
online consultations.  Empirically –  like Winkler and Kozeluh –  he works with a 
content analysis of four consultations (Hüller, 2010b, p. 180) and looks at the quality 
of the participation input. 
Against this background, how does this thesis aim to go beyond the state of the art 
in research on e-democracy in the EU?  From an institutional perspective,  the four 
sets of publications to some extend draw upon theories of deliberative democracy as 
a backdrop to assess the legitimacy potential of online consultations. However,  this 
thesis uses deliberative democracy more stringently as the yardstick for analysing 
and assessing the legitimacy potential of e-participation. In contrast, this research 
does not build hypotheses on the basis of the quality of the actual deliberation. This 
is  the  prerogative  classic  content  analysis,  which  has  been  done  for  the 
Commission's online consultations in particular by Hüller and Winkler and Kozeluh. 
All works (including this)  contrast the rhetoric of participation with the reality of EU 
policy-making.  Not surprisingly,  the reality is less participative and democratic than 
16
the rhetoric. Even Finke and Quittkat were sometimes baffled by the erratic reality of 
the online consultation regime.
Crucially, however this thesis seeks to go one decisive step further and to explain 
why the reality is not as good as the rhetoric. In this regard, the thesis is inspired by 
research on so-called 'street-level bureaucracy'. This term was introduced by Michael 
Lipsky (1980) and originally  refers to ‘the schools,  police and welfare departments, 
lower courts, legal services offices, and other agencies whose workers interact with 
and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public 
sanctions’ (1980, p. xi).  Instead of looking at 'legislatures or top-floor suites of high-
ranking administrators'  and their formal laws,  policy statutes and communiques, 
Lipsky argues that public policy is best understood by looking at what 'is actually 
made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers’ (1980,  p. 
xii) as 'policy making does not simply end once a policy is set out’ (1980, p. x). This 
means taking into account 'the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressures’  (Lipsky,  1980,  p.  xii).  According to 
Lipsky,  this is possible because street level bureaucrats have a high degree of 
discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority. What Lipsky brings 
forward is a ‘bottom-up’ argument not from the perspective of the civil  society but 
from the administrative side (Durose, 2011, pp. 979–980). 
From a participant perspective,  moreover,  this thesis stresses the importance of 
individual citizens as opposed to CSOs. This thesis goes beyond the premise that 'if 
we build they will come' and accepts that citizen participation is both rare and crucial 
for the legitimacy potential of online consultations. Hence, what are the motivational 
barriers and incentives for participation in the Commission's online consultations? 
Between the legitimacy potential of EU online consultations and their impact on the 
legitimacy belief,  the focus is on the former.  The reasons for this are discussed in 
chapter 4, which sets out the research design of the thesis. However, this thesis will 
not only help to understand what the Commission with their online consultations has 
provided in terms of input legitimacy;  crucially,  building on the empirical analysis it 
will also discuss and make some proposals for how to improve  the online 
consultations regime to enhance its democratic legitimacy potential.
Beyond  this  specific  literature  review  on  the  works  covering  the  online 
consultations of the Commission, more literature is reviewed in the theory chapters 1-
3. The aim of this wider literature review is threefold. First describing the nature of the 
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EU’s  legitimacy  and  identifying  the  core  challenges  if  we  want  to  improve  its  
democratic legitimacy (chapter 1), second, outlining why and how e-participation in 
policy-making is a potential option to improve the democratic legitimacy (chapter 2) 
and third to review the literature of participation (mostly ‘offline’) in EU policy-making 
in order to provide the cornerstones of the methods discussion in chapter 4.
Concepts and methods
Theories of deliberative democracy provide the theoretical backdrop for analysing 
the democratic qualities of the consultation processes. Bohnman suggest to broadly 
define deliberative democracy as a 'family of  views according to which the public 
deliberation  of  free  and  equal  citizens  is  the  core  of  legitimate  political  decision 
making (…)' (Bohman, 1998, p. 401). It differs from of a decision-making process that 
merely aggregates preferences by voting for a policy or for political personnel. It is  
also different from technocratic decision-making, in which aims are defined and the 
difficulty lies in the quest for the most efficient means to accomplish the aims.
Theories of deliberative democracy assume that citizens are able to consider their 
preferences and values in relationship both to their  overall  life and to a common 
good. The theories assume that citizens have the capability to empathise with the 
perspective of other individuals. Thus, they are able not only to evaluate the personal 
value but also the common value of actions and outcomes  (Rosenberg, 2007, p. 
338).
The quality of deliberative processes is assessed against two central categories: 
first,  inclusiveness,  which is concerned about information uptake and second, 
learning strategy, which concerns information processing.  This is backed  by the 
literature. Regardless of the context of the participation process, it is characterised by 
a consensus about these two  categories of legitimising deliberation (Delli-Carpini, 
Cook,  &  Jacobs,  2004,  pp.  59,  330). For the purpose of this study,  these two 
categorises have been refined to the 'prerequisites for meaningful participation'  and 
the 'prerequisites for a meaningful transformation of participation inputs'. It leads to 
three  hypotheses (split into the distinction between actor  groups -  Commission's 
personnel and the participating citizens)  for the empirical analysis of the 
consultations run online by the Commission.
The methods used for this thesis are based on a qualitative case study design. 
Ideally,  'one good case can illuminate the working of social  system in a way that 
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series of morphological statements cannot achieve'  (Gluckman, 1961, p. 9). A case 
study is an empirical inquiry that aims to investigate 'a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident'  (Yin, 1994, p. 13). The main phenomenon,  around 
which the research is built,  is the input legitimacy potential of online consultations. 
The input legitimacy potential of online consultations is analysed in the context of 
participation patterns,  policy nature and policy-making in the EU Commission. The 
unit of analysis are two online consultations of the Commission. These case study 
consultations are on the one hand the directive on 'Harmonisation of legislation on 
industrial  products'  and  on  the  other  hand  the  'Community  Action  Plan  on  the 
Protection and Welfare of Animals 2006- 2010'. The case study selection was guided 
by the heterogeneity of the cases. The initial reason why the two consultations were 
selected  lies  predominantly  in  the  perceived  nature  of  the  policy.  The overriding 
reasoning for selecting the Animal Welfare lies in the fact that it is regarded as a high 
salience case (from a participant's perceptive), which was listed on the Your Voice in 
Europe Website. It attracted a seemingly large number of participants (for the time) 
and  dealt  with  the  evocative  issue  of  the  treatment  of  animals.  In  contrast,  the 
consultation by Directorate-General (DG) Enterprise essentially dealt with the more 
technical  issue  of  product  standardisation,  which  attracted  comparatively  lower 
numbers of participants. The assumption is that the distinction between high and low 
salience consultations is relevant because it is very costly to substantially contribute 
to  EU  policy-making,  in  most  (not  salient  enough)  cases  probably  too  costly  to 
participate for the vast majority of potential participants. The following table gives an 
overview of the case selection criteria.
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Feature Animal Welfare Product Harmonisation
DG Health and Consumer (or SANCO) Enterprise
Type of legislation Non legally binding action plan Legally binding directive
Main type of participants Lay citizens Professionals
Maturity of the policy area New (at the time not mentioned as 
an EU policy in an EU treaty)
Old (at the core of European 
integration since its beginnings)
Communicative approach Mainly closed questions Closed/open questions mix
Policy area Animal ethics in agriculture, 
research and consumer protection 
Market regulation by reducing trade 
barriers
Table 1: Case studies selection criteria
The gathered original data comes from four primary sources –  semi-structured 
interviews with Commission officials directly related to case studies,  document 
analysis, semi-structured interviews with consultation participants and interviews with 
so-called case study outsiders. The core empirical data for this thesis is sourced from 
semi-structured interviews with Commission officials working on the implementation 
of the consultation procedure.  For the case studies,  interviewees were selected 
based on what they might know with regard to the practical experience of online 
consultations and their potential contribution addressing the input legitimacy problem 
of the EU. Case study outsiders are people who did not participate in one of the case 
study consultations but were familiar with the online consultation regime (or certain 
aspects of it),  namely representatives from Brussels based lobby firms,  think tanks 
and lobby watch groups but also Commission personnel working on technical issues. 
The rationale for interviewing these people was to increase the validity of interview 
data gathered from sources directly related to the case studies by incorporating a 
third observer. It also counterbalanced tendencies of the data and the researcher to 
see the main actors' views as the main explanation for the events of the cases. In the 
terminology of empirical research, interviewing case study outsiders is a form of data 
triangulation.  Similarly were the aims of the document analysis.  First,  it helped to 
frame the independent variables and provided the basic reference for structuring the 
interviews. Second, it allowed a cross examination of the core interview data and as 
such is a form of methodological triangulation. 
There are sound reasons for qualitative case study research design. Although the 
previous section used the language of quantitative research with dependent and 
independent variables in real life the distinction is not as clear-cut.  Therefore,  a 
method that inherently allows addressing these challenges by allowing the ambiguity 
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of 'context'  and 'phenomenon'  is particularly suitable for this research.  Moreover,  at 
the time of the design of this research project, the area of online consultations within 
the Commission was largely uncharted waters (which is still the case, although to a 
lesser degree as new literature emerged).  Research based on semi-structured 
interviews is especially suitable to sail those uncharted waters of a complex end 
emerging area of research (which also has its significance yet to proof)  because it 
allows us to find out what is there by asking the people in charge what they are 
doing, without having to establish a tight analytical corset. Nevertheless, the choice 
of methods undoubtedly was also related to the practicalities and reality of doctoral 
research not embedded in a wider project. Although arguably a qualitative approach 
combined with a major quantitative study would have been desirable, this approach 
was not realistic within the framework of a PhD that was not integrated into a large 
quantitative study.
Regarding the research practicalities, the first round of gathering data consisted of 
collecting relevant documents on all Commission's online consultations up until 2006. 
Moreover,  a small database (with the help of SPSS statistical software package) of 
all closed consultations was built.  This data in conjunction with the literature review 
was then used to make decision on the case study selection.  Initial interviews took 
place in June and July 2007  in Brussels and the main round interviews with 
participants and Commission staff took place from May 2009 to May 2010. Primary 
texts for the document analysis were fed into a database based on the Zotero 
software, which is a tool developed to archive and reference traditional literature and 
in particular electronic texts and digital artefacts.  With regard to the interviews, 
transcribed sections of the interviews and key excerpts of the document analyses 
were coded according to their links with the three  hypotheses along with some 
generic descriptive variables. This was done with the help of traditional spreadsheet 
software.  It allowed the easy grouping of data in relation to  a hypothesis across 
cases and data sources.  Also,  pattern of types of  interviews were easier to identify 
with this method.
Ultimately, two hypotheses were developed to assess the legitimacy potential of 
the Commissions online consultation and a third to assess a potential direct impact 
on the legitimacy belief of  participants.  The first  hypothesis is concerned with the 
degree  of  accessibility  of  the  arena  of  participation  and  assumed that  the  more 
inclusive and the higher level of awareness it creates the more legitimacy potential it 
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can claim. Inclusiveness and awareness are the concepts used for measuring the 
accessibility.  Indicators  for  public  awareness  centre  on  the  efforts  for  actively 
approaching individual citizens and attempts for reaching out beyond Brussels, i.e. 
attempts  to  include  participants  that  neither  are  based  in  Brussels  nor  travel  to 
Brussels.  Indicators for inclusiveness ask if  consultations are adapted to different 
participants  groups,  whether  educational  material  is  provided  and  whether 
accessibility is the guiding principle of the consultation implementation.
The second hypothesis deals with the meaningful transformation of inputs. Policy 
impact  and  feedback  are  the  two  concepts  to  measure  the  meaningful 
transformation. Indicators for policy impact are agenda setting, policy contestation 
and a change of policy proposal, the existence of internet accessible feedback and 
criteria why an input is included or not are indicators for the feedback concept. 
The  third  hypothesis  centres  around  the  direct  impact  of  participation  on  the 
legitimacy belief of participants. Indicators for the concept of salience and stake are  
personal relevance and personal consequences related to policy. The indicator for  
efficacy is self-attestation. Finally, the indicator for the acknowledging of impacts is 
whether a participant followed consultation after the submission of inputs. As the data 
on participants is less comprehensive, secondary sources are used to analyse the 
boundary condition of these hypotheses, too.
Chapter 4 will  discuss the development of  the hypotheses and the case study 
design in greater detail.
Structure of the thesis
The thesis is broadly divided into two parts. The first part consisting of chapter 1 to 
3  discusses  the  research  puzzle  and  lays  the  theoretical  foundations  for  the 
hypotheses for the empirical, second part of the thesis consisting of chapter 4 to 6.  
The second part of the thesis analyses the data gather from the case studies along 
the above outlined three hypotheses.
Chapter 1 outlines the debate on the nature of the EU's legitimacy, a debate that is 
far from settled.  Following  Føllesdal  and  Hix  and  conceptualising the lack of 
legitimacy as a deficiency of the EU, this chapter discusses the opinions and various 
options regarding the 'symptoms,  diagnoses,  cures'  (2006a,  p.  533).  The thesis 
follows the mainstream of this literature in assuming that the EU does have a 
legitimacy problem (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006b; Warleigh-Lack, 2003).  According to the 
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standard explanation of its democratic deficit,  the EU lacks contestation,  which is 
responsive to the preferences of the EU citizenry. This lack of contestation concerns 
policies,  political leadership and political personnel.  More specifically,  the main 
challenge for democratic legitimacy is at least twofold.  First,  citizens are excluded 
from dominant network-type arrangements of non-hierarchical policy-making (Kaiser, 
2009). Second,  the EU demos lacks the strong political identity that is needed for 
input legitimacy based on representative democracy.
The second chapter looks at participatory policy-making,  both in its online and 
offline versions. The main question for this thesis is how participatory policy-making 
can and does contribute to democratic legitimacy.  The chapter introduces the 
distinction between 'participatory democracy'  and 'participatory governance'.  The 
latter is mainly concerned with governance.  In contrast,  participatory democracy is 
mainly concerned with participation.  Participatory democracy is centred on the 
inclusive participation in policy-making.  Participation is seen as a socialisation 
process among citizens,  civil society actors and a governing body.  Citizens are 
entitled to participate if they wish to do so. Access to the policy-making process does 
not depend on the provision of information resources in connection with a policy 
problem.  Rather,  participation is even welcome for the sole purpose of political 
socialisation.  Here theories of deliberative democracy come into play as this is the 
main avenue for justifying the legitimacy claims of participatory policy-making.
Chapter 3 analyses the EU and the current state of participatory policy-making in 
the Commission. It reviews participatory governance in the context of the EU both in 
its online and offline forms.  It studies the attempts to remedy the input legitimacy 
problem of the EU via public policy-making and political participation.  The EU and 
especially the Commission is no stranger to attempts at participatory policy-making. 
The EU has a long tradition in its policy process of interacting with non-state 'civil 
society' actors. With regard to governance, the concept of civil society assumes that 
non-  or less hierarchical policy-making depends on the knowledge generated and 
communicated by societal actors.  Therefore,  civil society is regarded as a main 
component of output efficient EU governance (EU Commission, 2001a). With regard 
to the legitimacy debate of the EU, civil society actors in the political processes are 
seen as an alternative to or as complementing supranational European 
democratisation based on parliamentary democracy.  It is also regarded as a 
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counterbalance to the legitimacy problems deriving from the executive dominated EU 
policy-process. 
Chapter 4 outlines a framework for answering the question whether e-participation 
in the Commission's online consultation regime is actually a viable option for 
increasing the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The key aspects of this chapter were 
outlined above in the section on methods.
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the theoretical and policy background of the two 
case study consultations.  The first case study –  the directive on 'Harmonisation of 
legislation on industrial products' – deals with a horizontal legislative approach to the 
harmonisation of legislation on EU market access of industrial products. At its core, 
the policy of 'harmonisation of legislation on industrial products' is a meta-regulation 
of technical trade barriers caused by product standards. It is a follow-up policy to the 
ground breaking Council Resolution on the ‘New Approach to technical 
harmonisation and standardisation’ (85/C 136/01, 7 May 1985).  The second case 
study deals with the 'Community Action  Plan on the Protection and Welfare of 
Animals 2006-2010'.  An Action  Plan is a comprehensive overview of the 
Commission’s planned policy initiatives in a defined period of time.  It does not 
constitute EU law but is a strategic document often including a declaration of 
intended policies. 
Chapter 6  tests the research hypotheses developed in chapter 4  against the 
empirical data.  It concludes that the democratic legitimacy potential of the 
Commission's online consultation in its current form is negligible.  It is a prime 
concern neither for the citizens nor for the Commission. This finding of course stands 
in stark contrast to the official position of the Commission, as expressed for instance 
in its White Paper on Governance: 'Democracy depends on people being able to take 
part in the public debate. To do this, they must have access to reliable information on 
European issues and be able to scrutinise the policy process in its various stages' 
(EU  Commission,  2001a,  p.  10).  While  the  design  of  consultations  allowed  in 
principle every interested person to participate and while technology per se did not  
exclude citizens there was hardly any citizen participation. The lack of dissemination 
and of clear rules for participation made both cases highly inaccessible. Based on the 
analysis of the two case studies, there is no culture of inclusive participation aimed at 
individual citizens from  within Commission.  Although the Commission's officials 
interviewed for this research are by no means blind to ideas of widening the 
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participation base,  there is no evidence that they facilitate an inclusive consultation 
process beyond the confinements of Brussels and a meaningful transformation of 
online inputs. Instead, online consultations are primarily an instrument used to make 
the working life of policy officers easier. 
Hence,  this thesis argues that the legitimacy potential of online consultations is 
limited. Moreover, the thesis questions whether it is worth adapting the current online 
consultation regime due to the nature of the Commission as an institution and the 
high literacy skills needed for participating in the Commission's consultations. 
Nevertheless, the thesis suggests to introduce measures that allow establishing a 
more transparent long term electronic communication process between participants 
and a DG (especially for people who do not take part in 'offline' consultations) that 
moves  beyond  the  linear  input/output  model  envisaged  at  the  moment  by  the 
Commission's online consultations. 
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Chapter 1:  The EU,  its Legitimacy and the Democratic 
Deficit
At the beginning of the 1990s, the controversies surrounding the Maastricht Treaty 
referenda in Denmark and France introduced the term democratic deficit  into the 
public arena of the EU’s  Member States.  For instance in Germany,  the Maastricht 
Treaty and its democratic implications were the object of a crucial  ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court in 1993 (Føllesdal, 2006, p. 442; Papadopoulos, 2002, 
p.  2).  In the UK, John Major's Tory government was challenged by its own 
backbenchers over the Treaty in 1992  and 1993  (Williams, 1998, p. 96).  Looking 
back, the controversies surrounding the Maastricht Treaty became the watershed of 
the EU legitimacy debate.  Before this treaty and its ratification process most 
pro-European policy-makers and scholars,  backed consistently by opinion polls 
conducted  in then European  Economic  Community,  assumed that European 
integration was supported by the citizens of the Member  States based on a 
'permissive consensus' (Höreth, 1999, p. 252). The popular and legal response to the 
Maastricht Treaty considerably questioned this assumption (Føllesdal, 2004, p. 4). As 
a result,  much has been published about the democratic  deficit  and legitimacy 
challenges of the EU following the Maastricht Treaty. 
In recent years,  the issue of the democratic  deficit  has come onto the public 
agenda to an unusual extent,  particularly during the ratification process of the 
Constitutional Treaty. After its adoption by Member State representatives in October 
2004, the ratification process was in effect terminated after referenda in France and 
the Netherlands rejected the treaty in May and June 2005.  After the failure of the 
treaty, the heads of state and government and the Commission announced a period 
of reflection on the consequences of the failed ratification process ('The Period of 
Reflection and Plan D') (EU Commission, 2006a). Amongst other issues such as the 
'lousy'  pro-campaign,  the question of 'the euro and Turkey'  (Thomassen, 2008, pp. 
321–322), the insufficient legitimacy of the EU was publicly debated as a reason for 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by Irish,  Dutch and French voters,  whilst 
referenda in Spain and Luxembourg approved the Treaty (Crum, 2007).
This chapter aims to provide an answer to the question of what the key challenges 
are if online consultations want to address this problem of the EU's democratic 
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deficit. In order to identify these challenges the chapter reviews the academic debate 
on the nature of the EU's legitimacy.  The first part introduces briefly the basic 
concepts of legitimacy and democracy as well as developing structure for analysing 
the debate on the EU's legitimacy. The main part of this chapter discusses the nature 
of the EU's legitimacy as well as strategies for  and difficulties in enhancing it.  The 
chapter finishes with identifying key challenges for increasing the EU's legitimacy on 
democratic grounds. 
Legitimacy and/versus democracy
Max Weber (1922, p. 19) proposed a definition of legitimacy as the belief of the 
ruled that the political order they live in is lawful. The main components of legitimacy 
-  normative (lawfulness)  and positive (approval of the political order) -  are already 
identified in his seminal definition. In reality, political institutions such as the state (but 
we can also think of its subsystems) are usually not either legitimate or not;  rather, 
they are  more or less legitimate.  The term 'political institution'  or just 'institution' 
incorporates a wide range of objects of legitimacy from a complete political system 
or,  more often,  a subsystem including a single political decision-making process 
(Føllesdal, 2006, pp. 450–451).
A belief is, as values and attitudes, a latent construct, which can only be measured 
indirectly, for example by observation or opinion polls. Therefore, legitimacy has the 
problem that its measurement is inherently vague as the belief itself is only indirectly 
evident. This led Schmitter to conclude that: 'I may not be able to define (or measure) 
it, but I know it when it is not there' (Schmitter, 2001, p. 3).
The consequence of high legitimacy of a social institution is that the ruled 
voluntarily comply with the rules even if compliance is costly for them. On the side of 
the rulers, legitimacy lowers the costs of ruling because fewer resources have to be 
invested into coercion and supervision mechanisms (Scharpf,  2003).  As Scharpf 
argues:  '[L]egitimacy beliefs imply a socially sanctioned obligation to comply with 
government policies even if these violate the actor's own interests or normative 
preferences,  and even if official sanctions could be avoided at low cost'  (Scharpf, 
2003). 
Thus,  without legitimacy,  sustainable rule is not possible.  From a systemic 
perspective, legitimacy is a functional precondition for justifying a governing authority: 
'Legitimacy converts power into authority'  (Schmitter, 2001, p. 3).  Therefore, for the 
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function of any social order and any state,  legitimacy is of paramount importance. 
Any political system wants a high degree of legitimacy. However,  legitimacy cannot 
work without some sort of normative content, a system that provides a set of tools for 
judging a social institution. This is where democratic theory comes into play. 
Within the last two centuries,  political theorists have been increasingly using the 
concept of democracy to build legitimating arguments. Those arguments were in turn 
increasingly adopted by the ruled in some societies to judge the social order in which 
they lived. According to Held (1997), arguments from various theories on democracy 
are now the fundamental standard for judging political legitimacy in our times.  The 
core demand of any theory of democracy is that the ruled have a significant and 
formalised influence on the political processes.  This can be achieved through the 
participation of citizens in free and fair elections or in direct democratic referenda but 
also through participation in political organisations. Clearly, democracy cannot be the 
only yardstick with which to judge a society or state.  Hence,  democratic legitimacy 
may also gain from factors that are not exclusively associated with democracy such 
as the accountability and transparency of policy processes, the constitution and the 
rule of law, independent media, a system of checks and balances between different 
institutions and territorial entities ('separation of powers',  'federalism')  and political 
and economic stability (Dahl,  1971). Yet,  an institution that aspires to achieve 
democratic legitimacy cannot do so without referring to some minimum standards of 
democratic theory.
As in the case of the EU,  legitimacy usually becomes an issue beyond the 
academic world if it is missing or deficient.  Schmitter remarks, 'legitimacy recedes 
into the background and persons seem to take for granted that the actions of their 
authorities are "proper"’, "normal"  or "justified" '  (2001, p. 3).  Moreover,  legitimacy 
itself is difficult to measure on empirical grounds.  Risse points out that institutions 
(e.g. a law or an election process) but not actors (e.g. a single citizen or the head of 
state)  can be legitimate  (2004,  p.  7), whilst nevertheless acknowledging Weber's 
well-known  argument that one of the three principle sources of legitimacy (besides 
tradition and rational authority)  can be the charismatic qualities of a leader (M. 
Weber, 1922, p. 124). 
Yet, how is it possible to speak of the legitimacy of an institution? This might refer 
on the one hand to the alleged or proven approval of the institution by a significant 
share of the citizenry or,  on the other hand,  to its legitimacy potential,  that is,  the 
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(alleged)  potential of a social institution to maintain and/or increase its legitimacy 
among the ruled. In addition to the normative and positive aspects of legitimacy, we 
can distinguish between two analytical dimensions of legitimacy when addressing 
how to measure it: on the one hand, the legitimacy potential of an institution and on 
the other, the legitimacy belief of citizens. 
Based on this distinction of legitimacy potential and legitimacy belief, there are two 
principle strategies for assessing democratic legitimacy (Holzhacker, 2007, p. 259). 
The first,  normative approach looks at a political institution,  an institutional 
arrangement or a complete political system and evaluates features of this system 
against a normative theory of democracy.  The rationale of this approach is that the 
more criteria are concordant with the theory, the more legitimate the system should 
be.
Legitimacy is, however, what the ruled attribute to a political system. In an allusion 
to the military strategy of 'winning the hearts and minds of the population',  the real 
battleground of legitimacy is the hearts and minds of the ruled. Theory only helps to 
identify relevant characteristics of legitimacy providing arrangements.  To illustrate 
this point one can imagine a scenario, where according to normative political theory, 
a system is democratic but the citizens do not believe it is legitimate. Are the people 
wrong or is there a problem with the theory?  Clearly,  the theory is either 
incomprehensible or wrong.
In contrast,  the second,  positive approach centres not on institutions but on 
people. It assumes that a system is democratic and then asks the people living in the 
system about their legitimacy beliefs.  The problem here is that we can think of a 
scenario where people believe the system is democratic (and support it)  but it is 
actually not according to any theory of democracy.  The system would still be 
legitimate but not based on democratic theory.  There are of course many diverse 
sources of legitimacy as there have been,  and still exist,  a significant number of 
polities worldwide which do not rest on arguments of democratic theory for their 
legitimacy (Holzhacker, 2007; Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999).
The first approach establishes the democratic legitimacy potential whilst,  in 
contrast, the second measures legitimacy belief but needs the backing of normative 
theory in order to know what it measures. Of course, in an ideal world theorists would 
hope that the more a system conforms to their democratic theory,  the stronger the 
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legitimacy belief among the citizenry. We will come back to the distinction between 
legitimacy potential and legitimacy belief in chapter 4.
Scharpf (1999) suggests analysing the principle sources for democratic legitimacy 
potential with reference to the definition of democracy given by Abraham Lincoln in 
his Gettysburg Address.  Lincoln defended the United States'  authority (during the 
American Civil War, when the US president was not perceived as the legitimate head 
of state in the southern Confederate States of America) with the triple identity of the 
governed ('government of the people'),  the governing ('government by the people') 
and the beneficiaries of government ('government for the people').  Scharpf’s 
distinction between 'input' and 'output' legitimacy refers to government by the people 
(input) and government for the people (output). 
Input legitimacy is based on the participatory quality of the decision-making 
process leading to laws and rules. It relies on involving citizens and stakeholders in 
policy-formulation and 'the rhetoric of "participation"  and of "consensus" '  (Scharpf, 
1999, p. 7). In other words, those who have to comply with the rules ought to have an 
input in the rule-making processes. Output legitimacy on the other hand refers to the 
problem-solving quality of laws and rules. These should serve the common interest of 
the citizens. Finally, Lincoln's 'government of the people' does not fit into the scheme 
of output/input legitimacy; yet, it is an essential prerequisite of democratic legitimacy 
and it refers to the collective political identity of the ruled.  Input legitimacy needs 
political identity to enable the citizens to believe that the welfare of the minority is 
also 'an argument in the preference function of the majority'  (Scharpf, 1998). In the 
output dimension,  identity is necessary to define the membership in the community 
whose 'common interests' are thought to justify governmental action even if it entails 
individual sacrifices. 
Traditionally the legitimacy of a democratic government is input-orientated whilst 
the legitimacy of policies or governance itself is output-orientated.  It is obvious that 
democratic states aim to maintain their legitimacy by enhancing both components 
(Risse, 2004, p. 6). Scharpf argues that both sources have their own tradition in the 
theory of democracy and therefore he does not set them in a hierarchical relationship 
(Scharpf, 2006, pp. 1–6). However,  this is to some degree misleading.  While input 
and output legitimacy have their own tradition in political theory, only input legitimacy 
is a suitable criterion to differentiate democratic systems from undemocratic ones. 
Output legitimacy can be used by any type of political system as a source of 
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legitimacy.  Historically,  it preceded input legitimacy as the thinkers of the age of 
Enlightenment argued for a government that is based on the well-being of the ruled. 
Before the Enlightenment,  the interest of the ruled was subordinate to the alleged 
interest of a higher being or a ruling class with a shared social origin. The common 
good was not the source of legitimacy but only a factor of statecraft.  Well-being 
implied political stability and it was therefore part of wise politics.  Yet what 
distinguishes enlightened absolutism from a parliamentary democracy is,  above all, 
that the latter rests on input legitimacy  (Føllesdal,  2006;  Føllesdal  & Hix,  2006a; 
Greven,  1998).  Hence,  in a narrower sense,  only input legitimacy provides 
democratic legitimacy regardless of the fact that democracies base their legitimacy 
on other sources as well.  Thus,  in the terminology used in this thesis,  'input 
legitimacy'  and 'democratic legitimacy'  are interchangeable and do not describe the 
system-wide legitimacy of democracy.
After these analytical clarifications,  we can build a structure  for analysing 
strategies to improve legitimacy of more or less democratic states.  The legitimacy 
potential can be based on output or input orientated measures. These can be weak 
or strong in a given initial scenario. The legitimacy belief of the ruled can likewise be 
either strong or weak.  This leads to eight principle reform strategies as outlined in 
Table 1. This taxonomy is not exhaustive as not all permutations are included. It is, 
however, an analytically convenient tool for structuring the EU's legitimacy debate.
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legitimacy potential: input
legitimacy 
potential: output
strong weak
strong 1) ideal democracy, no 
need for reform
2) strong democracy 
with ignorant citizens, 
state education on 
participation channels 
and or performance of 
state
3) authoritarian 
democracy, reform 
depends on preference 
of citizenry
4) authoritarian 
democracy, educate 
citizens about 
performance of state, 
further reform depends 
on preference of 
citizenry
weak 5) weak democracy, 
reform based on 
performance 
improvement
6) weak democracy, 
reform based on 
performance 
improvement and state 
education participation 
channels
7) unstable democracy, 
revolution imminent
8) apathetic democracy
acknowledged by 
citizens 
not acknowledged acknowledged by 
citizens 
not acknowledged
legitimacy belief
Table 2: Strategies for improving legitimacy
The first box denotes the 'no need for reform scenario', an ideal democracy. Input 
and output oriented legitimacy potential is strong and both aspects are acknowledged 
by the citizenry. The second box is the scenario of a strong democracy. Whereas 
input and output orientated legitimacy potential is strong, it is not acknowledged by 
the citizenry, however. Here the state may try to communicate its performance better 
or strengthen the infrastructure to promote a common identity or a change of the 
belief systems of the citizenry.
The third scenario is a strong authoritarian democracy with low input but high 
output oriented legitimacy acknowledged by the citizenry.  In this scenario,  it is not 
clear whether any reform is needed. This depends mainly on the preferences of the 
citizenry and their perspectives on democracy. 
The fourth box describes a weak authoritarian democracy with low input and high 
output orientated legitimacy. However, this is not acknowledged by the people of this 
state. As a result, the state may want to consider educating its citizens better about 
its performance.
Fifth, the weak democracy is characterised by high input and low output oriented 
legitimacy potential,  which is acknowledged by the citizenry.  Reform strategies are 
subsequently based on performance improvement.
Sixth,  the unstable,  weak democracy is plagued by low output orientated 
legitimacy potential,  whilst nonetheless having a strong input legitimacy.  Both 
aspects are not acknowledged by the citizenry.  Reform here aims at performance 
improvement as well as state education on possible participation channels for the 
citizenry and how to use them.
The seventh scenario is an unstable democracy where an overthrow of the 
government is imminent.  The citizens acknowledge the low legitimacy potential of 
both input and output oriented institutions. 
The eighth scenario is arguably a hypothetical case of an apathetic democracy 
where legitimacy is not an issue in the belief system of the citizens whilst,  at the 
same time,  the state is characterised by a low input-  and low output oriented 
legitimacy potential.
The table shows that in principle two main strategies exist  for addressing a 
legitimacy deficit. The first strategy is to adapt the institutions so that they are more in 
accordance with the belief system of the ruled (in an out- or input orientated manner). 
This means that an institution is altered in order to increase its legitimacy potential. 
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The second is to modify the belief system of the ruled so that their standards for 
judging the situation or their information base for those judgements changes. While 
the former cannot be employed without the latter,  the latter is plausible without the 
former.
If the reform of institutions is not communicated to the citizenry,  however,  then 
they cannot re-evaluate the performance of those institutions.  Arguably the 
communication effort is higher if the state wants to convince the citizenry that their 
standards for judging the situation is either incomplete or not applicable whilst at the 
same time making suggestions on how to adjust or replace the inappropriate 
yardstick for judging an institution.
The EU's legitimacy
The previous section provided some insights into why assessing the EU's 
legitimacy is a cumbersome undertaking.  In particular,  making a decision as to 
whether the EU lacks democratic legitimacy or not depends upon the view one takes 
regarding the state of the EU's legitimacy and the legitimacy potential of its 
institutions.  Also in the process, the validity of the citizens'  belief systems must be 
questioned. Do they 'understand' the EU? Have they 'enough' knowledge about the 
EU? Do they judge the EU by the 'right' criteria? 
Difficulties aside, the term democratic deficit is used by many analysts. This brings 
us to the question of what precisely constitutes the 'democratic deficit’. What are the 
symptoms of the EU's democratic deficit? The debate has sprawled into many areas 
of EU research.  As early as 1995  scholars tried to identify key elements of the 
democratic deficit  by simply listing the more commonly mentioned features of the 
deficit in the public and academic debate, leading to a 'standard version' as opposed 
to the less mainstream aspects of the debate which then can be included in the 
'non-standard' version (Weiler, Haltern, & Mayer, 1995).
The three main aspects of the standard version are, first, a lack of input legitimacy 
providing institutions,  relating to an expansion of executive policy-making without 
strengthening input legitimacy providing institutions. Second, there is the perception 
of an opaque policy-making process,  which lacks accountability and transparency, 
and which makes it difficult for,  or even prevents,  citizens from acknowledging and 
judging the processes and outcomes of EU policy-making. Third, there is the lack of 
a common identity among the citizens of the EU, which prevents some citizens from 
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developing and maintaining a coherent belief system for judging the EU's legitimacy 
(Abromeit, 2002; McCormick, 2010, pp. 1–2).
The expansion of EU governmental power by transferring competences from the 
Member States to the EU level has been coupled with a weak control of these 
powers by input legitimacy providing institutions, mainly parliaments at Member State 
level and the EP. The expanding and highly executive character of EU politics lacks 
input by European citizens.  In this respect,  the role of the 'weak'  EP as the 
counterpart of the 'strong'  EU executive branch is highlighted by some scholars 
(Heard-Laureote, 2007).  The parliamentary powers are too weak to ensure proper 
accountability of the executive. The EP's status within the policy process is also weak 
compared to national parliaments and its role as facilitator of a public forum is 
hampered by its remoteness from EU citizens.
Policy-making in the EU is often based on opaque and informal policy networks 
and the EU decision-making process involves many actors on various levels (Kaiser, 
2009).  Does the resulting lack of transparency lead to a lack of accountability over 
who is responsible for the outcome of EU legislation? Who is to give feedback about 
EU regulations? The result is a policy process that can hardly be evaluated by most 
EU citizens.  At the same time,  feedback mechanisms on the outcomes are weak. 
Still,  non-compliance with EU regulations by citizens is rare mainly because 
regulations are mediated by the Member  States and implemented nationally.  In 
everyday life,  it is mostly not the EU and its public administration but the Member 
States that deal with citizens and their responses to EU regulations.  Hence,  the 
'specific multilevel characteristics of the European polity' save the EU from facing 'the 
empirical tests of political legitimacy because it is shielded against the behavioural 
responses of the governed’ (Scharpf, 2007, p. 9).
The EU is regarded by some of its citizens as remote. Cultural and geographical 
distance hinders the development of strong legitimacy beliefs.  The EU is 
characterised by strong linguistic,  geographical,  economic and  cleavages (Majone, 
1998, p. 11). Only weak mechanisms exist to support an EU identity. Thus, there is 
no cohesive European public sphere that reports on EU issues (Liebert  & Trenz, 
2008; Trenz & Eder, 2004). This lack of a common identity becomes a problem when 
the rule of the EU is perceived as foreign, as not part of political self-determination by 
the citizens;  as not a part of a legitimate process of politics and policies within a 
polity. Identity is of course socially constructed and in flux. Based on Eurobarometer 
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data, Marks and Hooghe comment that whilst the EU has changed rapidly in the last 
20 years, the self-perception of the identity among the citizenry has not. There is also 
no clear trend towards a more European identity as opposed to a national identity or 
vice-versa. They conclude that '[u]ntil generational change kicks in, Europe is faced 
with a tension between rapid jurisdictional change and relatively stable identities' 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2009, pp. 13–14).
It is important to bear in mind that legitimacy shortcomings attributed to the EU can 
also be found within the democracies of Member States.  This does not render the 
legitimacy problems of the EU less relevant but gives us the chance to put them in 
perspective.  The features characterising the standard version the EU's democratic 
deficit –  an opaque policy process dominated by the executive branch of the state 
combined with the limited influence of parliamentary institutions in addition to 
tensions based on the lack of a collective identity within the state – are a template for 
criticising virtually any western democracy.  Arguably,  some problems are more 
pronounced within the EU. Nevertheless, the EU is not as unique with its democratic 
challenges as some media reporting tends to make us believe.
The  majority of the  academic literature supports the idea that the EU has  some 
sort of legitimacy deficit but  this may partly be down to research pragmatism. First, 
the nature of the problem means that we can probably identify a legitimacy deficit in 
every democracy. After all, can a political system have too much legitimacy? Second, 
regardless of the substance of any alleged or actual EU legitimacy deficit,  from the 
perspective of the researcher it is always better to have a puzzle to solve. Third, the 
possibilities for combining topics from the EU studies canon with the legitimacy deficit 
is seemingly endless,  hence there are structural features that feed the literature on 
the EU's democratic deficit. Up to a point, this thesis follows such a pattern. Finally, 
two  prominent  researchers  of  the  EU  have  already  made  the  case  against  the 
existence of a democratic deficit  (Føllesdal  & Hix,  2006a, p.  537): Giandomenico 
Majone and Andrew Moravcsik. 
Majone sees the EU as something like a  weak authoritarian democracy in the 
structure outlined above. This scenario is characterised by low input and high output 
oriented legitimacy. However, the latter is not acknowledged by the people. Majone 
regards  the EU as an authoritarian democracy,  which is nevertheless  benevolent 
towards its citizens.  According to him, the EU is what he describes as a regulatory 
state.  It was created by its Member States for 'specific functional tasks that can be 
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tackled more efficiently and/or credibly at the supranational level'  (Majone, 1998, p. 
24). In Majone's view,  the EU is mainly producing efficiency improving policies as 
opposed to redistributionary policies.  The former policies  aim to increase the 
aggregated welfare within a society,  the latter to redistribute welfare from  one 
particular group to another.  Majone argues convincingly that producing efficiency 
improving policies can be delegated to a benevolent dictator –  or to 'institutions 
independent of the political process' (Majone, 1998, p. 24). Hence, the legitimacy of 
the EU can solely be based on output orientated institutions.
The problem with Majone's argument is that the reality of the EU does not support 
his analysis.  Whilst there is a considerable amount of regulatory,  non-redistributive 
and efficiency improving policies, the EU does engage in redistributive policy-making 
(such as the Common Agricultural Policy,  structural funds and EU-wide research 
funding).  There are EU policies where certain societal groups clearly gain at the 
expense of others.  In addition,  on the Member State level we can identify 'net 
contributors' and 'net beneficiaries' (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006a, p. 543).
Compared to Majone,  Moravcsik  makes  his  case  much  more  aggressively, 
describing the democratic  deficit as a myth,  which 'always was,  and remains, 
nonsense' (Moravcsik, 2008, p. 333) because 'the EU is at least as democratic, and 
generally more so, than its Member States' (Moravcsik, 2008, p. 332).
Moravcsik argues that the idea of a deficit is a 'myth'  because first (in line with 
Majone)  it is desirable that certain non-redistributionary policies are insulated from 
democratic institutions and their competition for the right policy. Hence, it is not more 
technocratic than any other western democracy (Moravcsik, 2002, p. 613).  Second, 
policies of the EU already have sufficient democratic legitimacy, which is generated 
by the Council and the EP. They ensure that preferences of the citizenry are in line 
with the EU's policy agenda (Moravcsik, 2002, pp. 611–612). Third,  increasing the 
input legitimacy potential is not advisable because the citizens'  apathy towards the 
EU would mean that they have no effect on their belief systems (Moravcsik, 2002, 
pp. 615–617).
For Moravcsik,  there is simply no need to reform the EU on legitimacy grounds. 
For an institution that aims to provide democracy beyond the nation state, the EU is a 
role model. Input and output oriented legitimacy potential is strong and both aspects 
are acknowledged by the citizenry.  Whilst Moravcsik sees possibilities to improve 
output legitimacy,  he sees no potential whatsoever for  improving input legitimacy 
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(beyond the already very high standards of the EU) because the EU citizens do not 
demand it.
Yet,  there are also  considerable weaknesses with  Moravcsik’s  argument.  First, 
while it is common practice in many democracies to insulate some branches of the 
executive (e.g. the central bank) from the democratic political process, this is not an 
argument to insulate all parts of the executive from this process (as is currently the 
case with the EU Commission) (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006a, pp. 542–544). 
Second,  the input legitimacy providing institutions of the EU clearly have their 
merits but fail to offer a forum for contesting policy. If citizens want a different policy 
agenda neither institution provides a forum for advocating a different policy agenda 
or forming an alternative  leadership (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006a, p. 549). There is no 
strong mechanism that links the preferences of citizens to the policy processes of the 
EU.  However,  even if the policies  are in line with the preferences of the citizens, 
these preferences are not fixed.  If the preferences change, there is no strong 
mechanism that translates this change into different  EU policies.  Moreover,  even if 
current EU policies reflect current preferences within the EU citizenry this does not 
take into account that preference formation is part of the process. Opinion on political 
leadership and policy agendas are shaped by the democratic process itself and 
therefore they are likely to be different from preferences formed under a benevolent 
dictatorship (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006a, p. 543). In short, due to the lack of contestation 
over policy and political personnel, the EU is less democratic than any of its Member 
States.
Third,  citizens demonstrating apathy towards EU issues does not necessarily 
mean  that apathy remains if the boundary conditions change;  in particular,  if there 
are channels of participation that offer policy and/or leadership contestation.  Or, as 
Føllesdal and Hix put it, the apathy of citizens 'is not a justification for no democracy, 
as long as it may equally well be the result of a lack of democratic arenas for 
contestation' (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006a, p. 551).
Moravcsik,  and to a lesser degree Majone,  have probably calmed the debate 
otherwise characterised by many other scholars aiming to identify various democratic 
deficits on different levels of the political system of the EU. After all, even at times of 
economic  and  financial  crisis,  the EU does  not  appear  to  be  on the brink of 
revolution. Anti-EU riots are rare. In many ways, the EU has worked reasonably well 
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during  better (e.g.,  the beginning of 1990s)  and worse times (e.g.  since the mid-
2000s). 
So what are the existing sources of legitimacy on which the EU is currently 
resting? Although the legitimacy foundations of the EU might be disputed, it has to be 
clear that there is anything but a complete absence of legitimacy in the EU. If we 
want to know how the central executive body of the EU, the Commission, sees the 
legitimacy problem, the 2001 'White Paper on European Governance', although now 
more  than ten years old,  remains the most important source  (EU  Commission, 
2001a). It contains several proposals for improving the EU’s systems of 
decision-making and implementation. It aims to realise more effective policy-making 
by better involvement of the citizens and through more efficient decision-making and 
enforcement. 
With regard to democratic legitimacy (in the sense of input legitimacy), according 
to the White Paper there is no need for fundamental change. The White Paper sees 
the EU as legitimate because '[t]he union is built on the rule of law; it can draw on the 
Charter of Fundamental rights,  and it has a double democratic mandate through a 
Parliament representing EU citizens and a Council representing the elected 
governments of the Member States'  (EU Commission, 2001a, p. 7). Moreover,  the 
'Union uses the powers given by its citizens'  (EU Commission,  2001a,  p.  8). As 
discussed above this view is incomplete.  Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998) and Lord and 
Magnette (2004) offer a more comprehensive view on the bases of EU legitimacy. 
They identify four sources of EU legitimacy: parliamentary, indirect, technocratic and 
procedural legitimacy.
Parliamentary legitimacy is widely cited in the Commission’s White Paper.  The 
dual legitimation by the Council of Ministers and the directly elected EP is a way of 
achieving popular sovereignty in a political system that has both individual citizens 
with their political preferences, and several citizenries divided along lines of different 
cultural identities (Lord, 2001, p. 644). Such a polity can aggregate and deliberate 
preferences both nationally and transnationally.
The historically oldest and still most widely acknowledged source of legitimacy is 
indirect legitimacy. The EU mainly rests on powers delegated by the governments of 
the Member States (Eriksen, 2001, p. 6). EU legitimacy depends on the legitimacy of 
the EU Member States, on its respect for their sovereignty and on its ability to serve 
their interests (Lord & Magnette, 2004, p. 185). This foundation is often stressed by 
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scholars who operate  with  an intergovernmental approach to explain European 
integration.  It is supported by findings that suggest that treaty authorisations of EU 
power have been dominated by state actors and state preferences  (Milward, 
Brennan, & Romero, 2000; Moravcsik, 1991, 1998; Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis, 1999).
Technocratic legitimacy is generated by the ability of EU institutions to offer 
'pareto-improving' solutions  (Majone, 1993). The EU is technically able to improve 
the welfare of the overwhelming majority of citizens in terms of their own felt 
preferences.  The prerequisites for this source of legitimacy are 'first,  a normative 
belief that the superior ability of a system to meet citizens’  needs is grounds for 
political obligation to it; second, epistemological confidence in a rationality or science 
of government (positivism);  and,  third the identification of specific public needs that 
can be met only by independent European institutions'  (Lord & Magnette, 2004, p. 
186). In essence,  the concept of 'technocratic legitimacy'  refines the argument for 
output legitimacy in the context of the EU. 
Procedural legitimacy is based on the belief that certain procedures generate 
legitimacy such as transparency, balance of interests, proportionality, legal certainty, 
and consultation of stakeholders (Lord  & Magnette,  2004,  p.  186). For instance, 
Risse and Kleine coined the phrase of 'throughput legitimacy’, which is achieved by 
adhering to certain standards of legality,  transparency and the  quality of the 
decision-making process (2007). However,  this point is questionable,  first,  because 
general and specific procedural rules are necessary for all mentioned sources (e.g. 
the rule of law, modes of communication). Therefore, one can argue that they do not 
represent a source in their own right and are already implied by other sources of 
legitimacy.  Second,  even if they represent a source of their own (as Lord and 
Magnette argue),  it is highly questionable if the complicated and highly 
non-transparent mechanism,  and formal and informal standards of the EU 
decision-making process significantly affect the legitimacy belief of the citizenry.
How to tackle the democratic deficit
The early debate about the democratic deficit  used classic political systems and 
their democratic institutions as reference models for the EU.  The sources of 
inspiration both for identifying the lack of democratic legitimacy and in attempting to 
solve the problem were parliamentary and presidential political systems as discussed 
in the literature on comparative politics (e.g.  Lijphart,  1999). This strategy is also 
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intuitively highly plausible. Why should one not apply the same democratic principles 
to the EU that are applicable to its Member States? Why should the EU be allowed to 
not fulfil criteria that are mandatory if a state is applying for EU membership (Zürn, 
2004, pp. 181–182)? 
These strategies are seen by some of today’s scholars with more critical eyes 
(Abromeit,  2002; Moravcsik,  2002, p. 605). Nevertheless,  these early suggestions 
are helpful in showing why the EU goes well beyond the boundaries of a classic 
nation state.  Moreover,  they highlight the central problem of the legitimacy debate. 
Democratic legitimacy is closely connected to the traditional nation state and beyond 
the nation state democratic legitimacy is a widely unknown area with regard to 
theoretical concepts and practical experiences (Risse, 2004; Scharpf,  1999; Zürn, 
2000). At the same time, nation states in Europe face a similar set of problems in the 
area of legitimacy (prominent examples are Belgium and Spain). Again, in this sense, 
the case of the EU is not as unique as one might assume.
If we look at a typical state in Western Europe,  we could state in  a  slightly 
simplified way  that a democratic system is legitimate because the government is 
accountable to the citizens,  who in turn can participate in the political decision-
making process (Crum, 2005, pp. 453–455). This implies a congruence between the 
rulers and the ruled through mechanisms of representation (Norris, 1997, p. 275). 
However,  when we look at the EU,  we have to admit that these mechanisms are 
violated in the EU. Those who govern the EU are not elected by the EP, nor is the 
head of the Commission (as a potential counterpart of a Head of State in a member-
state like France) elected by the people of Europe (like in a presidential democracy) 
(Norris, 1997, p. 275). Because of this, these democratisation strategies assume that 
the principle of democracy requires the transformation of European institutions into a 
'normal' parliamentary system with two chambers. The European Council of Ministers 
would be transformed into a second chamber of territorial representation like the US 
Senate or the German Bundesrat, and the EP would become a first chamber with the 
right to elect the members of the Commission (Zweifel,  2002,  p.  814).  The 
Commission in this scenario would be a government fully responsible to the EP. The 
core difference in the presidential variant would be that the government (the 
Commission)  or the head of the government (the President of the Commission) 
would be directly elected by the citizens of the EU (Hix, 2002, p. 2). 
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However, there are major problems with the application of this kind of institutional 
design to the EU.  For instance,  any majority rule is a considerable threat to the 
interests of small Member States (Coultrap, 1999). In any case, the majority rule itself 
has no legitimacy per se and needs to be legitimised.  A society where the majority 
rule is used for democratic decision-making needs a political identity that enables the 
defeated minority to acknowledge the majority decision, not as foreign rule but as the 
product of collective self-determination (Scharpf, 1998). However, the political identity 
of European citizens is weak at the European level (Katz,  2001,  p.  54),  and 
substantial value differences and different political cultures among the societies of 
the Member  States are significant obstacles in developing an EU parliamentary 
system (Fuchs,  2003).  On the other hand,  structural preconditions on which 
parliamentary processes depend are lacking. Some scholars have argued that there 
is no such thing as a European party system (Steunenberg & Thomassen, 2002). If it 
does exist, as other authors argue (Hix & Høyland, 2011), it is at the very least highly 
underdeveloped. This makes it very unlikely that a party government could develop in 
the medium term. 
The mass media tends to focus on the nation state rather than the EU. 
Consequently,  there are less European-wide controversies or debates on political 
issues and policy choices in the European public sphere (compared to national public 
spheres) (Chryssochoou, 2002; Trenz & Eder, 2004). In conclusion, even if the legal 
and constitutional preconditions were  to  allow the EP a greater influence on 
European legislation,  this would not automatically lead to an increase of legitimacy 
(Anderson, 2002). The democratic infrastructure in Europe as a whole is, at least at 
this moment,  insufficient.  That does not mean that this  situation  cannot change. 
Meanwhile the social reality does not favour a fully fledged representative democracy 
in the EU.
Explaining the EU – what it does, why it does it, and its effects – is still a difficult 
challenge for political studies  scholars.  It is obvious that there are significant 
differences between a classic nation-state and the EU. As seen above, the EU has 
neither a government nor any parliamentary opposition.  It  also  has no effective 
means of domestic control over compliance with its laws. It largely has to rely on the 
internal sovereignty of the Member  States to implement and enforce its laws. 
Moreover, the EU as a political system has several characteristics that make internal 
sovereignty – i.e. the ability of the political system to exercise factual control within a 
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given territory (Krasner,  1999,  p.  4) –  very difficult,  if not impossible.  These 
characteristics are:
• The EU does not have sufficient legal institutions.  The responsibility for the 
application and control of compliance with EU law rests to a high degree with 
the legal systems of the Member States. There is no separate system of EU 
courts equivalent to the federal courts co-existing with state courts in federal 
states (Piris, 2000, p. 322). The only EU court is the European Court of Justice 
in Luxembourg,  which is a mixture of a constitutional and an  administrative 
court (Shapiro, 1992, p. 124).
• The EU does not have sufficient human resources.  In 1999,  the EU 
permanently employed approximately 28,000 people in total. This is quite a lot 
for an international organisation (in comparison,  the UN employs some 9000 
people) but it is not that much if compared to the Member States. EU Member 
States have on average 322 civil servants per 10,000 inhabitants; the EU has 
0.8 per 10,000 for all of the EU institutions. They are only enough to maintain 
a central administration (20,000  of the 28,000  total are employed by the 
Commission), with few agencies outside Brussels (Nugent, 2006, p. 108).
• The EU lacks sufficient financial resources.  The EU budget is only 1.11% of 
the GNP of the Member States and approximately 2.5%  of their total public 
expenditure, which is incomparable to budgets of EU Member States (Nugent, 
2006, p. 390).
• The EU does not have sufficient means of law enforcement typical of  a 
nation-state,  such as police forces,  customs authorities,  or trade supervisory 
boards (Nugent, 2006, pp. 128–129; Tokár, 2001, p. 6).
Based on these observations,  Scharpf suggests understanding the EU 'as a 
government of governments,  rather than a government of citizens (…), [which]  is 
extremely dependent on voluntary compliance' (2007, p. 9). Hence, it is not surprising 
that many of the traditional institutions of legitimacy are less efficient or even not 
applicable in the EU context.  However,  if we were to assume that the EU is only a 
large international organisation and we were to see the EU solely in its international 
context,  then we would  have to accept that there is either 'governance without 
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government' -  to quote the title of an influential volume of Czempiel and Rosenau 
(1992) - or there is no governance at all (Rhodes, 1996). Consequently, compliance 
with EU legislation would be  based on rational acting motivated by incentives and 
sanctions or on normative acting by the perceived normative potency of a decision or 
a rule.
The analytical problem is, however, that the EU fits into at least two categories. It 
is both an international organisation and a political system.  Academic literature 
therefore has often used the term 'sui generis' to stress the deviant case of the EU as 
an international intergovernmental organisation and a political system at the same 
time  (Laffan,  1998,  pp.  236–238) although  the  term  has  become  much  less 
fashionable as the EU is now more often compared to the USA and other federal 
states  using  the  analytical  tools  of  comparative  politics.  From a more general 
viewpoint the EU is both a polity, 'in which the content of policy is highly contested, 
as well as an experimental exercise in international cooperation in which the type and 
degree of cooperation is contest' (Peterson, 2001, p. 293).
As a reaction to this 'state in between',  scholars dealing with politics and policy-
making in  the EU adopted the concept of 'governance'  from Public Administration. 
Following Pierre,  governance as a way of governing refers to 'sustaining 
co-ordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes 
and objectives such as political actors and institutions,  corporate interests,  civil 
society, and transnational governments' (2000, p. 3). Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 
(1996) first used the term 'multi-level governance'  to characterise  the European 
Union system. This  term  implies cooperative rather than hierarchical relations 
between different governmental units attached to different territorial levels 
(subnational, national and European). 
The concept of governance has decentralised governing, yet the legitimacy of this 
mode of governing still rests on traditional institutions for legitimacy. It is no wonder 
that governance has been criticized for its delegitimising effects (Benz, 2001; Carter 
& Scott, 1998). Within the existing EU institutions, there is no democratic legitimacy 
counterpart for governance. So far, however, it has become clear that the search for 
legitimacy should not be 'trapped in a state-oriented mode of thinking' (Jachtenfuchs 
et al., 1998, p. 417).
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Concluding remarks
The EU as a polity in the making fits well with Lipset's observation that 'the crisis of 
legitimacy is a crisis of change' (Lipset, 1984, p. 89). It is essential to recognise that 
the quest for democratic legitimacy is closely connected to the finality of the 
European integration process.  If one sees the establishment of a federal system 
('United States of Europe') as the aim of integration, then one has to judge the EU by 
the nation state's criteria of democratic legitimacy and one therefore also has to deal 
with the debate about the democratic deficit. On the contrary, if one sees the finality 
of the EU in the completion of the common market, then one does not have to be too 
concerned about the democratic  deficit.  From this perspective,  the EU is a  quite 
democratic institution when compared to other international organisations like the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)  or the United Nations (UN). Moreover,  the main 
problem would not be that the EU has a democratic deficit but rather a 'competence 
surplus' because the competences of the EU have stretched into policy fields beyond 
the common market. From this perspective, if the EU did not engage in redistributive 
policies, the democratic legitimacy of the EU would not even be a topic for academic 
research, let alone a practical issue for the EU.
The more the EU stretches its competences into fields beyond the common 
market and the more EU policies arouse public controversies, the more it is in need 
of democratic legitimacy. The input of the EU's citizens has to be allowed to make a 
difference to the outcome of the process;  otherwise,  the legitimacy of the EU is 
eroded.  Here lies the crux of legitimacy deficit or competence surplus.  Traditional 
institutions of democratic legitimacy are less capable when we take into account the 
character of the EU as an international organisation and as a political system with a 
weak common identity.
What then are the central challenges for creating an institution that enhances 
democratic legitimacy for the EU? First,  democratic legitimacy cannot solely rely on 
output legitimation.  Government by the people has to be part  of  such an 
organisational set-up. Second, the EU demos lacks the strong political identity that is 
needed for input legitimacy based on representative democracy.  Therefore,  this 
institution has to be able to deliver input legitimacy without a 'thick'  political identity. 
Third,  governance in the EU is based on network co-ordination and coherence 
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among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives.  Legitimacy 
has to be achieved in such a non-hierarchical environment.
The EU has become a laboratory for governance and international cooperation. By 
stretching its competences more and more into the field of domestic and international 
politics, the EU needs to become a laboratory for legitimacy beyond the nation state 
as well. To a considerable degree, this has already happened. The next experiment  
in this laboratory has to deal with the question of how democratic legitimation could 
look  beyond  the  nation  state  in  a  governance  environment.  Can  democratic 
legitimacy be achieved in an environment that lacks a 'thick' political identity?
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Chapter 2: Participatory Governance
In the last decades,  governments in western democracies have increasingly 
deployed participatory procedures during policy formulation (sometimes subsumed 
under heading of 'collaborative public management').  Examples are the interactive 
governance projects in the Netherlands (Edelenbos,  2005;  Edelenbos,  Klok,  & 
Tatenhove,  2008),  the Planungszelle (‘planning cell’)  experiments in  Germany 
beginning in the mid-1970s (Dienel,  2002),  the US-American citizen participation 
programmes in rule-making (Coglianese,  2006) and their citizens'  juries,  likewise 
beginning in the 1970s (Crosby, Kelly, & Schaefer, 1986; Ward, Norval, Landman, & 
Pretty, 2003) or the Danish consensus conferences (Joss, 1998). Although still not a 
standard instrument, this form of involvement by citizens and other civil society actors 
has grown in importance.  Koppenjan and Klijn describe these participatory 
procedures as 'a way of decision making in which citizens, users, interest groups as 
well as public and private organizations that have a stake in a decision are involved 
in its preparation. It is aimed at creating support for policy proposals,  improving the 
quality of decisions by mobilizing external knowledge and expertise, and enhancing 
the democratic legitimacy of decision making' (2000, p. 368).
This broader and institutionalised involvement of citizens and civil society actors in 
policy-making can be seen as a response to at least two wider social developments. 
First,  within the last few decades the idea has gained ground that a cleavage has 
developed between citizens and their governments (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000, p. 370). 
This trend has manifested itself through an increase in voter apathy and their growing 
affiliation to non-governmental voluntary organizations and a decrease in their 
affiliation to political parties throughout western democracies (amongst  others 
Barber, 1984; Castells, 1996; Tsagarousianou, 1998). Generally and as mentioned in 
chapter  1,  the  democratic  systems  based on the  nation  state  suffer  from similar 
legitimacy problems as the EU. 
Second, modern society is dominated by various social networks in which complex 
interdependencies prevail among actors who before functioned more independently. 
Castells (1996) first used the term 'network society'  to characterise this state of 
relations between the state and society. Government has become one actor among 
others,  dependent on the resources of other economic and social actors.  These 
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developments have resulted in new ideas about policy-making in which hierarchical 
structures are replaced by more horizontal modes of cooperation between 
governmental and social actors (Kooiman, 1993).  In a complex society,  knowledge 
about social problems is widely scattered and therefore it seems ingenuous,  if not 
unrealistic, to claim that one single actor could adequately deal with all kinds of social 
problems (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2006, p. 119). Fischer goes so far as to regard this shift 
in the academic discourse from government to governance as 'one of the important 
theoretical developments in political science and sociology during the past decade' 
(2006, p. 19).
Unlike in the case of voting, there is no canonical approach in Political Studies to 
this form of political participation.  Unquestionably,  while traditions of direct 
involvement of citizens in policy-making (such as the US-American New England 
town meeting) exist in various countries, so far there is no widespread tradition and 
political narrative for the direct involvement of citizens in policy-making across 
western societies. Generally, the various forms of direct citizen participation are not 
per se an alternative to liberal, representative democracy. More often than not, they 
are not conceived as mutually exclusive with democratic forms based on 
representation. 
Against this background,  this second chapter looks at some of the effects on 
democratic legitimacy of public participation -  particularly mediated via the internet 
(i.e. e-participation).  It scrutinises under which circumstances it is plausible to claim 
that internet-mediated forms of public participation in policy formulation contribute to 
input legitimacy.  Although participatory governance in the form of online 
consultations cannot be the only  and  ultimate  answer to the EU's legitimacy 
problems, it is nonetheless viable to ask what its contribution could be in enhancing 
input legitimacy.
The first section of this chapter  reviews the concept of participatory governance 
and legitimacy.  Section two introduces deliberative democracy as the normative 
backdrop for participatory governance. Part three discusses deliberative democracy 
in relation to the case of e-participation.  The last part makes some concluding 
remarks on e-participation in the context of the EU Commission's online consultation 
regime.
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Enhancing legitimacy via participatory policy-making
As discussed in chapter 1, Scharpf introduced the very fruitful analytical distinction 
between two sources of democratic legitimacy:  input and output orientated 
legitimacy. Input legitimacy is based on the participatory quality of a decision-making 
process leading to laws and rules. Output legitimacy on the other hand refers to the 
capability to increase the welfare of the citizenry. 
When contrasting the rationale of participatory governance with the dichotomy of 
input versus output legitimacy,  participatory forms of policy-making aim to 
counterbalance the decline of traditional forms of input legitimacy by offering new 
channels of participation in the policy-process. Moreover, tapping societal knowledge 
and expertise also aims at increasing output legitimacy by improving the 
problem-solving quality of the outcomes (Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004). The concept of 
widening the information foundation for decision-making and thus assuming to 
increase the output legitimacy is somewhat less disputed than the legitimacy 
increase by widening the participation base. Hence, it is necessary to understand on 
which type of normative arguments this assumption rests. 
While in an ideal world both input and output legitimacy would mutually reinforce 
their respective  positive effects,  in reality most institutional arrangements tend to 
favour, intentionally or not,  one type of legitimacy over the other.  In the context of 
participatory policy-making this dichotomy is reflected in the concepts of 'participatory 
governance' and 'participatory democracy'.
In the context of this thesis,  'participatory democracy'  and 'participatory 
governance'  are  distinguished  as  concepts that nevertheless share a couple of 
features.  Participatory governance and participatory democracy have at least three 
central features in common.  First,  both concepts share the same crisis perception 
regarding the lack of democratic involvement in western societies. Second, they both 
take  a sceptical view regarding the performance of hierarchical decision-making in 
complex environments. Third, they accept that it is necessary to provide information 
to a wider public before the implementation stage. 
Nevertheless,  the two concepts also differ in  central points.  First,  they disagree 
with regards to who should participate in the process.  While some participation 
arenas  are unrestricted and open to all who wish to participate (and have the 
resources to participate),  others only address certain groups or particular 
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stakeholders.  Second,  they differ on the mode of communication.  While in some 
participatory  policy-making  arenas  participants mainly receive information from 
government representatives who may then explain their policies in a question and 
answer session,  others are actively deliberative where participants exchange 
arguments in a structured process.
Participatory governance is concerned with why and how civic participation in 
policy-making contributes to more capacities of governing bodies for effective 
problem solving. It amounts to an attempt to improve the problem solving capacities 
of an established institution 'by means of officially sponsored and managed 
participation' (Bevir, 2006, p. 452). From a legitimacy perspective, participation aims 
mainly to contribute to output legitimacy. Participation is conceptualised foremost as 
a function of governing.  Hence,  the right to participate stems from certain qualities 
that a participant has in relation to the policy problem, normally information and the 
ability to communicate it  (Schmitter, 2002, p. 62).  Well-communicated information, 
which is perceived as relevant to the policy in question is the central resource 
participants should deliver from a participatory governance perspective.  A second 
aspect comes into play at the implementation stage. By securing a consensus over a 
policy early in the policy cycle,  governing bodies hope that policies are more 
acceptable to the target audience.
The connection between participation and policy influence is controlled by the 
governing body. Thus,  it is not genuinely democratic as such an instrument could 
occur in any type of government.  Participatory governance is not governing 'by the 
people' as the participation process is an exclusive venture. On the one hand, only a 
very small  group of people potentially has something to contribute and therefore a 
right to participate.  Hence,  the  process is  purposefully elite driven.  On the other 
hand, this governance form provides safeguards against the 'possibility that citizens 
and associations act as catalysts for change,  overturning existing norms,  practices, 
and institutions instead of enhancing their legitimacy and effectiveness' (Bevir, 2006, 
p. 457).
In contrast,  participatory democracy does not derive from a policy problem but 
from participation in policy-making.  This can also be perceived as intrinsic 
participation as opposed to functional participation (Barnard, 2001, pp. 145–149). In 
this thesis 'participatory democracy'  is defined as having a)  an authentic interest in 
creating input legitimacy (as opposed to this being  a welcome by-product),  b)  the 
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right to participate derived  from  the status of being a citizen and c)  draws on 
arguments of deliberative democracy theory,  particularly the link between political 
decision-making and inclusive deliberations by referring to a common good.
Summing up participatory governance versus participatory democracy,  the 
following table contrasts the two concepts.
Participatory governance Participatory democracy
Function of governing democracy
Main resource information willingness to participate
Mode of communication consultation dialogue deliberative consultation 
Right of participation is 
granted by 
governing body civil rights
Participation can be 
initiated by
governing body only both by a governing body or a 
civil society actor
In case of a trade-off the 
more important source of 
legitimacy is 
output oriented input oriented
Agenda setting by the governing body the participants 
Table 3: Participatory governance versus participatory democracy 
Participatory governance and deliberative democracy
Participatory governance does not need normative backing on democratic 
grounds.  If it delivers policies more efficiently then there is no need for further 
normative grounding.  This leaves the question of whether participatory governance 
measures improve the quality of policies. Giving a straight answer is difficult because 
a) the empirical evidence does not point in the same direction and b) answering this 
question poses some serious method problems – mainly that one policy can only be 
implemented once,  so there can be no clear-cut comparison between the policy 
impact caused by a process with and a process without participatory governance 
measures. It seems that only two studies have comprehensively addressed the claim 
that public participation in policy-making is improving output effectiveness. Newig and 
Fritsch have done a comparative meta-analysis of 47 North American and European 
case studies on public participation in environmental decision-making (2009). They 
come to the ambiguous conclusion that 'on the one hand,  the “quality”  of decisions 
with respect to more environmentally sound outputs was rather lessened than 
improved through participation. On the other hand, participation did indeed foster the 
effective implementation of these decisions'  (Fritsch & Newig, 2007, p. 12). Beierle 
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using a similar research design comes to the conclusion that regarding quality of 
stakeholder-based  decisions  'we  should  be  rather  optimistic  about  the  quality  of 
stakeholder-based  decisions.  Across  a  diversity  of  cases,  most  of  the  evidence 
points toward quality decision making from stakeholder processes' (Beierle, 2002, p. 
747). Generally Fischer's observation that '[d]espite much of the rhetoric surrounding 
the discussion of participation,  experiences with new forms of participatory 
governance show participation to be neither straightforward nor easy' (2006, p. 21) is 
still valid.
Thus,  the effectiveness of public participation remains unclear.  This holds true 
even more for the case of participatory democracy that has to deal with more 
ambitious normative criteria as it needs grounding in some sort of democratic theory 
to achieve its legitimacy claims.  The democratic theory context of participation by 
citizens and civil society actors in policy-making leans towards deliberative 
democracy (Barabas,  2004;  Bohman,  2004;  Dahlberg,  2001;  Dahlgren,  2005; 
Froomkin, 2003; Witschge, 2002). In general, legitimacy in a deliberative democracy 
is based on popular and inclusive participation with an emphasis on public 
discussion,  reasoning,  and judgement (Froomkin, 2003, p. 799). Fearon suggests 
seeing deliberation as either 'a particular sort of discussion (...)  that involves the 
careful and serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition or [as] an 
interior process by which an individual weighs reasons for and against courses of 
action'  (Fearon, 1998, p. 63). Chambers describes it as a '[t]alk-centric democratic 
theory [that] replaces voting-centric democratic theory'  (2003, p. 308).  Rather than 
simple compromise,  bargaining or voting,  deliberation aims at creating a discourse 
among all  those affected by a  decision  with  a  view to  creating a common good 
(Bohman, 1998, p. 400). It is therefore a different form of decision-making from one 
that merely aggregates preferences by voting for a policy or for political personnel. It 
is also different from technocratic decision-making, in which aims are defined and the 
difficulty lies in the quest for the most efficient means to accomplish the aims. 
'Deliberative democracy,  broadly defined,  is thus any one of a family of views 
according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of 
legitimate political decision making (…)'  (Bohman, 1998, p. 401). Rosenberg sees 
two traditions of the theory of deliberative democracy. An Anglo-American tradition 
which leads to an 'ahistorical vision that focuses on a universal set of individual rights 
and an associated set of political institutional arrangements'  and  theories closer to 
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the work of Habermas which 'stress[es] the capacities and goals of individuals (...) 
and how political institutions can and should function' (Rosenberg, 2007, p. 337).
Habermas and other deliberative democracy theorists argue that the legitimacy 
potential of deliberation depends on the ‘institutionalisation of the forms of political 
communication necessary for rational political will-formation’  (Habermas,  1992,  p. 
445). This 'includes a careful examination of a problem or issue, the identification of 
possible solutions,  the establishment or reaffirmation of evaluative criteria,  and the 
use of these criteria in identifying an optimal solution. Within a specific policy debate 
or in the context of an election,  deliberation sometimes starts with a given set of 
solutions,  but it always involves problem analysis,  criteria specification,  and 
evaluation' (Gastil, 2000, p. 22). Ideally, participants are informed about an issue with 
all its complexities,  uncertainties and trade-offs.  Deliberators reason and argue 
together and question underlying concepts, frames, and values. They also reflect on 
their own preferences and the arguments of others as well as being encouraged to 
provide reasons for others (Benhabib, 1996, pp. 71–72). As they act together  in a 
social environment, participants in a deliberative process should  become aware of 
their common  membership in a broader group  and  discovering  similarities  and 
differences (Dryzek, 2000, p. 79).
On a  practical level,  this concept of democracy raises the question of the 
implementation of its normative standards.  Arguably,  it is easier to claim,  in broad 
terms, that the political process might benefit from deliberation and participation than 
to facilitate meaningful interactions between the ‘man in the street’ and professional 
policy-makers.  Moreover,  what can  deliberation really  achieve?  Deliberative 
approaches tend to provide something more akin to 'soft'  advice,  feedback or 
suggestions,  which may stimulate public discussion,  rather than 'hard'  definitive 
political outcomes (Hendriks, 2008, p. 7). This raises the issue of the nature of the 
link between participation and discussions on the one hand and policy or public 
action on the other hand.
Above all, in practice, deliberative decision-making is less deliberative in the sense 
that certain criteria of the normative literature are not met or only partially met (for a 
comprehensive  discussion see Ryfe,  2005). In this sense,  real life deliberation is 
incomplete (Fishkin,  1995,  p.  41).  As in many other cases,  the normative theory 
provides a set of regulating ideas for real world implementation, rather than a recipe 
for best practice.  Any democratic decision-making procedure (such as voting or 
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deliberation)  does not automatically lose its  legitimising effects if they differ from 
idealised criteria.  For example,  a UK general election arguably does  not lose its 
legitimising effects on the selection of political personnel if,  say,  10  votes in a 
constituency are wrongly counted. This might change if a considerable share of the 
vote goes missing.  Also,  the circumstances of the decision are relevant. A hundred 
votes might be crucial in a marginal constituency but irrelevant in a ‘safe’ 
constituency. It is reasonable to argue that the more the democratic practice differs 
from the normative standards of the decision-making procedure,  the more the 
legitimacy potential can be expected to decrease.  What remains unclear though is 
how far an individual or the citizenry as a whole will be willing to accept flaws and 
incompleteness before decision-making can no longer be regarded as legitimate. 
Again,  when it comes to voting,  there is a consensus about what free and fair 
elections are.  Nevertheless,  the specific characteristics of what a free and fair 
election is differ widely among established democratic systems.
While the general definition of deliberative democracy sets the tone,  a more 
applicable and robust set of criteria is needed to assess participation in policy-making 
on democratic grounds.  The existing literature offers a wide range of criteria that 
ought to be fulfilled in order to maximise the potential of deliberative decision-making. 
This thesis stresses  two dimensions,  inclusiveness and learning potential.  First, 
deliberative decision-making requires an openness or inclusiveness regarding the 
access of participants to the deliberation process and,  after entering the process,  it 
needs openness towards the exchange of information and the competition of ideas 
during the deliberation. Hence, deliberative decision-making has to facilitate a form of 
respect and sincerity among all participants (Cifuentes, 2002, p. 18).
Second,  participants need a development or learning  strategy in a deliberation 
process.  A development strategy as an evaluating and learning mechanism is 
needed to analyse conflicting interests with the objective of negotiating opposing 
perspectives.  This form of socialisation aims to generate cooperation.  This ideally 
leads to a consensual decision by balancing both conflicting interests and the 
aggregation of participants’  interests (Cifuentes,  2002,  p.  19). These are robust 
minimum requirements. Although they may not be sufficient on their own, they can be 
seen as necessary preconditions for achieving democratic legitimacy.
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E-participation and input legitimacy
The ever growing significance of the internet since the mid-1990s has bolstered 
the idea of facilitating political participation by enabling citizens to connect with one 
another and,  in particular,  their elected representatives and policy-makers. 
Facilitating political participation between government participants,  politicians and 
citizens is a common definition of political e-participation.
Internet based technology is often  regarded as a driving factor for a reform of 
institutional conditions in the political-administrative system (Bimber, 2003; Mälkiä, 
Anttiroiko, & Savolainen, 2003). Traditional e-government has the aim of decreasing 
administrative costs and improving efficiency using information and communication 
technologies.  Therefore,  it can be seen as a part of administrative reform linked to 
the New Public Management paradigm (Mälkiä et al., 2003, p. 57). E-governance, as 
a broader term, goes beyond putting existing administrative processes and services 
online (Margolis,  2007,  p.  12). As  discussed  so  far,  the  concept of governance, 
broadly defined, offers a less state centric view on governing while putting emphasis 
on the involvement of societal actors in the process of governing.  Again, 
e-participation as part of e-governance is not centred on the mere computerisation of 
existing procedures.  The focus lies on developing new mechanisms of participation 
with the use of ICTs, embedded in a less executive- centred culture of administration. 
The principal idea is to open-up the policy process and use technologies based on 
the internet as a mode of communication between citizens and parts of the 
administration. It is worth mentioning that neither e-participation nor governance (with 
or without ‘e-’)  is inherently democratic.  Nevertheless,  ICTs  bears potential to 
facilitate democratic legitimacy.
If look at the reality of e-particpation in Europe, the following table adapted from 
the 'DEMO-net booklet no 1: Introducing eParticipation' (Tambouris et al., 2007, pp. 
11–12) gives an overview of forms of political e-participation. They are not all directly 
concerned with policy-making, though.
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Participation channel Role of ICTs
Community building / 
Collaborative environments 
to support individuals coming together to form 
communities, to advance shared agendas
Consultation in official initiatives by public or private agencies to allow 
stakeholders to contribute their opinion
Deliberation to support virtual, small and large-group discussions, 
allowing reflection and consideration of issues
Information Provision to structure, represent and manage information in 
participation contexts
Electioneering to support politicians, political parties and lobbyists in the 
context of election campaigns
Campaigning in protest, lobbying, petitioning and other forms of 
collective action
Mediation to resolve disputes or conflicts in an online context
Spatial planning in urban planning and environmental assessment
Polling to measure public opinion and sentiment
Voting in the context of voting in election and referenda 
Discourse to support analysis and representation of discourse
Table 4: Forms of political e-participation
A study by Panopoulou,  Tambouris and Tarabanis  (2009) identified 255 
e-participation initiatives in Europe from 18 different countries. Europe consists of 50 
sovereign states at  the  time  of  writing,  so  roughly  one third of European states 
engage in e-participation ventures.  Out of these 18  countries,  only Iceland and 
Switzerland are not EU members.  Of those 255  e-participation initiatives,  around 
50%  originate from the UK and Germany (60  and 61  initiatives respectively) 
(Panopoulou et al., 2009, p. 8).  Around 50%  of the initiatives operate at local and 
national level (31% and 28% respectively),  compared to initiatives at the European 
(19%)  and regional level (17%).  The rest are classified by the authors as 
'international' and 'transnational' (Panopoulou et al., 2009, p. 5).
While the idea of strengthening democracy via e-participation has been widely 
discussed both on theoretical and,  to a lesser degree,  on empirical grounds,  the 
overall picture of the current state of research is mixed (Shulman, 2005, p. 112). 
Mahrer  and Krimmer remark that e-participation in the policy process is not 
commensurate with the rate at which the diffusion of the internet has increased 
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(2005, p. 30). In addition,  the long-term engagement of participants via the internet 
(as opposed to sporadic participation)  is questioned (Komito,  2005). Other 
publications are generally rather sceptical about citizens' participation in government 
processes (Coglianese,  2007;  Lips,  2007,  p.  33).  On the other hand, various 
empirical studies report successful or partly successful applications and regard them 
as a desirable improvement of ‘democracy’ (e.g. Chadwick, 2003; Chadwick & May, 
2003; Häyhtiö & Keskinen, 2005; Muhlberger & Weber, 2006; Reddick, 2005; Tonn, 
2004; Winkler & Kozeluh, 2005; Zwahr & Finger, 2004). While the empirical findings 
are at least mixed,  a majority of authors claim or expect positive effects for 
‘democracy’ by strengthening civic participation.
The mechanisms for how participation translates into ‘democracy’  are often 
opaque,  however.  Hence,  the following section aims to clarify the relationship 
between e-participation in policy formulation and the alleged legitimacy effects.  The 
translation of participation into democratic legitimacy takes place in the participation 
process. Central factors with regard to the input legitimacy potential of e-participation 
rest on normative arguments discussed in the literature on deliberative democracy. 
As suggested above,  inclusiveness of the process and a development strategy are 
procedural requirements in order to legitimatise the decision-making process with 
arguments based on deliberative democracy. This is the normative dimension of the 
e-participation process.
Moreover,  the legitimacy potential can be analysed on the level  of  citizens, 
emphasising the individual characteristics of the participants and their legitimacy 
belief.  A third layer of analysis looks at how institutional factors can improve the 
legitimacy potential of the participation arrangement.  Concerning e-participation in 
the policy process the public administration is the central institution.  Moreover,  the 
legitimacy potential of e-participation depends on the characteristics of the media 
technology employed,  which facilitates the participation by offering possibilities for 
interaction between citizens and professional policy-makers.  In this sense,  media 
technology is regarded as an institutional choice.
Although media technology as represented in the iconic ‘e-‘  appears to be  the 
cornerstone in this approach of creating input legitimacy, its significance is debatable 
(Coglianese, 2007; Kampen & Snijkers, 2003; Noam, 2005; Pratchett,  1999).  Like 
governance or participation, there is nothing inherently democratic about technology. 
Technology does not make deliberation cheaper or even easier (quite the opposite). 
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It is still costly to produce a coherent sentence and argument with regard to policy 
challenges.  What  technology  -  in  principle  -  is  able  to  deliver  is  to  lower  the  
transaction costs of participation.  Therefore,  neither of the components generates 
legitimacy – it is the quality of the overall process that matters. 
E-participation and the EU Commission –  an opportunity to gain 
legitimacy?
As discussed in chapter one,  the EU as a whole is a polity,  which lacks input 
legitimacy in particular. According to the standard narrative  of the EU’s democratic 
deficit, its core problems are a lack of policy contestation, which is responsive to the 
preferences of the EU citizenry, and insufficient contestation over political leadership 
and political personnel. 
Thus,  could e-participation in EU policy-making be a promising approach to 
address the input legitimacy deficit?  What makes it attractive – especially for the 
Commission – to seek input legitimacy via an e-participation arrangement? There are 
three main answers to these questions.  First,  there is no need for treaty reform as 
e-participation could be integrated in the existing consultation mechanisms.  This is 
certainly true for any trial phase. Moreover, this means that it can be embedded in an 
established and potentially accountable process that links participation and policy 
action.  Second,  e-participation  directly addresses a core problem of democratic 
legitimacy by potentially offering a forum for policy contestation.  Third,  as a 
necessary precondition participation needs individual features, namely the access to 
internet technology and the  motivation to participate in discussing  a specific policy 
proposal.  In contrast,  societal features, namely an EU demos with a strong political 
identity that is needed for input legitimacy based on representative democracy, is not 
a necessary precondition. Therefore, e-participation has the potential to deliver input 
legitimacy without a 'thick' political identity.
In the light of the EU, insights can be drawn from the previously established use of 
e-consultations in conjunction with the Interactive Policy-Making (IPM) initiative. The 
IPM originated from the Commission's White Paper on Governance of 2001.  This 
White Paper outlined under Action XX a new procedure for obtaining feedback – the 
IPM initiative.  It  states:  'Information and communication technologies have an 
important role'  (EU  Commission,  2001a,  p.  11).  As a result,  the White Paper 
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stipulated that the EU website was  set to evolve into an ‘inter-active platform for 
information,  feedback and debate,  linking parallel networks across the Union'  (EU 
Commission, 2001a, p.  11).  At  its core, any consultation starts  with  one or more 
consultation document. Issues are ranging far and wide from a specific policy item 
(e.g.  the  remuneration  of  EU regulated  financial  fond  mangers,  see  DG Internal 
Market, 2010) to the direction of whole policy areas (such as the consultation on the 
Action Plan on Animal Welfare which is core to the empirical analysis of this thesis) 
to issue dealing with the institutional design of the EU (e.g. the consultation on the 
European  Citizens’  Initiative  based  on  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  see  EU  Commission, 
2009a). We will have a closer look at the Commissions online consultation regime in 
the  next  chapter.  For  now,  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  any EU deliberative 
decision-making would probably –  although potentially affecting about 480  million 
people –  be a highly selective project.  For various reasons only very view societal 
actors are motivated to engage in EU politics. Therefore, it is likely that mainly people 
with a  professional interest will engage in such a process (Ågren, 2001).  We can 
expect this to be even more the case  with more technocratic policy questions.  In 
short, it is plausible that in practice, deliberative EU participation would be a selective 
rather than an inclusive enterprise.
To this end, it is highly questionable if technology can provide  the solution. It is 
truly challenging to envisage how user-friendly internet technology could overcome 
the substantial motivational difficulties, language barriers and knowledge gaps, which 
impede citizens’ e-participation in EU policy-making. To put it differently,  it is very 
costly to substantially contribute to EU policy-making, in most cases probably too 
costly for 'ordinary' citizens to participate. However, from time to time there may be 
highly controversial policy-proposals, where people may assume that it is worth the 
effort  to  participate.  This  assumption  is  backed  by  findings  on  the  US-American 
e-rulemaking. Coglianese cites a non-public US-government report, arguing that '83 
percent of the total comments came from just a single proceeding'  (2006, p. 956). 
However, 'highly salient rules tend to be rare. Rules that garner a high level of citizen 
input presumably also remain rare'  (Coglianese, 2006, p. 958). Therefore, a usually 
elite  driven deliberative  e-participation  that  is,  in  principle,  open to  anyone  bears 
legitimacy potential. In such a setting, as we have seen above, knowing that there is 
a possibility to influence EU policies by participating could have an impact on the 
citizens’  legitimacy beliefs.  This is regardless of the fact  that  the vast  majority of 
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people will probably choose not to participate in most cases, which are not salient  
enough.  Based  on  above  outlined  argument,  two  types  of  citizens  can  be 
distinguished: participants and non-participants. It seems plausible that participation 
may  have  an  impact  on  the  legitimacy  belief  of  the  participant.  Moreover,  
e-participation may also have an impact on the legitimacy belief of non-participants. 
The possibility of participation, especially if backed-up as a legal right, may influence 
the legitimacy belief of the non-participants (as in the case of the right to vote and 
actual voting). Even if a citizen refrains from participation but knows that he or she 
could participate and have an input into decision making, then this knowledge alone 
could have effect on the legitimacy belief of the non-participant. We will come back to  
this  argument  in  the  light  of  legally  binding  structures  and  the  nature  of  the 
Commission's online consultation procedures.
Concluding remarks
Chapter 2 has  discussed e-participation as a  form of policy contestation for the 
EU.  It aimed to answer the question if and why the Commission's online 
consultations are, in principle, a viable strategy to enhance the input legitimacy of the 
EU. There is clearly a reality gap between the expectations invested into participation 
in the policy-process via the internet and the  fact that for now,  predominately male 
and young individuals in the Western world mainly populate the cyberspace created 
by the internet (Michailidou, 2008b, p. 348). At the same time, the social reality of the 
internet is changing rapidly.  The speed with which this communication medium has 
become an integral part of the cultural  economic and social infrastructure is 
unprecedented. The theoretical promise of the internet as an accessible medium of 
communication remains unchallenged due to its  'ability to bypass communication 
obstacles, as well as geographical and time-related barriers' (Michailidou, 2008b, p. 
348).
Neither ICTs in general,  nor the internet in particular,  will change the nature of 
democracy – or at least  only as much as previous media technology did (Bimber, 
1994, 2003). It is just a piece of technology,  not the saviour of democracy or the 
harbinger of doom. In a historical perspective, democracy has been quite resilient to 
technological change by changing itself. ICTs will alter politics and policy-making just 
as any other media technology has done before. The degree of change is still unclear 
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and mainly rests on the eye of the beholder.  The internet offers new opportunities, 
challenges and risks for any kind of polity.
E-participation provides a possibility for gaining access to political processes 
beyond voting and the narrative of election campaigns. Yet in practical terms, there 
are major problems with this approach.  First,  there is no public narrative for online 
participation. For most people e-participation is a rather esoteric process. However to 
realise its legitimacy potential it should be as accessible as elections are in a liberal 
democracy today. Generally, it is fair to assume that 'citizens can participate but that 
participation has to be carefully organized and facilitated,  even cultivated and 
nurtured' (F. Fischer, 2006, p. 21).
The chapter has also identified the problem of inclusiveness versus costs. From a 
government perspective, one can expect that the more inclusive a consultation is (by 
bringing the mass public into the process), the less valuable the average single input 
of a participant will be. Hence it becomes costly to produce policies.  On the other 
hand,  from the participant’s side,  it is costly to participate so that inclusiveness is 
difficult to achieve.  Moreover,  whether there are long-term output performance 
effects through participation,  which may compensate for alleged short-term 
performance deficits because of less effective policy formulation, is unclear.
One major cost factor is that online consultations are text based. Inclusiveness is 
therefore difficult to realise vis-a-vis participants with less education and literacy 
skills,  or citizens who generally  find it rather difficult to deal with written materials 
(Fishkin, 2005, p. 8). This problem is likely to be exacerbated by the foreign language 
barrier for some EU citizens.  In a not too distant future,  and with changing internet 
technology computer,  mediated face-to-face deliberation may become feasible and 
more manageable.  This could make it easier for less literate people to participate. 
Whether such technology will  become  relevant for e-participation in policy-making, 
remains to be seen.  For now,  we are stuck with a text-based internet for policy 
consultations.
Arguably,  the Commission's online consultations do not represent a radical 
departure from elite forms of policy-making given that they are not driven by 
inclusiveness and the idea of deliberation.  However,  could they form a  nucleus for 
something 'bigger'?
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Chapter 3:  The Commission and  Societal  Actors  in 
Policy-Making
The last chapter introduced participation in the policy-making process as a 
strategy to enhance the input legitimacy of democratic systems. Particularly since the 
publication of the Commission's White Paper on EU governance in 2001, 
participation in policy-making has been widely debated as a means to tackle the EU's 
democratic legitimacy problems.  The main area where the EU invites outside 
participation is the Commission's consultation procedures. Hence, this chapter looks 
in more detail at the participation arrangements in these procedures.  It clarifies the 
alleged legitimacy effect of civil society participation as well as its particular 
shortcomings, rooted both in the structure of the Commission's consultation process 
and the nature of CSOs.  In the light of its various shortcomings,  the chapter then 
addresses EU e-participation via online consultations.
In matters of participatory governance,  the Commission prides itself of  'a long 
tradition of consulting interested outside parties when formulating its policies'  (EU 
Commission, 2002a, p. 3). In fact, the EU subsidizes interest representation by what 
it calls civil society organizations (van Deth, 2008, p. 244). According to Greenwood, 
'[t]he most striking features of the institutionalisation of organised civil society 
interests in the EU are: the role of EU political institutions in interest-group formation 
and maintenance,  including substantial funding of non-business groups;  the 
incorporation of selected groups in formal and informal political structures of EU 
political institutions; and the use of procedures to empower and enhance the role of 
groups.  Around 1,500 (some guesstimates go to 2,500)  groups constituted in law 
organized at EU level embrace virtually every imaginable spectrum of civil society' 
(Greenwood, 2007, p. 342). Financially,  the Commission 'spends around 1 per cent 
of the EU budget,  around €1  billion annually,  in funding interest-group activities. 
Virtually every one of an estimated constituency of 300  citizen interest groups 
organised at EU level receives EU funding (Greenwood, 2007, p. 343).
Kohler-Koch and Finke  (2007) suggest distinguishing three generations of 
relations between the EU (in particular the Commission)  and the  civil society.  The 
first 'consultation generation' lasted from the 1960s through  the 1970s, the second 
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'partnership' generation through the 1980s and early 1990s.  The third 'participation' 
generation has begun in the late 1990s.
According to this conceptualisation,  the first generation was  characterised by a 
'rather intense,  yet informal,  irregular and ad hoc dialogue addressing a 
comparatively selective circle of societal actors'  (Quittkat  & Finke,  2008,  p.  187), 
mainly trade unions, employers' and farmers' associations. In this generation, '[t]here 
was hardly any dispute concerning the benefits of cooperation, and procedures were 
mostly informal, allowing the Commission the largest possible degree of discretion in 
its exchange with societal actors'  (Quittkat  &  Finke,  2008,  p.  187).  The second 
generation was characterised by both the broadening and deepening of civil society 
involvement. The participation base was widened by including actors concerned with 
issues such as human and women’s rights as well as environmental and consumer 
protection.  Their participation became  more formalised via,  for example,  the 
establishment of stakeholder forums such as the Platform of European Social NGOs 
('the Social Platform')  or the Commission's ‘Civil Dialogue’  programme (Quittkat & 
Finke, 2008, p. 188). The current  generation is characterised by the drive for more 
openness and transparency and,  in particular,  an explicit 'participatory'  momentum 
aiming to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU via civil society involvement in 
EU policy-making (Quittkat & Finke, 2008, p. 189).
At the time of the White Paper in 2001,  the Commission saw the legal basis for 
Commission consultations in Protocol 7 relating to the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality which is annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty and states 
that 'the Commission should [...]  consult widely before proposing legislation and, 
wherever appropriate,  publish consultation documents'  (EU Commission, 2002a, p. 
4). More recently,  the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe  (2004), which 
was never ratified, made a direct reference to participatory democracy.  Article I-47 
('The principle of participatory democracy') was to become one of the core principles 
of the EU.  The article stated that 'institutions shall,  by appropriate means,  give 
citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly 
exchange their views in all areas of Union action'  and that they 'shall maintain an 
open,  transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil 
society'  (Article I-47,  1,2).  It was also to give EU citizens the power to ask the 
Commission for a policy initiative (Article I-47, 3). This was an article that  survived 
and  was later included in the 2009  Lisbon Treaty  (2007) (the so-called 'Citizen 
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Initiative').  Yet, the elaborate reference to participatory democracy was not included 
in the Lisbon Treaty.  As the constitutional basis for EU input legitimacy, only 
'representative democracy'  remained in Article 10,1 ('The functioning of the Union 
shall be founded on representative democracy').  The Lisbon Treaty nevertheless 
makes implicit references to participatory democracy in Article 10,2 ('Every citizen 
shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall 
be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen')  and in Article 11, 1 
('The institutions shall,  by appropriate means,  give citizens and representative 
associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views on all 
areas of Union action').  Trenz has commented on this decline in the importance of 
participatory democracy in the transition from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon 
Treaty 'that the road to Lisbon was also marked by a trade-off between 
representative and participatory democracy. Whereas the Convention in 2003 agreed 
on an equal footing between participation and representation as the founding 
principles of European democracy,  the Lisbon Treaty abandoned the explicit 
reference to participatory democracy (...).  With this it was made clear that 
participatory elements of democracy should be considered mainly as an auxiliary to 
EU-governance but not as an autonomous principle on which the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU could be founded' (Trenz, 2008, p. 54). 
One major step stone in the difficult journey from the Constitutional Treaty to the 
Lisbon Treaty was the Commission's 'Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate'. 
With regard to participatory democracy, the document claims to 'set out a long-term 
plan to reinvigorate European democracy and help the emergence of a European 
public sphere,  where citizens are given the information and the tools to actively 
participate in the decision making process and gain ownership of the European 
project'  (EU Commission, 2006a, pp. 2–3).  The document also explicitly refers to 
citizens’ participation via online consultation (EU Commission, 2006a, p. 8). 
Apart from within its  consultation regime, the Commission has supported three 
other forms of participation that can be summarised under the heading 'participatory 
democracy'. First, so-called 'citizen conferences', which are closely modelled on the 
Danish consensus conferences (Joss, 1998) and the German planning cell approach 
(Dienel, 2002). Between 10 to 30 non-expert citizens discuss a policy problem with 
experts,  aided by moderators.  The non-expert participants are given access to 
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relevant information before and during the conference,  which is organized over a 
period of six to eight months. 
Five such conferences have taken  place in the EU so far.  They have  dealt with 
new regional and urban sustainability approaches in Europe (in 2005, as part of the 
'Raising Citizens and Stakeholders’ Awareness and Use of New Regional and Urban 
Sustainability Approaches in Europe' project), brain science (also in 2005, organised 
by the Belgium King Baudouin Foundation),  the rural areas in future Europe (from 
2006  to 2007,  sponsored by a consortium of mainly public bodies including the 
Commission via DG Education and Culture)  and with the future of the EU more 
generally (in 2006, also organised by the King Baudouin Foundation) (Abels, 2009, p. 
8; Boussaguet & Dehousse, 2008). 
The second form of participation is the 'deliberative poll' (also 'deliberative opinion 
poll'), a concept developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s by James Fishkin. It is 
a combination of small group discussions with a relatively large number of 
participants (in the two EU cases, 327 and 348 respectively) and a random sampling 
of public opinion. It aims to combine the best of both worlds: the representativeness 
of opinion polls (participant selection aims to be representative) and the in-depth and 
informed deliberation of small group discussions (Fishkin, 2009). 
So far,  two deliberative polls have taken place.  The first,  in 2007, 'Tomorrow's 
Europe'  dealt with a variety of social,  economic,  and foreign policy issues  (Luskin, 
Fishkin, Boucher, & Monceau, 2008). It involved citizens from all Member States and 
facilitated deliberation in 22  different languages.  The second deliberative poll 
('Europolis') took place in the context of 2009 EP elections. It aimed to shed light on 
how the election results might have been different if 'informed voters'  had voted for 
the EP (Boucher, 2009; Olsen & Trenz, 2010).
As a third forum of participation, the Commission maintained the Futurum 'Future 
of Europe -  Debate'  website as a portal for information and discussion on the 
constitutional process.  The website allowed an internet forum-style discussion on 
aspects of Convention on the Future of Europe in a moderated forum. The idea was 
that the discussions taking place there would inform the process of drafting a 
European constitution (which in the end was nonetheless called 'treaty')  (Wodak & 
Wright, 2006; Wright, 2007).
Yet, these approaches pose one main problem which is exactly how deliberation 
and discussion are actually linked with policy impact and public action. How can it be 
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ensured that participation matters? With regard to the policy impact, one might claim 
there is not much difference between a well-documented pub discussion and a 
deliberative poll. Although the Futurum forum was aimed at informing the convention 
process, this did not happen simply because 'the online debate was not listened to, 
summarized or otherwise fed into the Convention process'  and  because 'the 
Commission and Parliament could not agree the structure and details of this process, 
as well as issues about whose responsibility it was'  (Wright,  2007,  p.  1172).  In 
contrast,  the main comparative advantage of the participation in the Commission's 
consultation process is that it is an established, mutually accepted and effective way 
for non-state actors to participate in the policy-making process (Kohler-Koch, 2009). 
At least rhetorically, the explicit link between consultation and policy impact is clearly 
announced in EU and Commission publications (EU Commission, 2002a).
The Commission's consultation regime: 'participatory democracy' 
or 'participatory governance'?
To analyse the Commission's approach to its consultations we can use the 
distinction between 'participatory democracy' and 'participatory governance'. The last 
chapter introduced these concepts as ideal types for analysing participatory 
policy-making. The Commission hopes that participation enhances the quality of the 
decisions while at the same time improving the legitimacy of the EU governance 
process.  Hence,  consultation processes as part of democratic governance 
incorporate both democratic issues (input legitimacy)  and governance performance 
issues (output legitimacy).  In this sense,  the Commission aims at achieving 
participatory governance benefits. In addition, the Commission - at least rhetorically - 
seeks to go one step further by introducing participatory democracy elements via its 
consultation procedures.
Alongside the legal texts of the treaties,  the Commission's White Paper on 
Governance remains the key document on participation at the EU level as it focuses 
in particular on civil society participation.  Its starting point is the Commission's 
perception of the EU institutions as having enjoyed a good performance record. This 
however is in stark contrast to the disenchantment of EU citizens with the EU. 
According to the Commission,  many EU citizens do not adequately value the 
achievements of the EU  (2001a,  p.  7).  Here the White Paper employs the 
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'information argument'  according to which citizens lack information and/or are 
affected by misinformation and, thus,  do not judge the EU adequately.  The White 
Paper then goes on to suggest more participatory governance in the EU political 
process as a remedy.  A  central feature of this governance process is  ‘a less 
top-down approach’  (2001a, p.  4) through participation of civil society in order to 
'connect Europe with its citizen'  (2001a,  p.  3),  which  is also ‘more inclusive and 
accountable’ (2001a, p. 8). 
While the Commission clearly embraces the idea that civil society positively 
contributes to democratic legitimacy in the EU,  it is less clear what concept of civil 
society the Commission uses.  Although not stating this explicitly,  the White Paper 
follows a modern, liberal pluralist tradition of civil society. According to this view, 'civil 
society has been conceived as a public realm of action in the triangle between the 
state,  the economy and the private sphere,  constituted by autonomously created 
associations and organisations through which civic interests are formed,  self-
government is learned and exercised'  (Liebert & Trenz, 2008, p. 12).  Crucially, civil 
society should have the power to limit the 'uncivil power' exercised by some forms of 
economic and political powers (Habermas, 1992).
Instead of explicitly qualifying the alleged functions of civil society, the White Paper 
tries to describe how a 'good' CSO should look like. Such an organisation should be 
'representative, accountable and capable of following open procedures in formulating 
and applying agreed rules'  (2001a,  p.  21) as well as being able to 'follow the 
principles of good governance which include accountability and openness' (2001a, p. 
15). Besides, the White Paper names organisations, which the Commission regards 
as part of civil society:  trade unions,  professional associations,  churches,  charities, 
grass-roots organisations and NGOs (2001a, p. 15), the latter a catch all phrase for 
all aforementioned  organisations.  This hints at a rather eclectic approach to civil 
society as a collective of non-governmental bodies.  The Commission dubs this an 
inclusive approach to civil society.  Hence,  conceptually,  the White Paper does not 
add anything new (Armstrong, 2002, p. 128). What it does make clear,  however,  is 
that organisations are at the centre of civil society and not individual citizens.
Yet, what the White Paper does not acknowledge is that CSOs are multifaceted 
entities. They are not by their very nature committed to 'good causes' (as perceived 
by the mainstream of society) in the sense of promoting various aspects of common 
welfare in a civic,  peaceful and maybe even cosmopolitan way.  In contrast -  as 
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Liebert and Trenz comment -  CSOs can of course support,  and be part of, 'violent, 
xenophobic or anti-Semitic networks'  or engage in 'varieties of outright particular or 
even anti-public interest'  activities (Liebert & Trenz, 2008, p. 4).'[T]he dark side of 
civil society (…) [which] confound[s] the conventional wisdom about the relationship 
between civil society and democracy'  (Armony,  2004,  p.  15) is well documented. 
Writing about  US-American civil society, Armory  notes that 'Members of the Aryan 
Brotherhood,  the Aryan Circle,  the Texas Syndicate,  the Crips,  the Bloods,  and the 
Confederate Knights of America —  all prison gangs in Texas —  attend meetings, 
elect officers, have a system of rules and sanctions, exercise internal accountability, 
make the bulk of their decisions democratically, distribute benefits according to merit, 
and write their own constitutions.  Members learn to trust each other and thus 
discover the benefits of cooperation and reciprocity.  They develop organizational 
skills by handling paperwork and taking responsibility for specific tasks.  They also 
learn to exercise their rights (...)' (2004, p. 20).
Based on the White Paper, it seems that the Commission wants as much freedom 
as possible to experiment with different forms of civil society participation in their 
consultation regime.  This is achieved by a severe lack of normative and critical 
conceptual grounding in the functions of civil society actors,  which –  in all their 
diversity - they can, may or should have (Liebert & Trenz, 2008, p. 8). In contrast, the 
White Paper regards the participation of CSOs as a harbinger of democratic 
governance and concludes,  therefore,  that their involvement in whatever form  can 
only result in enhancing input legitimacy.
The White Paper suggests five abstract principles (openness,  participation, 
accountability,  effectiveness and coherence)  which it regards as  essential for 
democratic governance  (2001a,  p.  10). These principles appear,  however,  to be 
mainly rhetorical devices. The actual principles of civil society participation areas are 
-  as it becomes clear in White Paper and the Commission guidelines on how to 
conduct consultations -  that first,  consultations are initiated by the Commission; 
second,  that they do not produce binding decisions;  third,  that  participating 
organisations need to be representative;  fourth,  that access to the consultation is 
granted by the Commission;  and finally, that  consultation outcomes are not legally 
binding. When contrasting these practical principles of 'participatory democracy' with 
the 'participatory governance'  concept,  it becomes clear that what the White Paper 
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effectively proposes is participatory governance,  characterised in essence by four 
main criteria.
First,  the consultation is managed and controlled by the Commission.  Crucially, 
the Commission both decides whether (or not) to initiate a consultation and who has 
access to it. This is  very much in line with the logic of the post Maastricht Treaty 
framework, which continued to grant the sole right to initiate EU legislation under the 
first pillar to the Commission (while other institutions may file a request to initiate a 
policy). According to the 'General principles and minimum standards for consultation 
of interested parties by the Commission' and concerning access to participation, the 
Commission needs to take all interested parties into account  (EU  Commission, 
2002a). Again,  although the White Paper often refers to citizens,  when it comes to 
consultations, the dominant terms are ‘interested parties’  and ‘stakeholders’  while 
leaving it to the Commission to decide which groups to include under such headings. 
Second, although the Commission considered whether the civil dialogue needed a 
treaty article as a legal foundation (Armstrong, 2002, p. 120), the Commission made 
it clear that it had no intention of making any consultation procedure legally binding. 
The consultation itself is not legally binding in two ways, first with regard to the need 
to initiate a consultation and second,  concerning the procedural norms of the 
consultation itself.  The Commission names four main reasons for that.  First,  the 
Commission fears over-bureaucratisation.  Legally binding structures could hamper 
'creativity and free expression'  (EU Commission, 1997, p. 8) as the Commission's 
report on 'Promoting the Role of Voluntary Organisations and Foundations in Europe'  
put  it. Second,  the Commission fears being over-burdened with procedural 
requirements which 'would be incompatible with the need for timely delivery of policy, 
and with the expectations of the citizens that the European Institutions should deliver 
on substance rather than concentrating on procedures'  (2002a, p.  10). Third,  the 
Commission fears that a 'proposal could be challenged in Court on the grounds of 
alleged lack of consultation of interested parties'  (2002a,  p.  10).  Fourth,  the 
Commission fears that institutional responsibility could become blurred between the 
Commission's 'own initiative prior to the adoption of a proposal, and the subsequent 
formalised and compulsory decision-making process according to the Treaties' 
(2002a,  p.  10). In contrast,  the Commission prefers 'a flexible but systematic 
approach'  (EU Commission, 1997,  p.  8) dubbed as non-legally binding 'extended 
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partnership arrangements'  (2001a,  p.  17) with CSOs in order to formalise 
relationships (Greenwood, 2007, p. 346). 
Third, although the White Paper argues several times that participation should be 
encouraged ‘throughout the policy chain’  (EU Commission, 2001a, p. 10), concrete 
proposals actually focus on the consultative,  pre-decision stage.  While the White 
Paper can be seen as an acknowledgement of the partiality of legitimacy based on 
the representative institutions in the EU, the White Paper aims to reconcile and even 
support representative institutions with civil society participation at EU level. Indeed, 
the Community method under the old first pillar is at the centre of the White Paper 
(i.e.  the Commission's monopoly of legislative  initiative with the general use of 
qualified majority voting in the Council combined with the decisive role of the EP in 
co-legislating with the Council).  It makes a crucial distinction between the actual 
decision - which is reserved for the elected bodies (the Council and the EP) - and the 
rest of the policy process (Magnette, 2003, p. 150). 
Moreover,  if we take the notion of 'participation throughout the policy chain' 
seriously and therefore include the implementation and post-implementation stages, 
the mechanism through which the participation of citizens and civil society takes 
place in the latter stages of the policy chain is even more elusive in the White Paper.
This leads us to the fourth criterion. The Commission states in various documents 
that the representativeness of the organisation is a central quality for any 
organisation to participate.  What does the Commission understand by 
representativeness? Based on the Economic and Social Committee eligibility criteria 
for its 'civil dialogue',  which  are cited in  the White Paper  (Economic  and  Social 
Committee, 1999; 2001a, p. 14), representativeness at European level means that 'a 
European organisation must:  exist permanently at Community level;  provide direct 
access to its members’ expertise (…); represent general concerns that tally with the 
interest of European society; comprise bodies that are recognised at Member State 
level as representatives of particular interests; have member organisations in most of 
the EU Member States;  provide for accountability to its members;  have authority to 
represent and act at European level;  be independent and mandatory,  not bound by 
instructions from outside bodies;  be transparent,  especially financially and in its 
decision-making structures' (Economic and Social Committee, 2001, p. 4). 
It seems to be intuitively right to distinguish between groups that  are directly 
involved with the implementation,  groups that are directly affected by a policy and 
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groups that  just have a more or less general interest in a policy.  However,  if 
participation is perceived as an  inclusive  participation  arena,  the quality of a 
contribution is measured within the participation and not by ex-ante criteria.  Of 
course, a participant can acquire a good reputation, for instance by feeding accurate 
information into the process.  But again,  this reputation is built up during the 
participation process. Participatory forms of democracy emphasise the quality of the 
process as opposed to the quantity of participation.  Another advantage -  from the 
Commission's perspective -  in privileging representative organisations is that they 
can provide opinion or input aggregation for the Commission.  Again,  this is 
something that the participation process itself should deliver and not something that 
is delivered in advance. 
Looking beyond the description of the White Paper,  representativeness can be 
seen as the possibility of creating legitimacy based on representation arguments: 
representation in its basic form may increase the legitimacy potential of an institution 
if those who represent are 'acting in the best interest of the public'  (Pollak  & 
Slominski,  2002,  p.  9).  Thus,  the criterion of representativeness of course has 
another function:  excluding the 'unwanted',  'uncivil'  CSOs from the participation 
process. 
Trenz also brings-up the question of who supervises the Commission in their 
decisions on representativeness. He comments that the 'self-description of the role of 
the Commission as the guardian of representation by European civil society has 
remained surprisingly unchallenged within the academic community and even within 
civil society at large'  (2009,  p.  37). The question of who decides on 
representativeness becomes even more difficult if we acknowledge the complexity of 
legitimacy claims based on representation. Lord and Pollak point out that those who 
represent can claim to do so by referring to selection procedures such as election, 
appointment or nomination, thus 'based on different grounds (territorial,  institutional, 
ethnic identity; expertise; common interests) with widely different mandates and tasks 
leading to different representative styles (e.g. trustee, delegate, politico and modes of 
responsiveness (policy,  service,  allocation,  symbolic responsiveness)  as well 
different forms of accountability (e.g. legal, political, economic)' (2010, p. 126).
Moreover,  representation is of course the central concept of representative 
democracy and as such,  it is the main source of legitimacy for the EP and the 
Council. This leads to an inconsistent argument. On the one hand, the Commission 
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does not want to interfere with the legitimacy potential of the EP and the Council. On 
the other hand, it tries to use concepts, which, structurally, do not fit. 
Summing up,  the Commission expects CSOs to 'tighten up their internal 
structures,  furnish guarantees of openness and representativity,  and prove their 
capacity to relay information or lead debates in the Member States' (EU Commission, 
2001a, p. 17) if they want to participate. The following table summarises this section 
in terms of participatory governance versus participatory democracy.
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Participatory 
Governance 
Participatory 
Democracy
Comment
Participation in the 
Commission's 
consultation regime 
is a function of 
governing democracy Rhetorically both, 
practically so far 
mainly a function of 
governing.
Main resource 
participants have to 
offer
information willingness to 
participate
Information- most 
documents see 
participants as service 
providers for 
policy-making.
The mode of 
communication is 
consultation 
dialogue
deliberative 
consultation
Consultation with 
some dialogue
The right of 
participation is 
granted by 
governing body civil rights Consultations are not 
legally binding, there 
is no right for 
consultation or 
participation in 
consultations
Participation channel 
can be initiated by
governing body only both by a governing 
body and a civil 
society actor
De-facto only by the 
Commission 
In case of a trade-off 
the more important 
source of legitimacy 
is 
output orientated input orientated Output orientated 
Policy agenda setting 
is done by the
governing body citizens The Commission's 
DGs have so far 
initiated all 
consultations
Table  5:  Participatory  governance  or  participatory  democracy  in  the  Commission's  
consultation
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The White Paper leaves the impression that it pays lip service to participation and 
democracy but does not offer new ways of connecting the EU with its citizens.  In 
addition, civil society seems like a pool of service providers for EU governance rather 
than a starting point to 'get citizens more actively involved in achieving the Union’s 
objectives and to offer them a structured channel for feedback, criticism and protest' 
(2001a, p. 15), as the White Paper itself suggests.
In the same vein Magnette, comes to the conclusion that 'in spite of these 
ambitious objectives, the concrete reforms suggested by the White Paper focus on a 
limited conception of participation:  It will probably remain the monopoly of already 
organised groups,  while ordinary citizens will not be encouraged to become more 
active' (2003, p. 146). Nevertheless, he sees it as a step towards a more democratic 
EU because 'actions undertaken by mobilised minorities can benefit the whole 
citizenry,  and strengthen both administrative and political accountability'  (Magnette, 
2003,  p.  146). Armstrong regards the White Paper's 'discourses of democracy, 
governance,  and civil society (…) [as a]  rather oversized constitutional cloaking for 
the thin frame of improving transnational consultation processes'  (Armstrong, 2002, 
p. 12).  Höreth concludes that the consultation practice,  as suggested by the White 
Paper,  is 'limited to those citizens and groups who benefit from enough intellectual 
and financial resources to influence EU politics and policies' (2001, p. 15).
Rhetorically, the issue of participation in the Commission's policy-making has 
become engrained in debates since the publication of the White Paper.  Yet, the 
answer to the question of how citizens are able to participate in a constant and direct 
open dialogue with EU officials and policy-makers remains unclear.  Citizen's 
participation is not mentioned for instance in the 2006  Communication 'A citizens’ 
agenda - Delivering results for Europe' (EU Commission, 2006b). The White Paper 
on a European Communication Policy of the same year, while stating that  '[c]tizens 
should have a right to express their views, be heard and have the opportunity for 
dialogue with the decision-makers'  (EU Commission, 2006c, p. 6) does not explain 
how  citizens  can  exert  this  right.  The  picture  is  similar  in  the  Commission's 
'Communicating Europe in Partnership' (2007a) communication or in the 'Information 
note from Vice President Wallström to the Commission Plan D - Wider and deeper 
Debate on Europe' (EU Commission, 2006d).
There is a rhetorical shift from a mainly information-orientated policy ('if citizens do 
understood the EU better they would judge it more fairly')  to a partly 
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participation-orientated policy.  So far,  however there is no clear and coherent 
strategy for ensuring that citizen’s participation has a coherent impact on the on the 
everyday  working  life  of the Commission's policy-making (Michailidou,  2008b,  p. 
252). Does participation rhetoric only change the way the Commission communicates 
itself or has it also changed the Commission's policy-making process?
Since the publication of the White Paper more  than  ten  years ago,  various 
research projects have studied the issues raised by it.  In particular,  research which 
has emerged out of the European CONNEX network ('connecting excellence on 
European governance',  dedicated to the analysis of 'efficient and democratic 
multilevel governance in Europe')  from 2004-2008  and the RECON network 
('reconstitution democracy'  in Europe)  from 2009-2011 evaluated the Commission's 
governance outline of the White Paper.  The recent literature could add some very 
useful insights to the functioning of the Commission's participatory governance 
regime.  It mainly confirmed earlier work and assumptions about the 'participatory 
turn'  in EU governance. We will concentrate here on three aspects: First,  regarding 
CSOs and their provision of useful expertise for the Commission; second, related to 
CSOs as democratic transmission belts;  third,  regarding citizens' perception of their 
duties as a good citizen. 
First,  the Commission welcomes participation predominately via CSOs.  This 
follows from the institutional outline of the participatory regime and therefore,  is 
hardly surprising.  It is interesting to note though that CSOs are often happy to 
participate and provide useful expertise for the Commission.  According to 
Kohler-Koch, the plurality of voices heard has increased (2008, p. 284). Quittkat and 
Finke (2008) conclude that CSOs profit most from the introduction of new 
participatory instruments. Without doubt, the Commission and its consultation regime 
do not only provide them with money but also with a sense of purpose.
Second, CSOs are not able to act as a transmission belt between citizens and the 
EU mainly due to the professionalisation of these organisations and a lack of interest 
in EU affairs on the part  of  their  members.  This confirms Warleigh's assessment 
made in 2001: 'I argue that NGOs are, currently at least, unable to act as catalysts for 
the Europeanization of civil society,  since their internal governance procedures are 
insufficiently democratic.  I found no evidence of significant political socialization by 
NGOs (...). [They]  usually make little or no effort to educate their supporters about 
the need for engagement with EU decision-makers (...).  Moreover –  and perhaps 
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more worryingly – I found no evidence that supporters are unhappy with this passive 
role, displaying at best little interest in the EU (….)' (2001, p. 623). These findings are 
also confirmed by Sudbery (2003) and Jordan and Maloney (2007, pp. 160–161). 
The problem with CSOs as channels of participation is also emphasised by 
Greenwood and Halpin's (2007) research on their membership policy. They point out 
that almost all European associations are organised as associations of national 
associations, which generally do not admit individual citizens as members. Moreover, 
this structural remoteness from the membership base of key EU civil society actors is 
actually encouraged by the Commission itself  (Greenwood & Halpin, 2007, p. 189). 
As mentioned above, the  status of being an EU association encompassing various 
national associations ensures compliance with a representativeness criterion, which 
the Commission regards as an essential feature for democratic governance.
Third,  citizens do not regard it as part of their duty of being a good citizen to 
participate in EU CSOs,  which in turn participate in the Commission's consultation 
regime.  This aspect is highlighted by van Deth (2008).  He looks at the perceptions 
that different actors have on what is a good citizen?  Instead of concentrating on 
institutional arrangements and their normative implications,  he analysed the 
normative qualities of a good citizen from the actor's perspective.
Van Deth concludes that citizens are unlikely to participate via CSOs because 
'[a]part from casting a vote,  ordinary citizens do not support the idea that a “good 
citizen”  is necessarily characterised by political and social engagement'  (2008, p. 
253). His findings are in line with the very influential book 'Stealth Democracy'  by 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002). Analysing  US-American participation,  they argue 
that the 'last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision making: 
They do not want to make political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide 
much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions;  and they would 
rather not know all the details of the decision-making process (…) and would much 
prefer to spend their time in non-political pursuits' (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, pp. 
1–2).
The following table compares European policy-makers and European citizens in 
respect of their image of a 'good citizen'  highlighting the discrepancy between the 
Commission's expectations and the reality according to van Deth's analysis of survey 
data (2008, pp. 244, 255). 
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European policy-makers European citizens
Degree of political 
participation
uses the opportunities of 
representative democracy, 
supports CSOs
mainly casts a vote in elections 
but is not involved in other 
political activities 
Perceived role of the civil 
society 
supports the role of CSOs in 
decision-making processes; 
direct involvement of citizens is 
superfluous
supports the role of civil society 
organisations in decision-making 
processes; direct involvement of 
citizens is not needed
Impact on the attitude towards 
the EU
develops (more) positive 
orientations towards the EU
is unlikely to develop (more) 
positive orientations towards the 
EU
Table 6: What is a good European citizen? 
The first (degree of political participation)  and second aspect (perceived role of 
civil society)  are not contested and reflect the current state of empirical research in 
the field. Yet, the third point can be disputed. This stems from the fact that van Deth 
does not go into detail on the reasons why citizens do not see it as their duty to 
participate in the political process beyond voting. 
Why participation at all?
The Commission aspires to attract participation either via CSOs and/or directly by 
citizens. The research of van Deth's and others suggests that citizens do not want to 
participate; that is, if the Commission wants participation it needs to offer incentives 
to encourage it.  In order to understand these possible incentives we need to 
understand the motivations for participation, which will be addressed in the following 
section.
Arguably, the most influential argument on the motivation for political participation 
originated from rational choice theory -  namely rational ignorance  (Aranson, 1989, 
pp. 104–106; Downs, 1957). It aims to explain why citizens do not vote and have a 
low level of information about political issues.  The rational ignorance argument 
suggests that people do not make informed political choices or participate in the 
political process because the benefits of participation do not outweigh the costs of 
participation.  For example,  if a citizen has one vote out of thousands then the 
chances are marginal that her or his single vote is relevant. Hence, why should she 
or he invest  resources to make an informed choice or even bother to vote at all? 
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However,  participation,  and even more so participation in the policy-process, 
depends heavily on citizens being informed and active. 
The book 'Stealth Democracy' (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) employs a refined 
rational ignorance argument for explaining (non-)participation. It draws its arguments 
from social psychology.  It suggests first,  that people try to avoid conflict situations 
and, that second, more participation increases the risk of conflict, which third, raises 
the costs of participation prohibitively without any increase in benefits. Hence, even if 
there were meaningful participation channels citizens would have little or no interest 
in using them and instead,  would  delegate political decision-making solely to 
competent elites (see also Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005).
Perceived from the rational choice informed perspective, political participation thus 
constitutes a theoretical puzzle. The bulk of literature deals with this in the context of 
elections.  Nevertheless,  as Schlozman,  Verba,  and Brady comment,  the 'logic 
applies to almost any kind of political activity -  protesting,  campaigning,  making 
electoral contributions, whatever' (1995, p. 3). The phenomenon of rational ignorance 
with regard to electoral turnout is also known as the 'paradox of voting' (not to be 
confused with Arrow's 'voting paradox'), a phrase originally coined by Downs (1957). 
Consequently, Aldrich has claimed that the 'paradox of voting' is 'the major example 
of the failure of rational choice theory' (Aldrich, 1993, p. 247).
From a theoretical perspective, three main strategies can be applied to solve the 
puzzle. First, by adding altruism to the conception of citizens' behaviour so that social 
welfare becomes part of the individual cost-benefit calculation (Jankowski,  2002, 
2007) or, as Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan have phrased it: 'If one cares about others, it 
can be rational to vote' (Edlin, Gelman, & Kaplan, 2007, p. 295). The second strategy 
is to conceptualise participation not solely as costs but partly as benefits,  too.  This 
means taking into account benefits available only to those who take part. This is the 
core argument of  Schlozman et al.  (1995). These benefits could be derived from 
performing their civic duty as a citizen or expressing their political preference. 
Schlozman et al. explain that '[j]oint activity can bring social rewards - the chance to 
interact with other people or to gain respect from others involved - or can be fun or 
exciting. Moreover, performing the act may be intrinsically gratifying: participants may 
derive a sense of satisfaction from promoting a cause in which they believe (…)' 
(1995, p. 5). 
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What also happens by rephrasing the argument in this way is that benefits become 
connected to the cost and disconnected from the outcome.  These benefits are 
sometimes termed expressive rather than instrumental, the benefit deriving from the 
performance of the act, not from the consequences of the act. In these cases, costs 
and benefits are hard to disentangle, for paying the cost itself becomes a benefit. In 
the same vein,  Blais - as part of his critique of rational choice approach -  identified 
benefits connected with participation itself and not simply from the outcome of 
participation-dominated decisions (2000).
If we look at the core argument of ‘Stealth Democracy’,  the causal relationship 
between apathy and participation channels is not clear – why should the practise of 
meaningful participation not change the perception of conflict? Why should it not lead 
to a re-evaluation of conflict and participation –  as a problem in  its own right and 
regarding its importance?  Why should the competence of dealing with conflict not 
increase -  in terms of avoiding conflict or minimising unwanted consequences  of 
conflict? Stealth Democracy’s empirical argument likewise has to deal with conflicting 
results.  While alienation is certainly a phenomenon often analysed in research in 
Political  Studies,  the opposite has been on the record,  too.  Fishkin, writing on 
deliberative polls, sums-up this alternative view as follows: 'Our experience is that 
voters welcome the opportunity and view it as something that transforms their 
connection to the political process and their sense of efficacy and likelihood of 
continuing political involvement.  Given the right institutional design this problem 
[rational ignorance]  can be overcome'  (2005, p.  20).  Therefore,  in contrast to the 
claims of van Deth  (2008) and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002),  the jury on the 
nature of political efficacy and the participation of citizens is still out.
So how do we get out of this in practical terms? First and foremost,  we have to 
realise that rational ignorance is not a moral failing with regard to norms of civic duty. 
It is not the lack of moral integrity or complex human nature that makes citizens 
employ the strategy of rational ignorance but a rather simple cost/benefit calculation 
–  at least if we accept the utilitarian foundation of the argument and do not simply 
abandon the economic arguments to turn solely to normativist-culturalist explanations 
that stress individuals’  feelings of normative obligation as sole causal factors. 
Second, rational ignorance is not specific to a particular kind of participation mode. In 
contrast, rational ignorance behaviour can be observed in many everyday situations 
too.  Thus, with regard to political participation it occurs independently of the 
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participation arena in question. Third, any political institution that aspires to increase 
participation from a wider public must offer incentives that counter rational ignorance. 
Fourth and finally,  in real life most elections have a greater voter turnout than the 
rational ignorance threshold.  Thus, although rational ignorance is a coherent 
argument highlighting an essential causal mechanism it has not stopped political 
mass-participation –  it is simply at odds with the empirically measurable and 
substantial turnout rates. In this sense, we gain useful insights if we ask why rational 
ignorance has not stopped democratic participation completely. Therefore, not only in 
theoretical terms but also in practical terms there must be a way out.
If we look at empirical voting studies and their theories that explain participation 
then two concepts enjoy a long tradition - one based on political psychology (treating 
voting as the consequence of an attachment or attitude towards a party and/or 
candidate) (Berglund, 2005) and the other based on political sociology (where socio-
economic factors determine the vote)  (Oskarson, 2005).  In addition,  recent election 
studies looked at the participation environment itself as a causal factor in voting. 
Thomassen (2005b) in his book on the European voter argued that it wasn't so much 
social change (such as the shift towards post-materialistic values) that led to different 
voting patterns but more the choices put before voters by the different parties in an 
election. Thomassen and his colleagues found that the degree of polarisation (i.e. the 
degree of policy divergence between parties)  across political parties in a given 
election will significantly influence whether citizens vote or not and the degree to 
which social cleavages become relevant in voting behaviour (Thomassen, 2005a, pp. 
6–9). This will in turn have an influence on the degree of attachment of citizens 
toward political parties and/or candidates.  The lesson here is that it is participation 
design and context, which matters.
This in itself is not a new finding. The early literature working with the concept of 
rational ignorance explained US-American voter apathy in the 1950s.  Yet,  apathy 
declined sharply in the 1960s as the political polarisation increased (on issues such 
as the Vietnam War or the US-American Civil Rights movement).  This again 
suggests that participation depends on the importance citizens assign to political 
choices (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004).
The EU is not very good at providing incentives to counter rational ignorance by 
offering an arena for political contestation. Hence, apathy of citizens towards the EU 
in particular is not a convincing argument against participation per se as long as we 
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do not know that apathy itself is not caused by the lack of meaningful participation 
channels . The question of what determines and what changes participation is at the 
heart of any input legitimacy reform. Clearly, there is not much room for change if we 
accept the conclusions of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's 'Stealth Democracy'  (2002), 
van Deth (2008).  At the same time,  there are coherent arguments that meaningful 
political participation beyond voting is possible. 
Although the participation regime is an on-going process,  the preliminary 
conclusion is  as follows.  The participatory regime has been geared towards output 
legitimacy and the participatory turn in EU governance has been successful in 
increasing output legitimacy.  The problem of the lack of input legitimacy has been 
largely untouched by the participatory turn, although this had been one of the central 
problems of the 2001 Commission's White Paper.  This is mainly due to a focus on 
CSOs as actors in participatory governance and their inability to act as democratic 
transmission belts. They are not stepping-stones to political participation. If CSOs do 
not offer a meaningful participation channel for citizens in the Commission's 
consultation regime,  they simply do not address the core challenge of democratic 
legitimacy in the EU. 
This said, the Commission has made initial moves towards a participatory regime 
that could provide genuine input legitimacy.  Thus,  the road forward from here is to 
concentrate on participatory instruments used by the Commission that focus on the 
individual citizens – if we accept that it is unlikely (and perhaps undesirable) that the 
Commission can force CSOs to democratise their internal structures.  Two aspects 
are worthy of special attention.  First,  whilst for the vast majority of citizens the vast 
majority of  EU policy issues are not salient enough to make  them  participate, 
participatory instruments may be able to deliver input legitimacy for those cases 
where the issue is salient enough.  Second,  the question of how the Commission's 
consultation regime as a participation channel may offer incentives that counter 
rational ignorance is and will remain crucial. 
E-participation within the Commission
Although the White Paper set out to achieve a closer union between the EU and 
its citizens,  it offered hardly any new mechanisms to connect directly with citizens 
apart from the IPM. If we look at the overall digital agenda of the EU since early the  
1990s, online consultations can be seen as part of the shift from merely advancing 
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an economic agenda towards the use of technology as a means of facilitating EU 
governance online.(EU Commission, 2001a, p. 11)
The  EU's  digital  agenda  up  until  around  2000  was  shaped  by  an  economic 
perspective.  Digital  technologies  were  seen  inter  alia  as  a  means  to  increase 
employment,  to  improve  the  EU's  global  competitiveness  and  to  restructure  the 
economy in particular by fostering the creation of new businesses ('start-ups'). The 
debate on the EU's digital agenda was led against the backdrop of higher economic  
growth in parts of Asia and higher rates of employment in the USA throughout the 
1990s  (Vonortas,  2000,  p.  103). A  key  term  in  EU  documents  in  the  1990s 
encompassing the EU's digital agenda is 'Information Society'. It came to prominence 
in the Commission's White Paper on 'Growth, competitiveness and employment: The 
challenges and courses for entering into the XXIst century' (1993a). The Bangemann 
report (1994), the Commission's subsequent Action Plan (1994) and the Green Paper 
on Innovation (1995) have the same thrust. Core elements are first, the liberalisation 
of the telecom markets and second, to  promote a Europe-wide ICT infrastructure. 
These supply side ideas and policies were complemented by more user oriented 
policy  ideas  from  1997  onwards (Vonortas,  2000), for  instance  in  the  influential 
working paper 'Building an Information Society for us all' by DG Employment (1997) 
and then prominently in the first eEurope communiqué 'An Information Society for all' 
(1999).  These  reports  put  issues  such  as  cheap  internet  access  and  bolstering 
e-commerce on the agenda. Reflecting on the EU's digital agenda in 1990s Anttiroiko 
notes that 'EU information technology policies in the 1980s and early 1990s were 
written by industrial leaders' (2001, p. 33).Moreover he comments that 'the EU refers 
to "access" as critical mass, "participation" to consumption processes, "dialogue" to 
opportunity to make inquiries via Internet, and "transparency" to official documents 
available  in  e-format  on the Internet.  This  suggests  how eEurope and the entire 
Union deal with democracy.  The techno-economic message is usually surprisingly 
explicit,  though  sometimes  it  is  bundled  with  expressions  suggestive  of  genuine 
democracy and participation' (Anttiroiko, 2001, p. 34).
E-participation  in  policy-making  as  form online  governance  in  the  EU can  be 
traced  back  to  the  concept  of  e-government. E-government has been on the 
Commission's agenda prominently since the Bangeman report (1994).  This report 
entitled 'Recommendations to the European Council on Europe and the Global 
Information Society' was the first major EU level publication that fully acknowledged 
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the social and economic changes caused by new ICTs. It focused on the economic 
gains of the internet and called for more investment in infrastructure.  Political 
participation was not mentioned in the document, however. In fact, although the term 
citizen was used,  it often appeared synonymous  with 'consumers'  or 'users'. 
Regarding governing, the report saw technology mainly as a means to create '[m]ore 
efficient, transparent and responsive public services' (Bangemann, 1994, p. 5). It took 
another six years until the term e-democracy was mentioned in the document 
eEurope 2000 (EU Commission, 1999) in the context of the Lisbon strategy (Juhász, 
2007).  The document acknowledged the role that ICTs could play in citizens' 
participation. 
If look at the online governance aspect of the EU's digital agenda, we can divide 
the years from 2000 to 2010, in which the internet gained much more momentum, 
into two periods concerning the Commission’s vision of the role of the internet.  The 
first of these periods was from 2000 to 2004 (‘information provision’) and the second 
from 2005 to 2010 (‘two-way communication’). This distinction is based on work done 
by Michailidou (2008a), although she actually suggests dividing the decade into three 
periods. 
The first period is characterised by the 'information argument'  (citizens lack 
information and/or are affected by misinformation, so that they do not judge the EU in 
adequate terms).  Hence,  the Commission emphasised the need for more 
transparency and openness with regard to the EU decision-making process in 
conjunction with an increased amount of information on the actual policies in the 
making. Hence, the internet was used as a tool for information provision (Michailidou, 
2008b, p. 349).
The second period is characterised by emphasis  on  'two-way communication 
between citizens and the EU,  as opposed to the previously proposed top-down 
information flow' (Michailidou, 2008b, p. 350). The key document that emerged in this 
period is the Plan-D for democracy (EU Commission, 2006a). It especially embraced 
the idea of internet based participation,  arguing  that '[t]he internet is of prime 
importance for stimulating the debate'  (EU Commission, 2006a, p. 5) and that '[i]n 
recent years,  the Commission has improved the way it consults on major policy 
initiatives. The number of (...) internet consultations have risen sharply. As part of the 
listening process,  the Commission intends to use and improve existing tools for 
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collecting feedback directly from citizens,  consumers and business (…)'  (EU 
Commission, 2006a, pp. 8–9).
Plan-D boldly states that 'the Internet has become an important forum of the 
political debate.  If the Commission intends to play an active role in moderating the 
debate on the Future of Europe it should explore the use of every interactive 
communication medium that can facilitate this debate. The Commission will therefore 
use state-of-art Internet technology to actively debate and advocate its policies in 
cyberspace (…)'  (EU Commission, 2006a, p. 10).  Yet, it is fair to say that after the 
publication of Plan-D,  the IPM did not become a 'state-of-art Internet technology’, 
which facilitates e-participation.
In  this  context,  the  IPM can be framed as  an initiative  by the  Commission  to 
advance its digital agenda in terms of proliferating online governance at EU level.  
The IPM has its origins in DG Market and the first document that made IPM more 
widely known within the Commission was a draft progress report (DG Market, 2000) 
in  connection  with  the  development  of  the  White  Paper  on  Governance.  This 
document was sent for internal consultation in December 2000. It explains that the 
IPM aims to 'exploit fully the opportunities offered by the Internet, to obtain better  
access to the opinions and experiences of economic operators and EU citizens, and 
thereby enhance the Commission’s ability to assess the impact of its policies (or the 
absence of them) on the ground (…)'  (DG Market, 2000, p. 2). The IPM was first 
publicly  announced  in  April  2001  in  a  press  release  ('Interactive  Policy  Making: 
Commission seeks to use Internet in EU’s policy-making process') (EU Commission, 
2001b). Since November 2001 the IPM is operational and has been continuously 
developed further. As of summer 2012, the latest version of the IPM software is V3.1 
published  in  March  2012  (DG  Digit,  2012a). The  IPM  is  financed  by  the 
Commission's 'Interoperability Solutions for European Public Administrations', which 
since 2009 is the successor of the 'Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment 
Services  to  public  Administrations,  Business  and  Citizens'  programme  (EP  and 
Council,  2009). As  such,  the  IPM  is  part  of  the  EU's  long  term  aim  to  make 
e-government ICT systems interoperable within the EU and is an investment in IT 
infrastructure.
At its core the IPM is a tool developed to manage and facilitate online surveys and 
questionnaires (DG Digit, 2012b). Originally devolved by DG Market, the IPM is now 
run by DG Digit. Participants of online consultations who use the IPM do not need to  
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install specific software. A computer with any modern internet browser in conjunction 
with an internet connection is all the technology that is needed to participate. Coming 
from the perspective of someone who wants to create an online consultation, it is  
important to point out that in principle anyone can use the IPM software to generate 
online questionnaires as it is open source software under the European Union Public 
Licence (DG Digit, 2012b). The open source aspect is relevant in so far as it makes 
the IPM a genuine infrastructure project for the whole of the EU.
From the administrative side, the main advantage of the IPM is that it 'will produce 
information  that  is  much  easier  to  process  than  an  unstructured  and  general 
consultation (e.g.  asking stakeholders to comment on a White Paper).  A growing 
number of services are finding it helpful to use the Interactive Policy Making (IPM) 
tool  developed  by  DG  MARKT  to  run  their  structured  questionnaires'  (EU 
Commission, 2005a,  p.  10). DG Digit  produces detailed manuals aimed at  policy 
officers intending to create an online consultation with the IPM software (for the latest 
version  see  DG Digit,  2012c). The  main  weakness  of  the  IPM according  to  the 
Commission  is  the  difficulty  'to  reach  all  possible  target  audience  [sic]'  and  that 
'dissemination activities [need] to be reinforced' (Fassian, 2012).
The IPM is  mentioned in a few key policy document in the years  following its 
launch predominantly in follow-up documents on the White Paper on Governance 
such  as  in  the  communiqué  'Towards  a  reinforced  culture  of  consultation  and 
dialogue. Proposal for general principles and minimum standards for consultation of 
interested parties by the Commission'  (EU Commission, 2002a, p. 7) or the inaptly 
named 'Progress Review of Reform' report  (EU Commission, 2003b, pp. 21, 44). In 
the last five years it has not mentioned in any key document. Overall, the IPM itself  
(as opposed to online consultations) is rarely mentioned in official documents.
Two technologies are at the heart of the online consultation regime. Consultations 
can be reached via the Commission's internet site 'Your Voice in Europe'.  It 
originates from the Commission's Interactive Policy Making initiative. The IPM is not 
only a Commission initiative but also a piece of technology for managing online 
consultations.  The main access point is the  website 'Your Voice in Europe' and it 
consists of hyperlinks to the consultation websites of individual DGs. Three kinds of 
links can be found:  first to the generic DG consultation website,  second to specific 
open public consultations and, third, links to specific closed consultations. However, 
not all public online consultations are listed on 'Your Voice in Europe'.  The website 
85
presents only a selection of consultations. The majority of online consultations can be 
found on the individual DG's website. Only 13% of online consultations are published 
on the 'Your Voice in Europe' website (Quittkat & Finke, 2008, p. 206). Interestingly, 
a small minority of consultations can be found on the 'Your Voice in Europe' website 
only.  The rationale for why some consultations are promoted via the 'Your Voice in 
Europe' website is unclear. The Commission does not offer any criteria for selection. 
The same applies to  consultations that cannot be found via a DG site.  Here the 
online access point clearly does not stand up to the claim that '[t]he European citizen 
is entitled to expect efficient,  open and service-minded public institutions’  (EU 
Commission, 2005b, p. 9). 
The outline of the web page was unchanged  from 2001  until September 2009 
when the web-master team of DG Market altered the website. This development was 
at least partly triggered by an  exchange of information between the author of this 
thesis and DG Market about the phenomenon of the 'disappearing consultations'. 
The context of these developments and the website are discussed in more detail in 
chapter 6.
Most DGs use the instrument of online consultations.  Heavy users are DG 
Enterprise and Industry (15% of all online consultations), DG Internal Market (13%), 
DG Health and Consumer Protection (10%) and DG Environment (9%). In contrast, 
DGs concerned with the internal workings of the Commission (DG Budget,  DG 
Economic and Financial Affairs) and diplomacy related DGs - External Relations and 
Enlargement - tend not to employ online consultations. Also, not surprisingly, the use 
of online consultations has increased over the years (although not in linear form) in 
all DGs. These figures are based on the authors own calculations and Quittkat and 
Finke (2008, pp. 206–7) for the period 2000-6.
The vast majority (between two thirds and three quarters) of online consultations 
are in  principle  open also to  individual citizens.  Although stakeholders are often 
mentioned,  they are not defined,  so that in principle anybody who wishes to 
participate can do so. In contrast, some consultations are restricted to organisations 
or specific groups. Nevertheless online consultations are clearly the most important 
mechanism for opening policy formulation to a wider public. Although there are some 
cases with several thousand contributions such as the consultation on the 
Authorisation of Chemicals (Persson, 2007) the usual participation rate is around 
several hundred contributions for a single online consultation.
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Nevertheless, the most striking feature of online consultations is that they offer the 
possibility for both the Commission and citizens to directly interact without physically 
being in Brussels.  Hence,  it could be an instrument truly geared towards governing 
the EU by the people and not simply an exercise designed to raise the output 
legitimacy of the EU.  One of the main advantages from the Commission's 
perspective is its flexibility towards different participation patterns.  What we know 
from citizen behaviour based on rational ignorance research is that most citizens 
have much too busy lives and can only seldom  afford participation under specific 
circumstances. This is similar to a representative democracy setting where casting a 
vote is a rather exceptional event in a citizen's life.  Therefore,  participation from 
ordinary citizens will probably be an exception rather than the norm.  Hence,  any 
participatory instrument must be as much concerned with participation as with 
non-participation. 
From the technology side, online consultations can adapt comparatively easily to 
varying numbers of participants.  Online consultations have a twofold advantage.  In 
the case of direct citizen participation, the legitimacy effect does not depend on the 
internal structures of CSOs.  Democracy is not mediated through CSOs. 
Nevertheless, they can contribute to the political socialisation of citizens by providing 
information or normative orientation.  If citizens do not participate,  the Commission 
still has a pool of CSOs that can offer policy input. In other words,  in the standard 
case of the non-participation of citizens,  the Commission's policy producing 
machinery does not grind to a halt. Moreover, online consultations offer the possibility 
of various intermediate actors participating.  If we conceptualise a civil society actor 
continuum with,  on one side,  an individual  citizen and,  on the other,  a professional 
well-funded,  long running organisation,  various in-between  forms can be imagined. 
These could be families,  users of a website,  participants of a forum,  newspaper 
threads or other ad hoc groupings found on the internet and elsewhere. Thus, online 
consultations do not need pre-defined actors. 
Nevertheless, the IPM has major drawbacks. Apart from problems associated with 
the Commission and with participatory approaches such as the lack of a right to 
participate, a lack of legally binding structures and a lack of deliberation due to a lack 
of appropriate feedback channels, the IPM has two specific problems. One of the two 
problems is the specificity of policies discussed in the IPM.  While the Commission 
could embrace various issues,  it predominantly  develops  rather technical 
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consultations. The problem is not that there are so many technical consultations but 
the sheer lack of politicised consultations. This suggests that the Commission fears 
the debate it started with the White Paper. DG Research's 'Participatory science and 
scientific  participation'  reports comments that '[a]sking for participation at the 
regulatory stage,  when the large majority of issues and topics have been already 
framed and settled,  does not encourage participation(...)'  (2008,  p.  9). Yet, the 
Commission's consultation process is streamlined towards a policy consensus by all 
involved actors.  This consensus-seeking mode within the EU,  and especially in  the 
European Commission, is sarcastically summarised by an interviewee from a major 
lobbying firm: 'Here in Brussels [as opposed to Washington]  we are all part of the 
solution and nobody is part of the problem'  (O, 2).  The process  aims at creating 
consensus without allowing (too  much)  conflict.  Therefore,  how trustworthy is a 
consensus, which has come about by avoiding conflict and contestation? 
Avoiding conflict and politicisation is  not an issue only depending on institutional 
design as Magnette notes: 'Politicising the Union, and creating a clear deliberation of 
European issues, which could generate public interest, is not so much a question of 
institutions as a problem of political attitudes.  As long as the Commission,  which 
initiates policies,  considers itself to be a body designed to bypass political conflicts 
and forge compromise before public deliberation takes place, the politicisation of the 
EU will remain very difficult' (Magnette, 2003, p. 157).
Concluding remarks 
It would not be fair to claim that the Commission is doing nothing to increase 
participation  at  EU level.  Spending one percent of the EU's budget on CSOs is 
clearly more than paying lip service to the cause of participatory governance. In this 
regard, the Commission's talk is not cheap. However, as this chapter has argued, it is 
not necessarily money well spent for the cause of democratic legitimacy as there 'is a 
wealth of evidence about the limited capacity of EU citizen interest groups to bridge 
the gap between themselves and citizens in the Member States' (Greenwood, 2007, 
p. 347) Without doubt,  integrating civil society organizations in EU decision-making 
processes has been, and will probably continue to be, much more effective (from the 
perspective of the Commission)  than any efforts aimed at  including citizens in the 
policy-making process regardless of the looming problems of 'patronage,  “closed 
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shops”, and corruption' (van Deth, 2008, p. 253). Clearly, they will not lose their role 
in the policy-making process in the years to come. 
Regarding the patterns of participation, it must be clear that it is not participation 
that is the key to input legitimacy but 'good' participation. In other words, participation 
does not improve input legitimacy per se.  If we take participation as the causal 
variable,  we will probably not make  (analytical)  progress  if we claim 'the more 
participation,  the more input legitimacy'.  We should rather argue that 'more 
meaningful participation can create more input legitimacy'  while,  conversely,  the 
'more meaningless participation,  the more decrease in input legitimacy'.  It could be 
the case that the fixation with  'the more participation the better'  has its origins in 
election studies where a high degree of voter turnout is per  se  regarded as a 
desirable quality of an election.  The problem with voting is that the quality of 
participation is almost irrelevant in the act of participation. Whether a voter casts an 
informed or uninformed vote does not change the importance of the vote once he or 
she has cast it. In contrast, participatory forms of democracy emphasise the quality of 
the process as opposed to the quantity of participation. Hence, the main challenge is 
not the rate of participation but rather on what grounds participation is established 
(DG Research, 2008, p. 9). 
There is also empirical evidence that participation can decrease political 
legitimacy.  For instance,  Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005)  have looked at the 
US-American empirical civic participation literature and its claim that this form of 
participation, which is not motivated by the desire to affect public policy (as opposed 
to political participation), has a considerable democratisation potential. They come to 
the conclusion that 'civic participation in some circumstances actually turns people off 
of politics,  leaving them less,  not more,  politically engaged'  (2005, 228).  Van der 
Meer and van Ingen (2009) come to similar conclusions with regard to Europe. The 
crucial  aspect  in Theiss-Morse and Hibbing's conclusion is the words 'in some 
circumstances'. Meaningful participation depends on the participation arena. It is not 
simply a case of 'if we build, they will come' and participate meaningful. 
One aspect of 'good'  participation is the question of the availability of relevant 
information. Yet the question of what citizens should do with more information is not 
as straight forward as the Commission thinks it is. While the Commission hopes that 
more information on the EU leads to a better understanding of the EU, which in turn 
leads to an increased legitimacy belief,  this may not be the motivation for most 
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citizens to seek information.  Such  information  may improve their ability to 
contemplate issues linked to  the EU or their chances of winning a  pub quiz.  If the 
Commission aims to 'create a citizens'  ownership of EU policies,  to make them 
understandable and relevant' (EU Commission, 2006a, p. 3), then information has to 
become instrumental from the citizens' perceptive, too. One way of achieving this is 
to make it relevant for participation in the policy process. Information then is the first 
step to meaningful participation.
This link is not established in the Commission's documents,  however.  In the 
Commission's publications, 'participation', 'information' and 'coming closer to citizens' 
are strangely unconnected,  even more so in their practical application.  What 
Michailidou only alludes to casually,  namely that 'the exact ways in which the 
feedback from civil society organizations and citizens will impact on the modus 
operandi of the Union'  (2008b, p.  252) remain unspecified,  is at the heart of the 
methodological and empirical part of this thesis.
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Chapter 4: Framework of Analysis and Case Study Design
Chapter 1 analysed the main characteristics of the input legitimacy problem of the 
EU.  The  second  chapter  proposed  public  e-participation  in  policy-making  as  a 
potential way of addressing this legitimacy issue. The third chapter then discussed 
e-participation in the specific context of the EU and, in particular, the  Commission. 
While chapter 1 set out the problem of the lack of EU input legitimacy, chapters 2 and 
3  discussed  a  potential  remedy  for  the  EU’s  input  legitimacy  deficit.  This  fourth 
chapter  now  outlines  a  framework  for  answering  the  question  of  whether 
e-participation in EU policy-making is actually a viable option for reducing the input 
legitimacy deficit.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first part outlines the key aspects that the 
framework of analysis has to address. The second part then outlines the research 
hypotheses of  the comparative case study.  The third part  describes the research 
methods and their use in the comparative analysis of the two cases. It discusses the 
research design based on case studies, how the cases were chosen, the methods of 
data gathering and how the data is linked to the research hypotheses.
The translation of participation into democratic legitimacy
Before discussing the actual research design of the comparative case study, this 
first part of the chapter looks at the main theoretical aspects of the translation of 
participation into input legitimacy. As briefly elaborated in chapter 2, the normative 
grounding for input legitimacy based on participation in policy-making is provided by 
theories of deliberative democracy. Based on the review of the literature two layers of 
basic standards for deliberative democracy can be found: first, standards that must 
be met before a deliberation begins (or 'prerequisites for a meaningful process') and,  
second, standards of conduct during the deliberation process (or 'prerequisites for a 
meaningful transformation of inputs'). Chapter 2 linked these two core requirements 
to  the  concepts  of  accessibility  and  the  development  strategy.  The  following 
paragraphs  discuss  a  comprehensive  list  of  standards  in  the  context  of  the 
Commission online consultation regime and explain why the focus of the empirical  
analysis is on the standards of accessibility and development strategy.
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The first prerequisite for a meaningful deliberative process is the suspension of 
action  so  that  arena of  participation  can be created.  Policy  action  (including  the 
possible decision to do nothing) must come after the policy deliberation (Rosenberg, 
2007,  p.  340).  This  first  prerequisite  is  obviously  not  difficult  to  meet  for  the 
Commission's consultation regime, at least on formal grounds. The very idea of a 
Commission's consultation is that  the process takes place before the action. The 
Amsterdam Treaty states that 'the Commission should […] consult before proposing 
legislation, and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents'  (1997, para. 
Protocol no 7, Article 2). As a consequence, the Commission has committed itself not 
to submit policies before it has consulted widely (EU Commission, 2002a). 
The second prerequisite is that the deliberation is public 'so that all those affected 
but  not  directly  involved,  can  be  appraised  of,  and  potentially  respond  to  the 
substance  of  the  deliberations'  (Rosenberg,  2007,  p.  337).  In  the  case  of  the 
Commission's consultation regime, this is once more not controversial. It also ties in 
with discussions of accountability and transparency at the EU level. While there is 
room for improvement, the overall aims of accountability and transparency are not 
controversial.  Practising  the  principles  of  open  government  is  part  of  the 
self-description of the Commission (EU Commission, 2006e).
The  third  prerequisite,  however,  is  the  Achilles  heel  of  the  whole  online 
consultation  process  in  terms  of  its  legitimacy  potential:  the  arena  of  political  
participation must be accessible. This means the arena of participation both has to 
create public awareness and needs to be inclusive. The simplest way of achieving 
inclusiveness is to define it as the inclusion of all the relevant aspects, ideas and 
viewpoints  into  the  participation  arena.  This  is  very  much  in  the  interest  of  the 
Commission and forms a guiding principle for achieving output legitimacy. However, 
if participation itself is a yardstick, inclusiveness is more challenging because it then 
means the inclusion of all those actors who are potentially affected by a policy. Lack 
of resources and communication skills at the very least impede the participation of 
citizens so that they freely 'express their views and have them heard with respect and 
consideration and have an equal opportunity to speak and to persuade his or her  
audience' (Rosenberg, 2007, p. 337).
If we look at the process of deliberation within the arena of participation the first 
standard is that the aim of the deliberative process should be increasing the common 
good. While the general task of identifying the common good is laborious, especially 
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when the common good and individual gain might not go hand in hand, it is once 
again uncontested as a guiding principle. Ultimately, any consultation process can be 
regarded as a step towards developing the common good. Furthermore, additional 
'common good vetting' is also provided by the Council and the Parliament.
Finally,  a second Achilles heel is that meaningful deliberation needs a learning 
strategy, i.e. deliberation 'must consist primarily of the exchange of reasons for two 
purposes: that of communicating one’s own views in a way that can be understood 
and accepted by the other, and that of coming to understand the meaning and value 
of the other’s views in her terms'  (Rosenberg,  2007, p.  337).  This is a particular 
challenge  for  the  Commission,  which  is  also  expected  to  design  the  arena  of 
participation to allow for a learning strategy internally, within the Commission itself.
In essence,  the approach used here to analyse legitimacy based on deliberative 
democracy is closer to the Anglo-American than the Habermasian tradition. 
Moreover,  the approach is based on the assumption that the Commission's online 
consultation regime in its current form does not fulfil all criteria to be truly deliberative. 
Rather the thesis assumes that it could be the nucleus for a deliberative form of 
democracy. As such, the analysis concentrates on two core or necessary dimensions 
instead of a comprehensive set of criteria detailing the sufficient conditions for 
deliberations. 
If  we  turn  from  the  legitimacy  potential  to  the  legitimacy  belief  itself,  further 
clarifications are needed on the structure individual belief systems. As a research 
field, belief systems are predominately covered by the field social psychology (and, to 
lesser degree, political sociology). To further conceptually grasp the motivation for 
participation  of  participants  beyond  the  mere  economic  cue  of  a  cost-benefit 
calculation, it is advisable to refine the components of the cost-benefit calculation. In 
social  psychology,  the  theory  of  vested  interest  is  the  prevalent  approach  for 
explaining how attitudes are linked to participation. The central tenets of the theory of 
vested interest  were  developed by William Crano in  the early 1980s. Crano also 
coined the phrase, which refers to the legal process of vesting. In his own words, 
vested interests are defined as 'the extent to which an attitude object is hedonically 
relevant for the attitude holder'  (Crano, 1995, p. 132). The theory,  in its essence, 
suggests 'that people with strong vested interest in a behavior are more likely to act 
on their attitudes than people with little vested interests (...)'  (Ajzen, 2005, p. 50). 
According to this  theory,  vested interests do not  directly predict  the behaviour of 
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individuals  but  are  an  intervening  factor  (or  moderator)  between  attitudes  and 
behaviour (Anker, Feeley, & Kim, 2010, p. 1296). The advantage of this arrangement 
is that it provides an explanation for inconsistency between attitudes and behaviour,  
e.g. why did a person knowing of the existence of the animal welfare consultation not  
participate, although she or he believes it is important to give the Commission input 
on this subject?
In  its  most  developed  form,  Crano's  vested  interests  are  made  up  of  five 
components:  stake, salience, self-efficacy,  certainty and immediacy.  Certainty and 
immediacy deal with the chance of a recommended behaviour occurring with great 
likelihood and in a short time period. Salience is defined based on the amount of  
thought that one gives to an attitude object, while self-efficacy explains one's belief in  
one's ability to affect an outcome. Empirically the most important components in the 
sense of being able to explain and predict behavioural responses are stake, salience 
and self-efficacy (Crano & Prislin, 1995, pp. 15–16).
Stake  deals  with  individual  relevance  that  is  attributed  to  the  anticipated 
consequences of a decision. The higher the stake is, the more consistent attitude 
and behaviour  should  be.  In  this  sense,  it  is  the  little  brother  of  vested interest, 
although the latter is the overarching concept. Also, according to Crano, empirically it  
is the most important component in determining behavioural consequences. Salience 
'is  defined based on the amount  of  thought  that  one gives  to  an  attitude object' 
(Anker et al., 2010, p. 1297). It  can be seen as the importance that an individual 
attributes  to  the  attitude object  in  his  or  her  inner  world.  Finally,  self-efficacy,  in 
vested interest, is the degree to which an attitude holder believes that he or she is  
capable of performing an act, which is associated with a behavioural attitude (Crano 
& Prislin, 1995, p. 9). 
If  we  look  structurally  at  the  whole  research  puzzle  of  the  thesis,  the  main 
components  are  the  (governance)  administration  (at  the  macro  level),  media 
technology (at the auxiliary level) and the individual belief systems of the participants 
(at the micro level). Both the macro and micro levels have actor qualities while the 
auxiliary level works as an intermediary between the actors. Moreover, technology 
can be used to peruse democratic aims. Hence, we can argue that the legitimacy 
potential of e-participation depends on the characteristics of the media technology, 
which processes information between the normative and macro level to the micro 
level,  i.e.  the  belief  system  of  citizens.  It  facilitates  participation  by  offering 
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possibilities  for  interaction  between  the  structural  and  normative  levels  thereby 
affecting the transformation of participation so that it has an impact on the legitimacy 
belief of an individual citizen. Hence, we can assign media technology to an auxiliary 
role.  Yet,  overemphasising  the auxiliary  level  can easily  lead to  a crude form of 
technological  determinism,  an  idea  that  aims to  explain  a  social  phenomenon in 
terms  of  one  principal  factor,  i.e.  technology.  The  problem  with  technological 
determinism is,  as  McLuhan  and  Watson  have  satirically  pointed  out,  that  'such 
inventions as the horse collar quickly led to the development of the modern world' 
(McLuhan & Watson, 1970, p. 121).
A full discussion on technological determinism is beyond the scope of this work 
which adopts a broadly constructivist view on technology (Winner, 1993, pp. 364–8). 
Thus, technology per se has no 'natural effects' on a social system directly derived 
from  certain  qualities  of  a  technology.  While  technology  can  offer,  and  indeed 
change, predispositions for changes in a social system, its social manifestation is 
socially conditioned and depends on the intended and unintended forms of its use by 
human beings within a given system. Bimber describes this view as a 'norm-based 
account'  of  technological  determinism  (1994,  p.  82) which  is  something  of  a 
misnomer in that it attributes 'causal agency in the history of technology to human 
social practice and beliefs rather than to technology itself' (Bimber, 1990, p. 341). It is 
also worth noting in this context that the Commission online consultation regime is 
not technology rich. It is based on internet communication technology from the 1990s 
and is not sophisticated on the front-end (the part that participants and the policy 
officers see and use). It combines the functionality of an online poll with a comment 
function. Moreover, additional comments can be sent via email.  Finally,  there is a 
website for publishing calls for participation, accompanying materials and the results 
of consultation. 
Coming  back  to  the  translation  of  participation  into  democratic  legitimacy,  this 
takes  place  within  the  participation  process.  Central  factors  regarding  the  input 
legitimacy potential of e-participation rest on normative arguments discussed in the 
literature on deliberative democracy. As suggested, accessibility to the process and a 
development  strategy  are  procedural  requirements  in  order  to  legitimise  the 
decision-making  process.  Together  they  are  the  key  normative  dimension  of  a 
democratic e-participation process.
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Moreover, we can look at legitimacy belief on the level of individual citizens. On 
the macro level, we can study the legitimacy potential of political institutions, which, 
thanks to their design, may have a positive effect on the legitimacy belief of the ruled.  
With  regard  to  e-participation  in  the  policy  process,  public  administration  is  the 
central institution. 
What is  the causal  interplay between the  structural  levels? From a theoretical 
perspective, we can expect that the more the macro and auxiliary dimensions are 
able  to  support  the  normative  dimension,  the  more  legitimacy  potential  an 
e-participation process can claim. In turn – as suggested in chapter 1 – the higher the 
legitimacy potential of the institutional arrangement, the more we can expect positive 
effects on the legitimacy belief of the citizen.
The following section describes the structural components and their significance in 
supporting  the  normative  procedural  dimension  of  the  participation  process.  The 
section delivers the background for the development of the hypotheses presented in 
the next part of this chapter. The following table gives an overview of the six vectors. 
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Structural dimension
Governance administration 
(macro level)
Media technology 
(auxiliary)
Participants 
(micro level)
Procedural-norm
ative dim
ension
Inclusiveness 
Vector I
Acknowledging the 
potential of the 
e-participation process;
Offering the possibility of 
participation to as many 
civic actors as possible
Vector III 
Barrier-free applications 
for all participants on both 
levels;
Offering the possibility of 
participation to as many 
civic actors 
Vector V 
Inclusiveness towards the 
cost and benefit factors of 
participation; ties in with 
the vested interests theory
Development 
strategy
Vector II
Appropriate inward 
structure to process the 
inputs of the e-participation 
process
Vector IV 
Complementing the inward 
structure of the 
governance administration 
body as well as a tool to 
support understanding the 
deliberation process
Vector VI
Learning strategy based 
on evaluating all relevant 
information of the 
e-participation process; 
ties in with the literacy 
issues of participants
Legitimacy potential Legitimacy belief
Table 7: How do we assess the input legitimacy potential of e-participation?
Vectors  one  to  four  describe  how  the  legitimacy  potential  depends  on  the 
institutional arrangements and the capability to support the normative aspects of a 
just  rule.  The main institutional  features here are the attitudes of the governance 
administration and the use of media technology. 
Vector I: Accessibility and political and governance administration 
On a very basic level, the administrative body has to take participation seriously by 
expecting to gain from the deliberation process. This aspect should not be taken for 
granted  -  Aikins  and  Krane  (2005) found  that  public  officials  tend  to  ignore  the 
innovation e-participation offers or are very sceptical about its usefulness in general. 
Moreover,  the  political  administrative  system  has  to  make  information,  which  is 
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relevant for the decision-making process accessible to the participants. Meaningful 
participation is virtually impossible if  the administrative body informally blocks the 
process, e.g. by internally adhering to its information monopoly (Macintosh, 2006, p. 
6;  Märker  &  Wehner,  2007).  Accessibility  here  also  means  that  the  arena  of 
participation is designed by the public body to be as open as possible to all interested 
parties. This implies that the deliberation process offers the possibility of participation 
to  all  parts  of  the  citizenry.  This  particularly  means  taking  different  needs  and 
preferences into account. Citizens and other stakeholders vary considerably in their 
technological and political efficacy but they also vary in aspects such as their degree 
of literacy and communication skills (L. Weber, Loumakis, & Bergman, 2003). 
Vector II: Development strategy and governance administration
Engaging citizens to  interact  with  the administrative  body only makes sense if 
there is a development strategy within an administrative body, which analyses inputs,  
interacts with responses and feeds them into the policy process.  This requires an 
active inward structure to enable a learning process. The link between participation in 
policy discussions and the impact on the policy has to be transparent. Administrative 
bodies  need  to  integrate  the  results  of  the  e-participation  into  their  policy 
development (Macintosh, 2006, p. 4; Märker & Wehner, 2007, p. 363). Participation 
in itself does not automatically increase citizens' and civil society actors' influence in 
an  actual  decision-making  processes  if  there  is  no  procedure  for  handling  their 
inputs.
Vector III: Accessibility and media technology
Media technology offers the platform on which citizens and the administrative body 
interact. With regard to accessibility, technology should aim to provide a barrier-free 
platform for both citizens and the administrative body in order to facilitate deliberative 
decision-making. It remains highly unlikely that a single piece of technology meets all 
requirements for such an open process regardless of the policy environment. Hence, 
the  choice  of  technology is  highly  context  dependent.  Accessibility  of  technology 
needs to appreciate individual and social differences such as language and technical 
skills.  As  such,  the  choice  of  technology always  bears  the  risk  of  systematically 
excluding particular groups (Macintosh, 2004, p. 122). Moreover, media technology 
plays a vital role in supporting the aims of vector two, i.e. helping public bodies to 
make their participation arena as inclusive and accessible as possible. 
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Vector IV: Development strategy and media technology
In  order  to  support  the  development  strategy  of  both  structural  levels,  the 
technology needs, on the one hand, to be compatible with the information processing 
of the administrative system so that the deliberatively generated knowledge can be 
fed  into  the  decision-making process and,  on  the  other  hand,  technology should 
facilitate  the  transparency  of  the  deliberation  by  highlighting  the  interaction  and 
reasoning between the participants (Macintosh, 2004, p. 121). Technologies should 
help to analyse inputs in order to understand their significance for policy-making but it  
should  also  facilitate  understanding  the  deliberation  process  by  highlighting  the 
line(s) of reasoning. 
Vectors five and six describe key individual features of participants, which make it 
more likely that the participation process has a positive impact on their belief system.
Vector V: Accessibility and the cost and benefit factors of participation
This vector deals with motivational issues and vested interests. In essence, the 
lower the perceived costs of participation (in terms of invested resources or feelings 
of moral defection),  and the higher the benefits of participation (by either intrinsic 
participation benefits or benefits based on participation outcomes), the more likely 
participation is.  Moreover,  the higher the relevance of the participation arena, the 
more likely it will have an effect on the citizens' legitimacy belief.
Vector  VI:  Development  strategy  and  individual  characteristics  of  the  civic  
participants
The personal  learning strategy of  the participants  should avoid short  cuts  and 
information cues. Positively speaking, participants should aim to evaluate all relevant 
information offered during the deliberation process. Deliberative theorists argue that 
a  comprehensive  understanding  of  an  issue  and,  more  importantly,  the 
understanding  of  the  deliberation  process  is  the  key  for  successful  deliberative 
decision making  (Delli-Carpini et al., 2004, pp. 59, 330). Nevertheless, deliberation 
also implies a challenge of personal reasoning strategies. An individual learning and 
development  strategy  includes  acknowledging  the  difficulties  of  being  challenged 
during the deliberation. As such, it is closely linked to the literacy level of a person. 
If  we  look  at  vector  one  and  two  from  the  perspective  of  the  governance 
administration, it  then depends mainly on the motivation of an authority to initiate 
such a process. Likewise, if we look at vector five, it addresses the motivation for 
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citizens  to  participate.  Citizen  participation  causes  costs  for  both  sides.  Yet, 
legitimacy often fails to be a prime concern for citizens or authorities. For both sides,  
their cost-benefit consideration simply comes down to the question: Is it worth the 
effort?  (Irvin  &  Stansbury,  2004).  The  motivation  for  participation  is  nevertheless 
crucial because if there is no participation there cannot be any legitimacy effects – at  
least positive ones. It is of course possible that a single e-participation venture fails 
because there are no participants although this may still have a positive impact on 
the legitimacy belief because – as discussed in chapter 2 – the mere possibility of 
participation may influence the legitimacy belief.
Research hypotheses
The  broader  research  puzzle  of  this  thesis  is  under  what  circumstances  it  is 
plausible that e-participation in the Commission's consultation regime could have a 
positive  impact  on  the  legitimacy  beliefs  of  EU  citizens.  Based  on  the  previous 
section, the short answer is, if more prerequisites for meaningful participation and 
more prerequisites for a meaningful transformation of participation inputs are met, it  
is more plausible that the Commission's e-consultation regime will  have a positive 
impact on the legitimacy belief of EU citizens.
This thesis does not work with large survey-based data on EU citizenry and their 
belief  systems.  Hence,  the  more  precise  question  of  this  thesis  is:  Under  which 
circumstances is  it  plausible  that  e-participation  in  the  Commission's  consultation 
regime could have positive impact on the legitimacy beliefs of EU citizens?
The basic underlying assumption about the Commission's e-consultation regime is 
that the Commission established an arena intended for creating input legitimacy by 
welcoming participation in its policy-making. Nevertheless, the core concept of the 
Commission's  consultation  regime  was  established  before  the  'participatory  turn' 
(Saurugger, 2010) and has its roots in output-oriented ideas of policy-making. This is 
of  course  a  simplification,  at  least  on  the  grounds  that  it  assumes  that  the 
Commission  is  a  unitary  actor.  Moreover,  the  Commission  also  pursues  other 
interests with its consultation regime and it should be recognised that the motivation 
behind  consultations  might  differ  between  DGs  and  within  the  Commission  in 
general.
The following section looks at the key prerequisites for meaningful participation. It 
differentiates  between  two  chronologically  different  phases  of  the  participation 
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process: before and during the gathering of inputs and after the gathering of inputs. 
The following table sums up the prerequisites for meaningful participation. 
The commission (macro level) The citizens (micro level)
Prerequisites for meaningful 
participation
Inclusiveness,
Awareness
Salience, stake and efficacy
Prerequisites for a meaningful 
transformation of participation 
inputs
Policy impact,
Feedback
Acknowledgement of impacts 
Table 8: Meaningful participation
From the Commission's side the main factors for meaningful participation are the 
accessibility  of  the  arena  of  participation  in  terms  of  inclusiveness  and  public 
awareness. 
Therefore, if a Commission online consultation
a) is inclusive and
b) has a higher level of awareness,
and thus achieving high accessibility, then any participation is able to generate input 
legitimacy.
What are the prerequisites  for  the meaningful  transformation of  inputs? These 
aspects boil down to the impact of inputs on the Commission's policy formulation. 
From the point when the Commission takes over the stewardship of the inputs, the 
main  prerequisites  for  a  meaningful  transformation  are  policy  impact  and  the 
provision of feedback on the gathered and processed input.
Therefore, if the Commission 
c) allows an online consultation to have an impact on the final policy,
d) provides feedback on the consultation process,
and thus securing the meaningful  transformation of  inputs,  then any participation 
fulfils the necessary preconditions to be able to generate input legitimacy.
From the citizens' side the main prerequisites for meaningful participation are, first,  
the  perception  of  relevance  of  a  policy  (i.e.  salience  and  stake),  which  is  a 
component  in  the  cost-benefit  calculation  underlying  the  degree  of  motivation  to 
participate (or not). The second set of prerequisites deals with the communication 
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skills of citizens (in terms of literacy skills, efficacy).  On the citizen level,  the key 
prerequisite  for  the  meaningful  transformation  of  inputs  is  the  degree  of 
acknowledgement or recognition of their impact on the policy proposal. 
Therefore, if citizens
e) regard their personal skills as sufficient to communicate their inputs (efficacy),
f)  regard  the  process of  gathering  inputs  as  personally  relevant  (salience and 
stake),
g) understand and acknowledge the impacts of their inputs in the policy proposal,
then any participation fulfils the necessary preconditions for having a positive impact 
on the legitimacy belief.
In  the  context  of  the  hypothesis  outlined  above,  a  case  study  approach  was 
adopted to  analyse the legitimacy potential  of  online consultations.  The empirical  
research is based on the Commission's consultation for the 'Action Plan on animal 
welfare  2006-2010'  (animal  welfare  case),  which  originated  from DG Health  and 
Consumer (also known by its French acronym 'DG SANCO') and the consultation for 
the regulation on 'requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to 
the marketing of products' (harmonisation case) initiated by DG Enterprise.
Arguably,  the biggest challenge for case study research is linking the gathered 
data with the theoretical propositions. Yin for instance comments that this is the least 
well  developed  component  in  case  study  research  (compared  for  instance  to 
quantitative  large  survey  research)  and  of  course  empirical  research  based  on 
experiments  (1994, p. 25). The challenge is to make the phenomenon and causal 
mechanism around the phenomenon of input legitimacy visible, taking into account 
that the phenomenon always tries to escape in practical research (Silverman, 1993, 
pp. 201–203). The simplest form of assessment is to identify a boundary condition, 
establishing its  existence in  the real  world  and then to  assess the quality  of  the 
boundary condition. Assuming that we found measures for securing accessibility (the 
boundary  condition),  then  a  hypothesis  will  say  that  the  consultation  has  input 
legitimacy potential (or the consequence of the hypothesis). Strictly speaking these 
are working hypotheses as they are provisionally accepted when faced with of a lack 
of viable alternatives. They are also not complete in a logical sense, which would  
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require that only the hypotheses devised here are able to explain and predict the 
phenomenon of input legitimacy of online consultations.
Hence, the first step is to identify whether the boundary condition exists (if x leads 
to y and we find x then it is a valid deduction to predict that y exists too). The problem 
with this research though is that there is not only one boundary condition but also an  
unknown number of  them. In this case,  accessibility  as a research construct has 
boundary conditions itself which are not well defined. One of the challenges of this 
research  is  precisely  to  identify  unknown  boundary  conditions.  Second,  it  is  a 
challenge  to  assess  the  quality  of  the  existence  of  a  boundary  condition  in  an 
interpretive  way,  which  means comparing the evidence found with  the theoretical 
propositions  and  the  evidence  found  in  the  other  case.  The  hypothesis  on 
accessibility  is  not  operationalised  in  such  a  way  that  it  can  be  measured  with 
quantitative means. This is due to the perception that phenomenon and context in 
this  research  are  not  easily  and  meaningful  discernible  and  that  therefore  the 
operationalisation  of  the  hypotheses  to  achieve  a  codifiable  multiple-choice 
questionnaire would be a bad choice of method. In terms of quantitative research, the 
variables presented are dummy variables (i.e. they have only two possible values).  
As data rarely speaks for itself, the question of how to judge the data is crucial. In the 
case of the accessibility hypothesis, the first approach is to compare the data with the 
purpose of accessibility within deliberative democracy theory. Beyond the description 
of  the  measures  to  secure  accessibility  based  on  documents  and  interview 
responses, the key question is if there is awareness for this problem as part of an 
exercise  to  generate  input  legitimacy  based  on  deliberation.  Is  the  design  and 
employment of these measures informed by this concern? This obviously includes 
the  aspect  of  what  measures  were  not  implemented  and  what  other  purposes 
measures of accessibility may have for the staff working on the consultation.
The second layer to establish the quality of boundary conditions is to compare the 
two cases – what are the main differences and similarities with regard to the aspect 
of accessibility? What are the reasons for similarities and dissimilarities? Are they 
down to the same causal factors? What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
different approaches? 
Nevertheless, the first step is the operationalisation of the three hypotheses. The 
first  hypothesis  is  concerned  with  the  degree  of  accessibility  of  the  arena  of 
participation and it is assumed that the more inclusive it is and the higher the level of 
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awareness it creates the more legitimacy potential it can claim. Inclusiveness and 
awareness are the concepts used for measuring accessibility.  Indicators for public 
awareness  centre  on  the  efforts  for  actively  approaching  individual  citizens  and 
attempts at reaching out beyond Brussels, i.e. attempts to include participants that 
neither are based in Brussels nor travel to Brussels. Indicators for inclusiveness ask 
if consultations are adapted to different groups of participants, whether educational 
material  is  provided  and  whether  accessibility  is  a  guiding  principle  of  the 
consultation implementation.
The second hypothesis deals with the meaningful transformation of inputs. Policy 
impact  and  feedback  are  the  two  concepts  used  to  measure  the  meaningful 
transformation  of  inputs.  Indicators  for  policy  impact  are  agenda  setting,  policy 
contestation, and a change of policy proposal, whilst indicators for feedback are the 
existence of internet accessible feedback and criteria for why an input is included or 
not.
The third hypothesis centres on the direct impact of participation on the legitimacy 
belief of participants. Indicators for the concept salience are personal relevance and 
personal consequences related to policy. The indicator for efficacy is self-attestation. 
Finally, the indicator for the acknowledgement or recognition of impact is whether a 
participant has followed a consultation after the submission of inputs. As the data on 
participants  is  less  comprehensive,  secondary  sources  are  used  to  analyse  the 
boundary condition of these hypotheses in chapter 6, too.
The following tables show how the hypotheses of the study are linked to relevant 
concepts and indicators. Directly linked to the indicators are the interview items (see 
also Appendix I and II) developed for qualifying the concepts as well as elements  
from primary documents and secondary sources (if applicable) that are connected to 
these indicators. 
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Concept Indicator Main interview items Primary documents Secondary 
sources
Public awareness Actively approaching individual 
citizens 
List of measures for rising awareness;
Initial addressees of the consultation
Direct reference to awareness in 
the internal documentation;
State of the documentation of 
DG specific implementation 
Commission-wide guidelines 
based on the 'General principles 
and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties 
by the Commission' (EU 
Commission, 2002a)
none
Reaching out beyond Brussels Forms of promotion beyond the Commission (e.g. 
campaigning);
Internal responsibility for communicating with the 
web master team of DG Market/wider 
communication strategy 
Inclusiveness Adapting consultation to different 
participants
Measures included to reach out to potentially 
marginalised groups;
Examples of best practice. DG specific best 
practice cases
Direct reference to 
openness/inclusiveness in the 
internal documentation
State of the documentation of 
DG specific implementation 
Commission wide guidelines (EU 
Commission, 2002a, p. 13)
none
Educational material provided Forms of background material provided
Accessibility as guiding principle of 
the consultation
Assessment of “usability” of online consultation 
site;
Decision-making process on promoting a 
consultation on the 'Your Voice in Europe' 
website
Table 9: Evidence chain for the accessibility hypothesis
Concept Indicator Main interview items Primary documents Secondary 
sources
Policy-impact Agenda Setting Relative importance of inputs of the online 
consultation in comparison to inputs provided by 
other forms of consultations
Referencing of the online 
consultation in documents 
accompanying the final policy 
outcome
none
Policy-Contestation Contestation of internally held viewpoints by input 
provided through online consultations
Changes to the policy proposal Relevance for input for adapting policy proposal;
Inclusion and participation or policies consensus
Feedback Criteria for why something is 
included
DG specific policies to communicate feedback;
Procedures regarding the handling of 
contributions which were discarded for a policy 
draft
Publicly accessible document 
that explains the decision making 
process endorsed by the 
Commission
none
Internet accessible feedback given Public actively informed about results after the 
consultation period
Table 10: Evidence chain for the meaningful transformation of inputs hypothesis
Concept Indicator Main interview items Primary documents Secondary sources
Salience and stake Statement of personal relevance Relevance of participation in relation to other 
aspects of life/work;
Monitoring of the 'Your Voice in Europe' 
web-portal
Individual written 
replies to the 
consultation 
Works on the 
relevance of EU policy 
issues
Personal consequences related to 
policy
Personal interest apart from/in addition to the 
professional interest 
Efficacy Self-attestation Perception of impact on a policy;
Impression of the communication skills of 
participants by Commission personnel;
Assessment of the relevance of own contribution 
for the DG/other participants
Works on adult literacy
Acknowledgement of 
Impacts
Following the policy proposal 
through the course of policy cycle
Recollection of the handling of the online 
consultation by the DG;
Acknowledging contributions of other 
participants;
History of participation in online or other forms of 
consultation;
Monitoring of the consultation and its results after 
the submission of input
Table 11: Evidence chain for the participants hypothesis 
The question of how to assess the legitimacy potential of technology is not within 
the scope of this thesis. On the contrary, as argued above, the thesis assumes that 
there is nothing inherently democratic or  undemocratic  about  internet  technology.  
Certainly, technology may be used in better or worse ways to pursue political and 
social  purposes.  This  comparative  aspect  of  the  employment  of  technology  is 
discussed with the help of the two case studies in the remaining chapters. However, 
this thesis does not employ a genuine research hypothesis based on technology. A 
genuine  technology  research  hypothesis  could  be  that  'the  more  interactive  web 
elements a consultation exercise has, the more legitimacy potential a consultation 
has'.  The rationale behind this hypothesis could be that interactive elements offer 
channels for participation and that the more channels exist,  the more meaningful  
participation can take place. As mentioned in the first part of the chapter the thesis  
aims to avoid the fallacy of technological determinism as found for instance in the  
sentiment that 'the internet is the saviour of democracy' (O’Loughlin, 2001). Certainly 
a more technology focused research design can be fruitful (especially when it takes 
into  account  what  humans make out  of  technology)  such as,  for  example,  when 
questions  are  raised  about  how  internet-based  technology  changes  political 
participation. Yet, this is not within the scope of this research. In the context of this 
specific research puzzle, media technology plays a subordinate role with regard to 
creating input legitimacy. The implications of the choice and deployment of media 
technology is nevertheless discussed throughout the empirical part of this thesis. In a 
nut shell, technology is discussed simply as a feature of the cases. Hence, there are 
no hypotheses built around the nature of the technology used by the Commission.
Methods and selection of case studies
Ideally, the chosen cases will achieve Gluckman's aspiration that one good case 
should 'illuminate the working of a social system in a way that series of morphological  
statements  cannot  achieve'  (1961,  p.  9).  Following  Yin,  this  case  study  is  an 
empirical inquiry which aims to investigate 'a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident'  (1994,  p.  13).  In  this case study,  the main phenomenon, 
around  which  the  research  is  built,  is  the  input  legitimacy  potential  of  online 
consultations. The input legitimacy potential of online consultations is analysed in the 
context of participation patterns, policy nature and policy-making in the Commission. 
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Although  the  previous  section  distinguished  between  dependable  variables  (i.e. 
'legitimacy  potential')  and  independent  variables  (amongst  others  the  'quality  of 
feedback given by the Commission'), in real life the distinction is not as clear-cut, as 
the  next  chapters  show.  Therefore,  a  method  that  inherently  addresses  these 
challenges by allowing for the ambiguity of 'context' and 'phenomenon' is particularly 
suitable for such a research project. 
While this research is firmly located within the 'qualitative research camp', this is 
not an either/or decision. The problem is that '[i]n the field, material is much more 
messy  than  the  different  camps  would  suggest'  (Silverman,  2001,  p.  294)  and 
different approaches become fruitful  if  we look beyond the polarities (and implied 
contradictory  nature)  of  different  approaches.  The  language  of  dependent  and 
independent  variables  (or,  to  put  it  in  other  words,  the  language  of  quantitative 
analysis) has its place as it provides a starting point of clarity from which we can 
venture  into  the  less  clear-cut  aspects  of  this  research  subject.  Moreover,  the 
language  of  quantitative  analysis  makes  it  potentially  easier  to  follow-up  on  this 
research by quantitative means. 
Although a widely used method, case study research is not self-explanatory. While 
being intuitively plausible,  it  has its own challenges: starting from the question of  
what actually constitutes  the case (i.e. defining the unit of analysis)  (Yin, 1994, pp. 
21–25) to  the  number  of  cases  studied.  After  the  constitution  of  the  cases,  the 
content of the cases and the interplay between them needs to be clarified. What is 
the comparative aspect of this method and what is the relevant context of the cases? 
(Gomm & Hammersley,  2000,  pp.  4–5). Finally,  the interplay of  theory and case 
study needs elaboration in terms of mere descriptions of events but more importantly 
in terms of explanation, evaluation and, potentially, prescription.
The  units  of  analysis  in  this  research  are  the  aforementioned  consultation 
procedures initiated by two different DGs of the EU Commission. In terms of the 
research design, they are naturally occurring cases. 'Naturally occurring' refers to the 
fact that the cases were not fabricated by the researcher for the analysis but found in 
the real world (Gomm & Hammersley, 2000, p. 4). The consultations were not started 
by the Commission to serve as a research object but rather their research worthiness 
was assigned by the researcher (in a process that included other people's works and 
comments). 
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The  consultations  were  primarily  chosen  for  being  representative  of  EU 
policy-making.  The  representativeness  of  the  cases  is  rooted  in  the  aspect  of 
policy-making and not in the aspect of being commonplace as examples of online 
consultations.  As discussed in  chapter  2,  the unique aspect  with  regard to  input 
legitimacy  of  online  consultations  is  that  they  offer  the  possibility  of  broadening 
participation  in  the  policy  formulating  stage  of  the  policy-making  process.  It  is 
therefore plausible to base the case selection on the nature of the policy and not on a 
typical online consultation. 
Moreover,  not  one  but  two  cases  were  chosen.  This  was  done  to  add  a 
comparative layer  to the analysis.  Potentially any argument based on case study 
data  in  conjunction  with  prepositions  derived  from  a  theoretical  framework  can 
become stronger if they can be related not only to the theory but also to another  
case. The comparative element allows a conclusion to be drawn from at least one 
other angle, which potentially increases the validity of the research results.
The relationship of the two case studies is marked by the dissimilarity between the 
two  cases.  Dissimilarity  potentially  highlights  the  challenge  of  creating  input 
legitimacy  better  (in  comparison  to  similar  cases)  by  allowing  the  complexity  of 
policy-making to emerge as opposed to a design that stresses similarity. This thesis 
does not engage in theory building. Nonetheless, dissimilar cases potentially broaden 
the  theoretical  perspective  on  the  phenomenon  in  question,  which  in  turn  may 
highlight shortcomings of the theoretical framework. Again, this assumption disrupts 
the  pure  nature  of  deductive  research,  where  research  data  logically  does  not 
change  the  theoretical  assumptions.  This  also  relates  to  the  issue  that  the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In addition, the 
ambiguity  of  purposes  of  online  consultations  is  an  essential  part  of  the  beast's  
nature. From the start, the Commission itself did not subscribe to a hierarchical order 
of purposes for its consultations. The case study method accepts the ambiguity of the 
unit analysis rather than silencing the ambiguity by over-simplification.
However,  case  study  research  with  small  Ns  raises  the  question  of  how  far 
reaching the results are. The ideal deduction (assuming that the hypotheses of this 
thesis  are  both  true  and  valid)  leads  to  what  Lincoln  and  Guba  describe  as  a 
generalisation that would be the 'be-all and end -all of inquiry' (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, 
p. 39). Yet, in the research reality of social science, this is rarely achieved, if ever at 
all. Even natural science often finds new boundary conditions, which apply to a rule 
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previously regarded as completely generalisable. While this may shatter belief in a 
'be-all and end -all of inquiry' it does not challenge the regulative idea of finding a 
simple Popperian rule (i.e. one and only one boundary condition and an almost 100% 
chance  of  falsification)  that  explains  (and  predicts)  as  much  as  possible  (ideally 
everything) (Caldwell, 1991, pp. 2–4). What it does challenge, though, is the opinion 
that this is the only way to undertake meaningful research. 
Case study design in this sense embraces the open-ended nature of any type of 
research. Although the small N of case study research (in comparison to for instance 
survey type research) makes generalisation less authoritative (Lieberson, 2000, pp. 
209–212) and conclusions less far reaching, it also makes it paradoxically easier for 
other researchers to pick up open questions and loose ends and incorporate case 
study research into their work, both by highlighting unanswered puzzles but also by 
raising the question of the transferability of conclusions. This also holds true for this 
work (as discussed in the introductory chapter). Whilst all researchers stand on the 
shoulders of giants, case study design often makes it easier to assess whether an 
existing scapula is a viable platform for their own feet.
The  aspect  of  generalisability  is  treated  here  in  a  twofold  way.  First,  the 
generalisability  is  not  the  main  purpose  of  this  research.  Second,  there  may be 
potential for generalisation even in the murky water of small Ns. Clearly, one has to 
be  cautious  about  the  limited  capacity  of  small-scale  case  study  conclusions. 
Nevertheless authors like Stake make claims to generalisability based on what he 
calls  'naturalistic  generalization'  (Stake,  1995,  p.  85) or  what  Lincoln  and  Guba 
describe as 'transferability' (2000, p. 40), a term used in this thesis. The basic idea is 
that the reader, researcher, practitioner or consumer of case study research have 
analysed  the  case  studies  and  decided  on  possible  applications  elsewhere  for 
themselves. Generalisability of case study research is then not mainly based on the 
degree of credibility assigned by the author of the research by adhering to certain 
standards  but  by  the  recipient(s)  of  the  research.  Hence,  with  the  concept  of 
transferability  the  problem of  generalisation  is  handed  over  to  the  researcher  or 
practitioner who knows about research context in terms of both its origin and where 
potentially  useful  applications  may  exist  elsewhere.  In  this  sense  generalisation 
becomes an extrapolation not based on statistical or probabilistic concepts but rather 
on  the  abilities  of  the  recipient  to  assess  ‘logical,  thoughtful,  case  derived,  and 
problem oriented’ potential other applications (Falk & Guenther, 2006, p. 9). 
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The design of this research does not stress the aspect of the intrinsic value of the 
cases (Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000, p. 99). The case studies as part of the 
whole  research  design  gain  their  value  from  the  potential  to  answer  puzzles 
presented by theories of democratic legitimacy in a non-nation state context.  Yet, 
there may be a claim of intrinsic relevance based on the novelty of the research area 
of  internet  based  participation  in  EU  policy-making,  also  known  as  gap  filling 
research (Dunleavy, 2003, p. 21). However, this should not be overly stressed, not 
only because the case study is explicitly not employed for its intrinsic value but also 
because the novelty aspect rapidly fades with the research, which is emerging in this 
area.
As  mentioned  above,  the  heterogeneity  of  the  cases  were  paramount  in  their 
selection. The reason why these two consultations were selected lay predominantly 
in  the  perceived  nature  of  the  policy.  The  overriding  reasoning  for  selecting  the 
animal welfare case lay in the fact that it is regarded as a high salience case (from a 
participant perceptive),  which was listed on the Your  Voice in Europe Website.  It  
attracted a comparatively large number of participants (for the time) and dealt with 
the evocative issue of the treatment of animals. In contrast, the consultation by DG 
Enterprise essentially dealt with the more technical issue of product standardisation.  
Both  cases  also  differ  with  regard  to  centrality  for  the  EU.  While  product 
harmonisation has been at the heart of EU polices ever since its early days, animal 
welfare is a comparatively new policy area for the EU. 
Feature Animal Welfare Product Harmonisation
DG Health and Consumer Enterprise
Type of legislation Non legally binding action plan Legally binding directive
Main type of participants Lay citizens Professionals
Maturity of the policy area New (at the time not mentioned as 
an EU policy in an EU treaty)
Old (at the core of European 
integration since its beginnings)
Communicative approach Mainly closed questions Closed/open questions mix
Policy area Animal ethics in agriculture, 
research and consumer protection 
Market regulation by reducing trade 
barriers
Table 12: Case studies – overview
The gathered original data comes from three primary sources – semi-structured 
interviews  with  Commission  officials,  document  analysis  and  semi-structured 
interviews with  consultation participants.  The core empirical data for this thesis is 
112
sourced from semi-structured interviews with  Commission officials working on the 
implementation  of  the  consultation  procedure.  For  the  case studies,  interviewees 
were selected based on what they might know with regard to the practical experience 
of  online  consultations  and  their  potential  contribution  in  addressing  the  input 
legitimacy problem of the EU. These are generally speaking lower to middle ranking 
EU Commission  officials  (up  to  'Head  of  Unit'  within  a  DG)  who  held  privileged 
positions in conducting the consultation. Apart from staff directly related to the two 
case study DGs, personnel in charge of the Your Voice in Europe website and the 
IPM were interviewed. 
We can expect that such individuals are likely to have a crucial influence on the 
outcomes of a consultation, more so than higher ranking officials who are often not 
involved into the day-to-day work of drafting polices. These middle-ranking officials 
have a degree of expert knowledge but their formal power within the organisation 
does not (yet) match their expertise. In particular, due to their functional responsibility 
for drafting policies, they have a high degree of discretion in interpreting guidelines 
issued by higher-ranking  members  of  the Commission.  This  makes their  position 
particularly relevant for the outcome of the consultation. In this sense, they are the 
Commission's  equivalent  of  Lipsky's  (1980) street  level  bureaucrats,  which  were 
discussed in the introduction. 
Apart  from  gathering  more  knowledge  on  the  consultation  process,  the  main 
function of these interviews is to cross-examine the theoretical positions of this thesis 
on the input legitimacy potential of online consultations with perceptions and beliefs 
held  by  the  Commission  officials  on  this  matter  (Richards,  1996,  pp.  199–200). 
Hence, the interviews were interested in attitudes, values, and beliefs with regard to 
implementing online consultations and in an account of the historic evolution of the 
consultations.
At the time of the design of this research project, the area of online consultations 
within  the  Commission  was  in  even  more  uncharted  waters  than  at  the  time  of 
submission of the thesis. Research based on semi-structured interviews is especially 
suitable to sail those uncharted waters in what is a complex end emerging area of 
research because it allows us to find out what is there by asking the people in charge 
what they are doing, without having to establish a tight analytical corset. Moreover,  
the  semi-structured interview technique can also create  an environment  in  which 
highly educated professionals articulate their views on the matter, elaborating what 
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they think and why  (Aberbach & Rockman, 2003, p.  674) This method may also 
produce new insights on a theoretical level. Additionally, open-ended questions allow 
engagement  in  broader  discussions,  something,  which  enables  the  interviewer  to 
probe beneath the surface of a reply and shed some light  on the reasoning and 
premises that underpin a response.
However,  there  are  major  drawbacks  to  this  research  design.  Semi-structured 
interviews necessarily produce a subjective account of the consultation event. This 
does mean, though, that they can provide data with a high degree of reliability as 
open-ended  questions  offer  the  opportunity  for  the  interviewee  to  organise  their  
responses  within  their  own  frameworks.  Also,  the  question  of  the  reliability  of  a 
narrative  can  be  addressed  during  the  interview  process.  This  kind  of  data  is 
especially valuable for the exploratory and in-depth research interests of this thesis. 
On the other hand, the (high) price for this is a significant lack of validity. Validity is  
hampered by both the case study design and the nature of the interview design. 
Although it seems plausible that conclusions based upon those case studies are valid 
for  other  cases,  there  is  not  much  apart  from anecdotal  evidence  that  supports 
validity across the EU online consultation regime within this thesis.
Whilst  reliability  is  generally  considered  as  one  of  the  advantages  of 
semi-structured interviews, there are nevertheless also problems with reliability as 
Richards (1996) points out. They are caused by 'failures in his/her memory. The older 
the witness, and the further from events they are, the less reliable the information 
(…). This is partly a result  of  the stretch of time, but interviewees also have the  
problem of confusing what  they can actually remember of events,  with what  they 
have later read on the same subject' (Richards, 1996, pp. 200–201).
Coming  to  the  types  of  interviewees,  there  are  three  categories  of  interview 
partners; interviewees from the Commission, participants of online consultation and 
outside observers. The latter two categories do not need further clarification. Outside 
observers are people who do not work for the Commission in areas directly related to  
the case studies or have participated in one of the case study consultations but are  
familiar  with  the  issues  of  the  online  consultation  regime,  most  of  them  are 
representatives  from  Brussels-based  lobby  firms,  think  tanks  and  lobby  watch 
groups. The rationale for interviewing people from this third category was to increase 
the reliability of interview data gathered from sources of category one and two by  
having a third observer of the online consultation process (Beamer, 2002, p. 93). It 
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also counterbalanced tendencies (in both the data and the researchers) to see the 
main actors' views as the main explanation for events and processes in the cases 
(Silverman, 1993, p. 199). 
With regard to the research praxis, one of the more severe problems was related 
to the organisational dynamics of the Commission. Ideally, we would like to know all 
key players of the policy-drafting phase who can then either be interviewed in total or, 
alternatively, a sample of the totality can be chosen. Although both cases were not 
affected by a reorganisation of units and/or responsibilities, not all people involved in 
the case study consultation still  worked in  the unit  when the interviewing began. 
Luckily, the key players still worked in the respective units and were able to name 
other  relevant  people  involved.  Yet,  their  accounts  regarding  relevant  players 
(although  cross-referenced  with  other  interviewees)  could  not  be  verified 
independently.  Ultimately,  the totality of key players is therefore unknown, so it is 
possible  that  not  all  of  those  who  were  relevant  for  the  case  studies  were 
interviewed.
To  further  address  the  reliability  issue  of  semi-structured  interviews  with  EU 
officials and to add another layer of data (Davies, 2001), a document analysis of the 
European Commission’s  policy communication was conducted regarding both  the 
case studies and online participation. As far as the latter is concerned, some of this 
research has been presented already in chapter 3. To allow for a potential contrast 
with the views of the Commission, semi-structured interviews with participants of the 
case study consultations were also undertaken. This is however close to anecdotal 
evidence as no sampling technique of participants was employed. While the totality 
of  participants  is  known,  contact  details  are  accessible  for  only  a  fraction  of 
participants. These were provided by the Commission's staff. As it was never an aim 
to draw conclusions about the whole EU citizenry, the lack of a systematic sample is 
acceptable.  The  aim  of  data  provided  both  by  the  participant  interviews  and 
document  analysis  allowed for  cross-referencing with  Commission  interview data, 
which  in  turn  helped  with  the  interpretation  of  EU  documents,  especially  as  the 
people who wrote key documents were interviewed.
Another reason why the research is less conclusive when it comes to participants 
lies  in  the  time  lag  between  the  act  of  participation  and  the  conducting  of  the 
interviews. A common answer to the posed questions was 'I can't remember', which 
is understandable, given that some interviews took place more than three years after 
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the participation event. This was especially a problem with participants of the animal 
welfare  case,  who  generally  had  no  professional  interest  in  consultations  and 
therefore their  life did not evolve around the activities of  the EU. In addition, the 
'professional participants' of the harmonisation case were often kind enough to admit 
that  they  could  not  answer  the  question  because  they  could  not  remember  the 
context and detailed content of the consultation. This became especially apparent 
when questions were asked about the content of the policies (such as 'from your  
perspective  which  were  the  most  relevant  points  raised  by  the  Commission's 
documents?'). Most interview partners only had a vague idea about the policy issue 
at stake.
The material on participants is likely to be further biased as the interview partners 
selected themselves by replying.  Hence,  it  is  likely,  and especially  in  the animal 
welfare  case,  that  individuals who  responded held  strong opinions on the Action 
Plan. Some comments made in the interview seemed to confirm this assumption. 
This, however, was not an issue with participants in the harmonisation case. One can 
speculate  here  that  the  willingness  to  participate  in  a  research  interview  was 
inversely proportional to their workload at the time of contacting. 
The last section of this chapter before the concluding remarks is used to describe 
the key elements of the field research and research practicalities. The first round of 
gathering data consisted of collecting relevant documents on all of the Commission's 
online  consultations  up until  2006.  Moreover,  a  small  database (with  the  help of 
SPSS statistical software package) of all closed consultations was built. This data in 
conjunction  with  the  literature  review  was  then  used  to  decide  the  case  study 
selection. 
Initial  interviews  took  place  in  June  and  July  2007  in  Brussels,  mostly  with 
interview partners outside of  the Commission.  The main round of  interviews with 
participants and Commission staff took place from May 2009 to May 2010. 
The initial  contact  with  the Commission was established in  two ways.  First  by 
contacting  the  DGs'  communication  offices  in  writing  and  second,  by  directly 
contacting personnel working in the relevant units of the DG via the directory of the  
Commission (accessible via the internet, see EU Commission, 2012a). The rationale 
for the former approach was that the Commission is obliged to reply to 'written on 
paper' requests for information or help (usually within month). This was done in case 
the latter approach would not yield any replies.
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After  the initial  contact  was established,  staff  also provided me with  names of 
colleagues  who  were  potentially  relevant  for  this  research  (also  referred  to  as 
'snowballing'), usually people who left the DG between drafting the policy and the 
field research. 
The medium of communication for the initial contact was a written letter sent via 
traditional post. Much of the subsequent communication was done via email and, to 
much lesser degree, telephone. 
The participants were contacted after the unit of the DG allowed me access to 
their participants' record. The permission was obtained to contact participants who 
decided that their input was not confidential (in the case of DG Enterprise) or, in the 
case of DG Health, to contact organisations to which the call for participation was 
sent. The response rate of participants was very low. Fewer than 7% of the contacted 
individuals responded to my request. Appendix III lists all interview partners. 
Interviews  were  conducted  via  telephone  and  via  email.  The  face-to-face 
interviews, bar two, took place in Brussels.  Appendix I contains an interview matrix 
used as guideline for interviewing EU officials. Appendix II is an example of an email  
questionnaire sent to participants.
No specialized software package was used in the analysis of the data, although 
versions of Atlas.ti, NVivo, MAXQDA, Qualrus, QDA Miner and HyperRESEARCH 
were tested. Instead, generic spreadsheet software was used. The decision to use 
spreadsheet software was based on the fact that the powerful statistical tools these 
other packages offer were not required. On the one hand traditional  spreadsheet 
software (both Open Office Calculator and MS Excel were used as processing took 
place  on  computers  using  both  MS Windows and Linux  operating  systems)  was 
deemed sufficient for the data and on the other hand no extensive training to use 
unfamiliar software was required. In addition, primary text documents were fed into a 
database based on the Zotero software, which is a tool developed to archive and 
reference traditional literature and, in particular, electronic texts and digital artefacts.  
This programme was also used for the traditional referencing of secondary literature 
for the thesis. 
With regard to the data analysis with spreadsheet software, transcribed sections 
(where voice recorded) of the interviews and key excerpts of the document analyses 
were (binary) coded according to their links to the three hypotheses along with some 
generic  descriptive  variables  (such  status  of  interview  and  case  relation).  This 
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allowed the easy grouping of data in relation to a hypothesis across the cases and 
data sources. Also, patterns of interview types were easier to identify by this method. 
This setup was very helpful in not becoming entangled by the narrative of individual 
interviews and cases and concentrating more on the propositions of the hypotheses 
without completely sacrificing the context of an interview narrative.
Concluding remarks
The  fourth  chapter  discussed  the  research  methods  of  this  thesis.  Three 
hypotheses  were  developed  in  order  to  analyse  the  data  originating  from  two 
Commission online consultations. The success and failure of this qualitative case 
study research depends to a great extent on effectively utilising interpretive methods 
as a form of establishing credible links between the data and the hypotheses. Such 
credible  links  are  established by both  having  data  from a  range of  sources and 
conducting systematic comparisons between the data, cases and theory. This is the 
task of the remaining two chapters. 
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Chapter 5: Case Studies – Policy Issues and Choices
This chapter gives an overview of the two case studies on policy issues. We will  
study the development of the proposals before and after the consultation took place 
and place them within the wider debates in the policy fields. 
This chapter is divided into two major parts, each part looking at one of the two 
case studies, 'Harmonisation of Legislation on Industrial Products' and 'Community 
Action  Plan on the  Protection  and Welfare  of  Animals  2006-2010'.  The first  part 
describes the product harmonisation case while the second is concerned with the 
animal welfare case.
Part I: Harmonisation of legislation on industrial products
The  first  case  study  deals  with  a  horizontal  legislative  approach  to  the 
harmonisation  of  legislation  on  EU  market  access  for  industrial  products.  This 
approach could also be described as the 'harmonisation of EU harmonisation policy'.  
It is a follow-up policy,  in particular to the ground-breaking resolution on the 'New 
Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standardisation' (Council, 1985). The case 
study consultation led to a package of three measures with the aim of improving the 
coherence  of  the  Single  Market.  First,  'Regulation  (EC)  No.  764/2008  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council  of 9 July 2008 Laying down Procedures 
relating to  the Application  of  certain  national  technical  Rules to  products lawfully 
marketed in another Member State and repealing Decision No. 3052/95/EC' (EP and 
Council, 2008a); second, 'Regulation (EC) No. 765/2008 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 July 2008 Setting Out the Requirements for Accreditation and 
Market Surveillance Relating to the Marketing of Products and Repealing Regulation 
(EEC) No. 339/93' (EP and Council, 2008b); and finally, 'Decision No. 768/2008/EC 
of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  9  July  2008  on  a  Common 
Framework  for  the  Marketing  of  Products,  and  Repealing  Council  Decision 
93/465/EEC'  (EP  and  Council,  2008c).  These  three  measures  collectively  are 
sometimes  referred  to  as  the  '2008  Goods  Package'  or  the  'New  Legislative 
Framework' (a phrase preferred by the Commission).
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The following first part of this case study overview will  shed some light on the 
mechanisms of European integration and market access. The second part looks at 
the online consultation process and the content of the consultation. The third part  
then analyses the policy problems and policy choices made by the Commission in 
the light of the consultation process. 
Policy background of product harmonisation
The policy of the 'harmonisation of legislation on industrial products' is essentially 
a meta-regulation of technical trade barriers caused by product standards; in other 
words,  this  is  a  harmonisation  of  harmonisation  rules  and  a  part  of  the  wider 
'regulatory mode of EU policy making'. The regulatory mode refers to a 'framework 
for  numerous micro-level  decisions and rules,  for  the  shape of  relationships  with 
member governments and economic actors (…)'  (Wallace, 2005, p. 81) within the 
Single Market. 
At the centre of the regulatory mode, the Commission acts as the main policy 
designer  and  defender  of  regulatory  goals.  The  Commission  also  offers  various 
access points for societal  actors.  The Commission's consultations in their various 
forms (and, among them, online consultations) in principle offer the opportunity to 
shape the content of European market legislation. 
The Council of Ministers shapes the broader political aims of harmonisation. The 
role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is to ensure a coherent application of the 
law across the EU and also creates an arena for addressing cases of discrimination 
of or by individual economic actors (Wallace, 2005, p. 81). Moreover, the ECJ holds 
the classic judicial role of settling disputes. The Parliament is less important in this  
policy-mode  (Lord, 2003, p. 265). It  can nevertheless prompt 'the consideration of 
non-economic factors (environmental, regional, social and so forth) with increasing 
impact  as  its  legislative  powers  have grown but  it  still  has  little  leverage on the 
implementation of regulation' (Wallace, 2005, p. 81). 
This  regulatory mode is  the  bread and butter  work  of  large parts  of  the  EU's 
institutions and, in particular, the Commission. Although many EU actors – including 
the  Commission  –  prefer  to  focus  on  a  specific  policy  area,  the  legal  basis  for  
legislation  is  ultimately  treaty  articles  dealing  with  the  Single  Market  and  the 
regulatory regime (Pelkmans, 2011, p. 2) – as we will also see in the animal welfare 
case.
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From a historical perspective, early European (market) integration was focused on 
customs, tariffs and quotas and less concerned with technical barriers to trade. This 
changed during the 1960s and 1970s,  with  the perception that  new technologies 
resulted in new products, which led to concerns over consumer protection and the 
environment. Subsequently,  as Pelkmans comments, 'modern developed countries 
have turned into machines for risk regulation' (2007, p. 707). Technical barriers to 
trade increased, which challenged the then new idea of the internal market and the 
free movement of  goods. As a policy problem, non-tariff  barriers largely replaced 
tariffs, which had been abolished among the Member States by 1968 (Young, 2005, 
p. 95). 
The Commission's initial approach to tackle the problem of technical barriers to 
trade  aimed  at  complete  harmonisation  (also  called  'Old  Approach'),  that  is  the 
adoption of detailed identical rules for a product or a product category for all Member 
States. Apart from the sheer volume of technical details (Voss, 1998, pp. 54–56), this 
process was slow mainly due to the need for unanimity in the Council, an institution 
made up of government representatives who were faced with pressure from interest 
groups wishing to preserve the status quo (Pelkmans, 1987, pp. 252–53). 
The nature of policy-making for the Single Market changed significantly with the 
Single European Act (SEA), effective since the 1st of July, 1987. The SEA revived 
so-called 'negative integration',  'that is,  the removal  of  national  rules that  impede 
economic exchange' (Young, 2005, p. 102). It led to the mutual recognition principle, 
the abolition of frontier controls and the elimination of exchange controls. The SEA 
also changed the institutional framework for 'positive integration' i.e. the process of 
'agreeing  common  rules  to  replace  national  ones  by  reinstating  QMV  [qualified 
majority voting] and enhancing the powers of the EP'  (Young, 2005, p. 102). The 
SEA made it easier to achieve negative integration, which happens '[i]f one member 
government  prohibits  the  sale  of  a  product  produced  legally  in  another  Member 
State,  the  producing  firm  can  challenge  that  prohibition  under  European  law.  If 
successful the importing member government must accept the product, and negative 
integration has occurred'  (Young, 2005, p. 103). Nevertheless, Member States may 
seek to exclude products from their markets, usually on the grounds of safety, health, 
environmental concerns and/or consumer protection. In the spirit of free movement,  
this is an exception to the rule. If the standards in both the producing/exporting and 
importing country are essentially the same then there will  be no exception for the 
121
product in question. If there is conflict regarding the assessment of standards then 
the ECJ will be asked for a ruling. Mutual recognition thus becomes the default case. 
It is only not applied in cases where a harmonisation measure exists or if a Member 
State  believes  that  there  are  substantial  dangers  associated  with  the  product 
although it is accepted in other Member States' markets.
If negative integration is not possible because national standards are substantially 
different then positive integration is needed. National legislation is then replaced by 
European legislation  (Young,  2005,  p.  103).  At  this  stage,  the  New Approach to 
product harmonisation becomes relevant. Where standards are not at a comparable 
level, an exception has to be made. The free movement of goods then depends on 
product harmonisation. The New Approach to technical harmonisation amounts, in 
essence,  to  mutual  recognition  with  regard  to  technical  standards  (also  called 
'regulatory mutual recognition'), i.e. the goal is defined but the means are open. The 
core concept of the New Approach to harmonisation is that the Commission together 
with the Council and the Parliament defines standards in broad terms for groups of  
products.  The more  technical  and often  case-specific  decisions are  then handed 
down to assessment bodies: certification organisations or so-called 'notified bodies' if 
they are accredited at EU level (Gehring & Kerler, 2008, p. 1002). Their task is it to 
test,  inspect  or  certify  a  product  with  regard  to  EU  safety  standards  as  an 
independent third  party.  If  a  product  meets  the  standards  according  to  the 
assessment organisation it is awarded the CE (Conformité Européenne) label (or 'CE 
marking' in official terms) and can be freely placed on the Single Market.
The EU's harmonisation policy aims to minimise unwanted trade barriers based on 
technical  regulations  and  product  standards.  In  1995,  the  WTO  produced  the 
agreement on 'Technical Barriers to Trade' (negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round 
of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade)  in  which  it  described  product 
standards regulations as 'a document approved by a recognized body, that provides, 
for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or 
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory'  
in contrast to 'technical regulations',  which are mandatory measures  (World Trade 
Organization, 2003, p. 497). In other words, minimisation of technical trade barriers is 
a show case for the differences between free trade and the EU's 'guarantee' of the 
free movement of goods, capital, services, and people (also known as the EU's four  
freedoms) within the Single Market. Free trade simply means that a country abstains 
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from imposing  tariffs  and  quotas  for  goods  but  remains  autonomous  in  granting 
market access, based, for instance, on technical regulations. The concept of free 
movement  of  goods,  however,  changes  this  fundamentally  because  the  right  of 
market access is already a given. Without the free movement of goods and services, 
the EU would merely form a customs union but the EU's four freedoms make it a 
union of states with a fully fledged internal market (Pelkmans, 2007, p. 700).
The  Achilles  heel  of  this  approach  to  regulation  is  the  matter  of  what  is 
'recognised'  within  the  internal  market.  A  single  directive  may  refer  to  several 
hundred different products. This is a problem both for Member States and market  
operators. The development of European technical standard based objectives in the 
relevant directives is done by (semi-) private standardisation organisations such as 
the  European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the  European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI). Pelkmans comments that the legally voluntary character 
of those standards is beneficial: 'In case a company is innovative and creates novel  
aspects or techniques or uses new materials not foreseen in a European standard, 
the new good can be tested directly on compliance with (...) the relevant directive(s)'  
(2007, p. 703). Wallace however also points out the limitations of the New Approach 
in commenting that 'it appears to have been particularly successful in dealing with 
product regulation, and less robust in dealing with process standards (...). The mode 
has also had rather less purchase on the regulation of services, financial markets, 
and  utilities,  where  instead  we  see  moves  towards  more  decentralized,  less 
hierarchical versions of regulation' (2005, p. 82).
The key concept of the New Approach is to distinguish between general health 
and safety requirements and detailed technical specifications. While these standards 
are not legally binding, they still have an important market function. An EU Member 
State  'must  assume  that  products  conforming  to  their  requirements  are  also  in 
conformity with the legally binding general health and safety standards of the relevant 
directives' (Gehring, 2007, p. 12). Hence, a Member State must accept the marketing 
of such products within its jurisdiction  (Gehring & Kerler, 2008, p. 1010). The CE 
marking represents a claim by the manufacturer or importer that a product has meets 
EU health, safety, and environmental requirements. This is the de facto entry ticket 
into  the European Single Market.  As a consequence consumers from across the 
globe frequently come across the CE label on products. 
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The  harmonisation  of  technical  standards  for  products  is  seen  as  a  central 
prerequisite  for  the  free  movement  of  goods within  the  European Single  Market.  
Egan notes that 'a market is not organized by itself, but always operates within a 
political and legal framework that provides the rules of the game’ (2001, p. 2). Mario 
Monti,  the former Commissioner  for the Internal  Market  and for Competition,  has 
argued that  'a  robust  Single Market  is  key to  the overall  health  of  the European  
Union, because it represents the very foundation of the integration project'  (Monti, 
2010,  p.  12).  Naturally,  the  Commission  is  enthusiastic  about  the  drive  towards 
comprehensive EU market integration and regards the Single Market as 'one of the 
great achievements of our time (...). This economic space, where goods, services, 
capital  and labour can circulate freely,  provides a foundation for prosperity in the 
European Union (…)' (EU Commission, 2000a, p. 3).
According to Gehring, 'today 23 directives are in force, which cover wide product 
areas (...) including sectors, in which decision making had been blocked under the 
Old Approach'  (2007, p. 12). The directives cover everything from machinery of all 
types  and  sizes,  toys,  elevators,  radio  and  telecommunication  equipment  and 
building materials to railway transport and medical products. At the time of the online 
consultation process in 2006, the Commission reckoned that some 600 legislative 
texts for harmonisation covering industrial products had been adopted since 1969 
and  that  the  EU's  harmonisation  legislation  covered  around  80%  of  industrial 
production  as  well  as  approximately  74%  of  intra-EU  manufacturing  trade  (DG 
Enterprise, 2007, p. 7) with an estimated value of more than €1500 billion per year 
(DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 11).
However, regulating the conformity assessment had become a difficult challenge. 
The new battleground for product harmonisation shifted from the Commission and 
the Council to organisations dealing with product certification. The question of mutual  
recognition  of  standards  among  testing  and  certification  organisations  was  first  
comprehensively addressed 1990 in the Commission's so-called ‘Global Approach’ 
(Nicolaïdis & Egan, 2001, p. 462).
According to the Commission, during the implementation of the New Approach 
legislation various shortcomings were uncovered. Foremost amongst these was a 
lack of coherence in its implementation and enforcement. The Commission identified 
the  'distortion  to  competition  because  of  differing  practices  in  the  designation  of 
conformity assessment bodies by national authorities and unequal treatment in the 
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case of non complying or dangerous products on the market, through very different 
national  market  surveillance  infrastructures,  rules  and  means'  (EU  Commission, 
2007b, p. 2). 
The fact that notified assessment organisations are a source of market distortion is 
not  surprising  as  legislation  only  sets  minimum  criteria,  which  a  conformity 
assessment  body must  interpret  and meet.  It  is  the responsibility  of  the Member 
States to ensure that a conformity assessment organisation does meet the criteria. If 
a Member State believes that such an organisation fulfils the relevant requirements it 
notifies the Commission and the other Member States that this organisation has been 
appointed to implement conformity assessments in accordance with one or more EU 
directive(s). Hence, in EU legal terms the conformity assessment body becomes a 
'notified body'. Moreover, the '[n]otification of notified bodies and their withdrawal are 
the responsibility of the notifying  Member State'  (DG Enterprise, 2012). Apart from 
very  small  Member  States  such  as  Malta  and  Cyprus,  all  Member  States  have 
national accreditation schemes for assessing whether an assessment organisation 
complies with EU criteria so that it can become a notified body. The main difference 
between Member States is that in some states the accreditation bodies are private 
organisations,  whilst  other  countries  delegate  accreditation  duties  to  their  public 
bodies. Hence, the mode of accreditation differs both between Member States and 
between  product  sectors  (DG  Enterprise,  2007,  p.  62). Different  accreditation 
schemes contributed to different implementation outcomes, which according to the 
Commission led to the aforementioned 'distortion to competition'.
The  upshot  of  all  this  is  that  the  Commission's  proposed  legislation  had  the 
'objective  to  provide  a  common  framework  for  the  existing  infrastructures  for 
accreditation  for  the  control  of  conformity  assessment  bodies,  and  market 
surveillance for the control of products and economic operators, by reinforcing and 
extending what  exists (...)  and the organisation of the revision of existing product 
related Community harmonisation legislation' (EU Commission, 2007b, p. 2).
Consultation process and content
Given its complexity and importance, it is no wonder that the process of market 
harmonisation and its tools are under constant review. With regard to the directive on 
'Harmonisation of Legislation on Industrial Products', the Commission held a public 
consultation on the New Approach directives as early as 2002. This consultation also 
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provided the background to the 2003 Commission's communication on 'enhancing 
the implementation of the New Approach directives'  (EU Commission, 2003c). Both 
the 2002 consultation and the 2003 communication already outlined core elements 
for the 2006 internet consultation. This case study consultation was open between 
the 13th of June and the 26th of July 2006 (EU Commission, 2006f).
At the initial policy formulation stage, the Commission circulated its main working 
documents to all  major stakeholders. Based on the feedback to these (some 250 
replies), a draft proposal went on the Your Voice in Europe website as an internet 
consultation in 2006. The internet consultation received 280 replies (EU Commission, 
2007b, p. 3). From the Commission's perspective, the internet consultation confirmed 
the results of the initial consultations on the working documents: 'The contributions 
received  confirm  that  the  proposals  should  build  on  what  exists  as  opposed  to 
creating  a  new system (...).  They reaffirm it  [notified  body]  as  a  public  authority 
activity  and  (…)  should  be  free  of  commercial  competition.  The  conformity 
assessment  body  system  [sic]  requires  stricter  selection  criteria  and  harmonised 
national selection processes. Support was given to the harmonised definitions and 
the obligations set out for the economic operators (...).  Practically all contributions 
supported  a  Community  market  surveillance  system with  an  information  and  co-
operation system between national authorities (...)  and without creating new tools.  
The option of abandoning the CE marking was contested and clarifying its meaning 
and protecting it legally were supported' (EU Commission, 2007b, p. 3). 
Subsequently, the Commission developed four 'fact finding questionnaires' aimed 
at specific industry sectors. The questionnaire for companies was used by the Euro 
Info Centre network to carry out face to face interviews with some 800 small and 
medium-sized  businesses.  Additionally,  the  Commission  consulted  experts  in  the 
fields of conformity assessment, accreditation, market surveillance, standardisation 
and technical harmonisation at all stages of the policy formulating process. Experts 
also  directly  participated  in  meetings  (EU Commission,  2007b,  p.  3).  Finally,  an 
Impact Assessment was compiled (DG Enterprise, 2007). The Impact Assessment is 
a procedure that aims to raise the quality of a potential policy before implementation 
by assessing the consequences of different policy options (including the option to do 
nothing). The option of changing nothing was discarded as was the option to work on 
the  basis  of  non-regulatory  measures.  The  latter  was  ruled  out  because 
non-regulatory measures had already been used exhaustively before. Moreover, the 
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Impact Assessment came to the conclusion that '(p)roblems originating in the existing 
legal  provisions  can  only  be  eliminated through a  change in  the  legislation'  (EU 
Commission, 2007b, p. 5). 
If  we  look at  the  specific  design  of  the  case study online  consultation  from a 
technology perspective it is vital to remember that the IPM itself is an empty shell,  
which needs to be filled by the policy officer in charge. The initial content, i.e. the 
design of the survey and questions is in effect prepared outside of the IPM. The 
unglamorous role of the IPM in providing help with the design of the consultation is  
perhaps best illustrated by the  following advice found in the IPM manual: 'Please 
note that prior to the process of creation of the online questionnaire it is advised to  
create the questions and answers in a simple Word document. You can then proceed 
by copy/paste to introduce the different elements in the system' (DG Digit, 2012c, p. 
1). Publishing an online consultation with the IPM can be divided into three phases. 
The first is to create an initial survey, which is then tested in a second phase with a 
select  group  of  people.  Their  feedback  may  then  inform the  design  of  the  final 
consultation. The third phase is the actual publication of the online consultation. It is 
crucial  to  remember  that  the  policy  officer  can  in  any  phase  alter  parts  of  the 
consultation (including deleting items), temporarily halt a consultation or permanently 
delete it. The latter is particularly severe as the operation cannot be undone  (DG 
Digit, 2012c, p. 107). From the participants’ view, the IPM does not help to trace such 
changes. The core problem here is that the technology of the IPM does not improve 
institutional  accountability.  The  IPM  is  a  weak  tool  to  hold  the  policy  officers 
accountable to the ideals of a transparent and democratic policy process as they can 
fundamentally change the consultation process virtually undocumented. 
If  we  look  at  the  main  participants  characteristics  of  the  2006  case  study 
consultation we can see that 
• the  majority  of  the  280  participants  (77.5%)  took  part  on  behalf  of  an 
organisation, institution or enterprise (DG Enterprise, 2006, p. 1),
• the  majority  of  participants  came  from  Germany  with  73  participants, 
followed  by  France  (60),  the  UK  (25),  Italy  (22)  and  Belgium  with  20 
participants (DG Enterprise, 2006, p. 2),
• important sectors of economic activity for the participants were electronics 
related enterprises,  machinery and construction and less important  were 
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sectors  such  as  toys,  transport,  recreational  craft  and  chemicals  (DG 
Enterprise, 2006, p. 3).
If we turn to the content of the consultation then part one and two of the consultation 
address issues around standardisation, part three and four assessment procedures 
and notified bodies, part five deals with CE marking while part six and seven deal 
with traceability and market surveillance. 
The first part of the consultation results revealed that European standardisation is  
generally regarded as an effective tool within the framework of the New Approach.  
Roughly 86% of participants held this view (DG Enterprise, 2006, p. 5). According to 
the participants,  the most  pressing problems were  the lack of a coherent  market 
surveillance  regime  and  conformity  assessment.  In  contrast,  the  accreditation 
infrastructure for notified assessment organisations was deemed to be less important 
(DG Enterprise, 2006, p. 18).
In the second part of the consultation dealing with standardisation, the participants 
complained  that  the  standardisation  process  was  to  too  slow.  Two  thirds  of 
respondents  regard  this  as  an  'important'  or  the  'most  important  problem'  (DG 
Enterprise, 2006, p. 5). A less pressing problem was the complexity of the process. 
The  participants  did  not  consider  the  'lack  of  stakeholder  visibility'  or  that  the 
'standardisation  process  has  a  wrong  image'  (DG Enterprise,  2006,  pp.  5–6) as 
important issues. 
The third part on conformity assessment procedures highlighted a high degree of 
consensus among participants and no real concerns in this area. Most participants 
believed that a 'wide choice of conformity assessment procedures is important' (80% 
replied 'I  agree'  or  'I  tend to  agree'  with  the statement),  whilst  at  the same time 
agreeing that 'the current directives leave a sufficiently wide choice' (DG Enterprise, 
2006, p. 7).
The  most  surprising  result  of  the  fourth  part  on  notified  bodies  was  that 
participants  were  split  over  the  assessment  of  the  uniformity  of  assessments  by 
notified bodies across the EU - an issue that the Commission identified as a core 
problem. 55% of participants answered either 'I disagree' or 'I tend to disagree' with  
the  statement  that  '[n]otified  bodies  across  the  EU  perform  their  tasks  to  a 
satisfactorily even level  of  quality'.  In contrast,  40% agreed with  the statement in 
broad terms (DG Enterprise, 2006, p. 8). Nevertheless, a majority (61%) considered 
notified bodies to be insufficiently monitored. 98% of participants supported the idea 
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of  withdrawing  accreditation  for  dubious  notified  bodies,  believing  that  an 
accreditation scheme for assessment bodies would improve the credibility of notified 
bodies (DG Enterprise, 2006, pp. 8–9). Other issues were more consensual, such as 
an agreement on a minimum amount of activity of notified bodies in their accredited 
areas, a time limit on the validity of the notification of a body by a Member State and 
the  verification  of  competencies  of  assessment  bodies  by  Member  States  (DG 
Enterprise, 2006, p. 8).
The fifth part on CE marking again was an area of consensus. The vast majority of 
respondents (87%) did not wish to abolish the CE marking and believed that the best 
way forward was to initiate an information campaign to make it better known (89%). 
Anything leading to more obligations for manufacturers or importers was rejected 
(such as 'compulsory third party certification' as opposed to in-house self-certification 
for certain products) as were 'imposing traceability' and 'systematic border controls' 
(DG Enterprise, 2006, pp. 10–12).
In the sixth part on traceability, there were no real surprises. Participants decided 
that  the  idea  of  clarifying  the  obligations  of  economic  operators  would  be  an 
acceptable measure (88% answered either  'I  agree'  or  'I  tend to  agree'  with  the 
statement).  They  also  supported  appointing  a  representative  authorised  by  the 
manufacturers to deal with standardisation issues (the top priority out of three with 
41% of the respondents). Less acceptable was the idea of a 'registration system' and 
'keeping record(s) of suppliers and purchasers' (DG Enterprise, 2006, pp. 13–15).
The  seventh  and  last  part  dealt  with  market  surveillance.  There  was  general 
agreement that a 'coherent enforcement of product safety rules throughout Member 
States would ensure a level playing field for companies and a safe market place for 
consumers' (96% answered either 'I agree' or 'I tend to agree' with the statement) 
and that 'market surveillance is insufficiently rigorous'. Participants broadly supported 
the demand that 'Member States should invest more in market surveillance' (89% 
answered 'yes', 'No' 5% and 'I don’t know' 5%) (DG Enterprise, 2006, p. 16). More 
controversial was the question of whether 'it is justified to treat consumer products 
differently  than  products  for  professional  use'.  54% of  respondents  agreed,  37% 
disagreed (and 9% did not have an answer) (DG Enterprise, 2006, p. 17). 
Arguably,  more interesting than the results of the consultation is the degree to 
which these results actually fed into the draft proposal. How much, if at all, did the 
online  consultation  influence  the  policy  paper  subsequently  produced  by  the 
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Commission? From outside the institution, the impact of the online consultation is 
difficult to assess because the Commission bundled together the inputs from different 
types  of  consultation  over  longer  periods  of  time.  Hence,  to  single  out  one 
consultation and attribute to it specific importance is impossible without analysing the 
internal view of the Commission’s officials. We will  address this issue of how the 
Commission saw the online consultation in chapter 6. In the meantime, we will treat 
the Commission as a black box. Input from the consultation goes in and out comes a 
policy proposal. In this sense, the last section on results provided the input for the 
black box. 
A document produced by DG Enterprise explaining the decision-making process of 
the  New  Approach  package  provides  initial  insights  into  the  Commission's 
assessment of the role of the online consultation. This 'Commission Staff Working 
Document, accompanying document to the Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and 
of the Council setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance 
relating to the marketing of products – Impact Assessment' (DG Enterprise, 2007) (or 
short 'Impact Assessment') aims to explain and justify the internal decision-making 
process for other actors in the EU, in particular the Council and the Parliament. The 
document highlights three problematic areas: first,  the role of assessment bodies; 
second, issues surrounding market surveillance and enforcement of directives; and 
third, the role of the CE marking. Hence, how exactly does this Impact Assessment 
document explain the internal decision-making process also in the light of the online 
consultation?
Policy problems and policy choices
The first issue centres on notified bodies. Here the main problem – as mentioned 
above – was the varying rigour in the implementation and enforcement assessment 
standards  across  different  Member  States  by  different  notified  bodies.  Problems 
arose on at least three levels: first, for manufacturers needing a CE marking to place 
a product on the market; second, for assessment bodies that award the CE marking; 
and third, for consumers buying products on the market. 
Conceptualised in terms of game theory,  the problem of varying  standards for 
notified  bodies  constitutes  a  classic  race  to  the  bottom scenario  (Deakin,  2006), 
although official Commission documents did not use this term. Instead, they merely 
describe  the  mechanisms,  which  is  a  form of  the  well-known prisoner's  dilemma 
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(Deakin, 1999). From the demand side of conformity assessments, manufacturers 
realise  that  both  the  interpretation  of  safety  requirements  and  the  procedural 
requirements vary considerably between different assessment organisations. There 
is  no  incentive  for  manufacturers  to  obtain  their  assessment  from more  rigorous 
assessment organisations (where the whole process is potentially more costly, too) 
because a directive defines only minimum standards that need to be met for a CE 
marking.  Hence,  manufacturers  have  a  clear  incentive  to  go  for  the  cheapest 
assessment body. At the same time, from the supply side, assessment organisations 
compete with one another. While in theory this may lead to better services and lower 
prices  for  manufacturers,  it  can have also  negative  consequences if  assessment 
organisations lower their requirements for product assessments in order to provide 
their  services  cheaper  than  competitors  do.  Ultimately,  consumers  in  the  Single 
Market loose out in this scenario because they have to buy products that are less 
safe  compared  to  a  world  where  the  same  level  of  rigour  in  implementing  and 
enforcing assessment standards applies for all  notified bodies across the Member 
States. 
The Commission gathered some evidence that such a race to the bottom was 
actually taking place. In a non-representative survey amongst notified bodies, 42% of 
the respondents named 'less rigorous implementation of procedures by some notified 
bodies',  37%  'unrealistically  low  pricing  for  services'  and  30%  'less  rigorous 
implementation of essential requirements' (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 13) as sources of 
'unfair competition'. Bearing in mind that lower prices do not automatically equate to 
lower  quality,  this  data  needs  to  be  treated with  caution.  In  this  survey,  notified 
bodies determined what constitutes 'unfair competition' and overstating the degree of 
'unfair competition' may well be a strategy to eliminate 'fair competition'. 
Another indicator for a possible race to the bottom is the variance of price for the 
same service. The Commission reckons that a variance in the range of 15% is a 
common market scenario. However, a Commission's survey amongst notified bodies 
revealed a variance range of between 30% and 75% for the same service in different 
testing areas. From the demand side, a Commission's survey amongst small  and 
medium sized enterprises revealed an average variation of 48%.  (DG Enterprise, 
2007, p. 14). 
At  the  time of  the consultation,  the  Commission was  not  sure if  the  obscured 
downward spiral  had already had significant effects at the level  of the consumer. 
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Ambiguously, the Commission states in its Impact Assessment: 'The negative impact 
of  such procedures has been limited to  economic  effects  for  notified bodies and 
manufacturers alike and has not yet reached a level where the health and safety of  
consumers, workers or end-users is routinely endangered, although there have been 
cases' (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 14, emphasis added) The report goes on to claim 
that '[t]here is no specific data which would allow to make a link between the [sic] an 
inappropriate  testing  by a notified body and accidents  occurred with  the certified 
products'  (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 41). From these statements, it is not clear if the 
Commission  wanted  to  downplay  the  effects  for  the  consumer,  if  there  was  no 
backlash, or, if it had no clear idea about the situation in the market. It should be  
noted,  however,  that  it  is  highly  plausible  that  if  both  notified  bodies  and 
manufacturers were already affected by such an obscured downward spiral that then 
this would also have had a negative effect on the products sold by manufacturers,  
which in turn would have had an effect at the consumer level.
The root cause of this presumed race to the bottom was different standards for 
notified bodies across EU Member States. The Commission identified a couple of 
factors for this. First, in the survey amongst EU notified bodies, roughly half of them 
believed that the competence of notified assessment organisations was not the same 
in all Member States (56%), while only roughly a quarter considered the level to be 
consistent (24%)  (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 16). Second, some notified assessment 
organisations notified to the Commission did not perform any conformity assessment 
activities with regard to directives for which they had been appointed by Member 
States (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 15). Third, the assessment process of notified bodies 
by Member States is seriously lacking in transparency. Essentially, a Member State 
does little more than to announce that an assessment organisation fulfils the criteria  
laid down in the EU legislation for notified bodies without providing further details for 
the  Commission  or  other  Member  States  (DG  Enterprise,  2007,  p.  16).  Fourth, 
different  Member  States  have  different  approaches  to  monitoring  their  notified 
bodies.  This  is  to  say  that  some  Member  States  evaluate  their  notified  bodies 
annually whilst other Member States do this every four years (DG Enterprise, 2007, 
p. 17). Finally,  the notification procedure (i.e. informing the Commission and other 
Member  States  about  the  existence  of  a  notified  body)  lacks  transparency  (DG 
Enterprise,  2007,  p.  17).  This  problem had  already  been  tackled  by  an  internet 
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application managing the notification process with the  New Approach Notified and 
Designated Organisations (NANDO) input tool (DG Enterprise, 2012).
According to  the Commission's  report,  the second set  of  problems centred on 
directives that were not properly enforced. Member States and many market actors 
regarded the enforcement of EU legislation on products as insufficient. In essence, 
this means that products, which do not comply with the EU legal requirements enter 
the Single Market. There is a range of causes for this situation. At the Member State  
level,  this  includes  -but  is  not  limited  to-  issues  like  insufficient  frequency  and 
efficiency of checks, lack of resources allocated to enforcement, lack of traceability of 
products,  lack  of  coordinated  actions,  lack  of  effective  sanctions,  insufficiently 
controlled external borders, lack of cross-border co-operation in the EU and a lack of 
traceability  of  economic  operators  (which  means  that  authorities  have  problems 
identifying  the entity  which  made a product  and/or  distributes  it  within  the Single 
Market) (DG Enterprise, 2007, pp. 21–23). 
At  the  EU  level  especially,  the  safeguard  clause  mechanism  does  not  work 
effectively. In EU terminology, the safeguard clause refers to a measure whereby one 
Member State notifies the Commission that another Member State fails to comply 
with obligations regarding to the internal market. Reasons for the ineffectiveness are 
the lack of resources within the Commission to assess cases, insufficient information 
provision by the Member State which triggers the safeguard clause mechanism and a 
tendency to over-notify, which means that a Member State notifies a breach without  
thoroughly  checking  whether  the  case is  actually  a  valid  breach  (DG Enterprise, 
2007, p. 23). 
Another problem at the EU level is common to complex systems: inconsistencies. 
In  this  case,  we  refer  to  inconsistencies  in  the  regulatory  framework.  The  main 
causes of inconsistencies were unclear key terminology, which remains undefined in 
some directives  or  has different  meanings in  different  directives.  This  problem is 
amplified by the fact that the same product can be subject to a whole range of EU 
directives  and  other  legal  instruments,  which  led  in  some cases  to  incompatible 
conformity assessment procedures (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 27).
This in turn leads to an unnecessarily time consuming, judicially laden and costly 
process for the manufacturer. It also makes it more difficult for national authorities to 
implement  and  enforce  EU  law.  On  the  level  of  market  actors,  distributors  and 
especially importers from outside the EU do not always check the EU conformity of 
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their products. In principle, this is the obligation of the manufacturer. However, this 
obligation is transferred to the EU distributor for products manufactured outside of the 
EU as products made outside do not a priori have to comply with EU standards as 
they may have been produced for other markets (DG Enterprise, 2007, pp. 23–24). 
The effects of insufficient enforcement of EU directives are similar to the effects of 
varying  standards  for  notified  bodies.  Insufficient  enforcement  creates  an  unfair 
competitive advantage for market actors who do not comply with EU legislation. This 
can ultimately lead to a downward spiral because compliance in this case constitutes 
a competitive disadvantage. Again, consumers in the Single Market loose out in this 
situation because they buy products that are less safe compared to a world where 
directives are rigorously enforced across the EU (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 24). 
All of this is happening in a highly interdependent world with complex economic 
relations  within  the  EU  and  beyond.  At  the  moment  intra-EU  production  (or 
EU-domestic)  is  growing  slower  than  imports  from  non-EU  countries.  Hence,  if 
compared to issues around notified bodies the scale of the problem is a very different  
one. The number of relevant actors is seemingly endless compared to roughly 1500 
notified bodies (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 67) within the EU. Equally, the relationship is 
infinitely more complex than between notified bodies and manufacturers.
While  the  two  issues  of  notified  bodies  and  inconsistencies  in  the  regulatory 
framework  concerned  mainly  professional  market  operatives,  the  third  issue  of  
misunderstanding the CE marking affected the average consumer – at least in the 
way  the  Commission  initially  phrased  the  problem.  In  the  consultation,  the 
Commission addressed the problem that many consumers seemed not to understand 
what the CE marking tells them about a product. The main reason lies in the fact that 
the addressee of the CE marking is not the consumer, which is already a very wide 
category – from the man in the supermarket buying a soft toy to the architect ordering 
a lift installation for his new building complex – but national authorities. Seeing the 
CE marking,  official  bodies have to  assume that  this  product  can circulate freely 
within the Single Market (as long as there is no evidence of non-compliance). 
Interestingly, the Commission's Impact Assessment also states that this problem is 
not solely restricted to average consumers but '[e]ven amongst professionals and 
legislators,  the meaning [of  the CE marking] is not  always  clear'  (DG Enterprise, 
2007, p. 26). There are a number of common misconceptions about the CE marking. 
To start with, most people do not know which products need to have a CE marking.  
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This  has  led  to  a  situation  where  manufacturers  place  CE  markings  rather  too 
generously on their products even when they are not in fact required. This is done 
either in the hope that it will enhance the value of the product and/or to 'guarantee' 
that their product could definitely be marketed in the entire EU. Moreover, the CE 
marking is often perceived as an indication of origin (similar to locally produced food) 
or as proof that a product is in any case tested and approved by some authoritative 
third  party  (similar  to  awards  by  consumer  organisations  or  magazines)  (DG 
Enterprise, 2007, p. 25). In addition, products often bear labels that indicate exactly 
these  qualities,  such  as  local  origin,  adherence  to  non-obligatory  environmental 
standards  or  quality  testing  of  some  kind.  All  this  blurs  the  meaning  of  the  CE 
marking for the consumer. Hence, it is criticised for its lack of credibility, especially if  
we take into account that the CE marking is sometimes affixed to products that do 
not comply with the relevant EU legislation.
In  light  of  these  policy  problems,  what  policy  options  were  discussed?  As 
mentioned above, the Commission took from the start the view that there was a need 
for regulatory action. The option to do nothing was dismissed on the grounds that the 
problems were too important to ignore and that a 'self-healing' of the market was 
unlikely to  occur.  Furthermore,  the option to  resort  to non-legal  actions was also 
dismissed by the Commission. On the one hand, the Commission believed that it had 
already unsuccessfully tried to tackle the problems on a non-legal basis. On the other 
hand, the Commission argued that issues arising from the existing legal framework 
could only by tackled by changing the problematic part  of the EU legislation  (EU 
Commission, 2007b, p. 5). 
In the context of notified bodies, the main options discussed were a) to directly 
regulate notified bodies at the EU level; b) create a specific agency at the EU level,  
which  would  centrally  take care  of  assessing notified bodies  with  the help of  an 
accreditation scheme;  c)  to  establish  an EU legal  framework  that  would  regulate 
competence assessment of notified bodies and d) to create a horizontal network of 
notified bodies at the EU level. In addition, the Commission discussed the already 
adopted web-based notification procedure via the NANDO-Input service.
The  first  option  –  directly  regulating  the  activities  of  notified  bodies  –  was 
dismissed almost outright. Clearly, a regulatory framework would probably produce a 
more consistent conformity assessment. However, it would bring back the problems 
of  the  Old  Approach  to  harmonisation  through  the  back-door.  The  Commission 
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argued that the policy-making process would be rather lengthy and cumbersome and 
that also after the adoption of the regulatory framework, it would lack the flexibility to 
react quickly to new technical developments (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 53).
Option b) – an EU agency to assess notified bodies via an accreditation scheme – 
was accepted within  the consultation process as an effective way of tackling the 
problems around notified bodies. Nevertheless, the Commission also dismissed this 
policy  option  because  of  the  costs  involved  in  setting  up  such  an  agency  and 
because of subsidiarity issues (any matter that can be regulated better on a national 
level  must  be  left  to  the  Member  States).  Building  an  agency  would  mean 
establishing  a  whole  new  structure,  when  most  Member  States  already  have 
accreditation schemes. What is more,  Member States would lose their  powers to 
regulate an assessment organisation. The Commission clearly anticipated a conflict  
with the Council and concluded: 'The disadvantage of the agency option is that it  
would create a totally new structure instead of building upon an existing system. 
Important knowledge and synergy would be lost and adaptation to a new set of rules 
and procedures would lead to an unnecessary and additional administrative burden, 
both for the notified bodies and the national authorities, especially in the initial period'  
(DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 53). 
Hence, the Commission went for option c) – establishing a legal framework for 
competence assessment of notified bodies – which means that the assessment and 
monitoring of notified bodies is still  to be done by the Member States but with  a 
common legal framework at EU level. This framework addressed the broad terms for  
accreditation on minimum standard grounds,  e.g.  the principle of  non-competition 
between  assessment  bodies,  reviewing  intervals,  rules  on  cross-frontier 
accreditation,  obligations  for  co-operation  among  the  Member  States  and  their 
accreditation bodies. In the Commission's view, it promised to reduce the differences 
between notified bodies from different Member States. If we look at the final legal  
text,  the details of the framework are laid down in Chapter II,  Articles 4-12 in the  
Regulation (EC) No. 765/2008 (EP and Council, 2008b).
Option d) – the creation of an EU level network of notified bodies - was seen as an  
auxiliary  measure  to  promote  the  coherence  of  conformity  assessments  via  a 
common  EU  framework.  Here  the  Commission  decided  to  foster  the  'European 
Co-operation  for  Accreditation';  an  organisation  at  EU  level  which  promotes 
coherence  among  assessment  organisations  in  the  EU based  on  a  peer  review 
136
system of evaluating accreditation schemes. The Commission wanted to make the 
participation in co-ordination activities of the European Co-operation for Accreditation 
mandatory for all  notified bodies. In the legal text,  the European Co-operation for 
Accreditation  is  named  in  Chapter  II,  Articles  14,6  of  the  Regulation  (EC)  No 
765/2008 ('The first body recognised under this Regulation shall be the European co-
operation for accreditation, provided that it has concluded an agreement as specified 
in paragraph 2.')  (EP and Council, 2008b).  From the Commission's viewpoint both 
measures, c) and d), built on existing structures and were therefore deemed to be 
efficient. 
Two more aspects are worth  mentioning.  First,  the importance of  the issue of 
standards of certification across the EU was not as clear in the consultation  (DG 
Enterprise,  2006,  pp.  8,  18) as  in  the  Impact  Assessment.  The  industry  did  not 
uniformly identify it as a major problem. Consumer representatives generally backed 
the Commission's stance, noting critically, however, that 'the ongoing cost (...) is to 
be paid from the Community budget. Why should the EU pay Member States to do 
what they should do anyway? Is this the only way to get Member States to do their  
duty? However, even with more money for accreditation and conformity assessment 
there  is  no  guarantee  that  Member  States  will  assign  the  necessary  national 
resources to direct market surveillance to ensure that the system is producing the 
desired results' (BEUC, 2007, p. 1).
Regarding the other main point on the policy agenda – market surveillance and 
enforcement  of  New  Approach  directives  –  the  Commission  discussed  four 
measures. Option a) suggested improving the existing co-operation mechanisms for 
market surveillance authorities. Option b) proposed an information campaign aimed 
at businesses regarding their obligations in the context of New Approach directives. 
Option c) looked at  more effective  control  mechanisms after a product  has been 
placed on the Single Market. After-market control was seen as more essential than 
the so-called pre-market control (e.g. testing a product before it enters the market) 
because pre-market control would increase the burden for complying manufacturers 
whilst non-complying entities would still  be out of the reach of pre-market control. 
Option d) is rather similar to option c) on the notified bodies (establishing a legal  
framework  setting  minimum  standards  for  the  operation  of  national  market 
surveillance  authorities),  on  issues  such  as  procedures  on  how  to  process 
complaints, on the removal of non-compliant products from the market, on how to 
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perform checks on products or on monitoring accidents (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 36) 
enhancing coordination mechanisms amongst these bodies by improving the pooling 
of information on best practices or common projects as well as sharing resources  
(DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 36). This would include an extension of the, then already 
existing, RAPEX information exchange system. RAPEX stands for 'rapid alert system 
for  dangerous  non-food  consumer  products'.  It  enables  Member  States  and  the 
Commission  to  exchange  information  about  dangerous  products,  which  are 
withdrawn from the EU market and/or recalled from consumers. It aims to prevent 
further sales of these products on the Single Market. 
The Commission also suggested reforming the safeguard clause by transforming it 
into  an information exchange system amongst  Member States,  which  would only 
needs  intervention  from  the  Commission  if  there  were  disagreement  between 
Member  States.  This  aimed  to  tackle  the  problem  of  over-notification  of 
infringements.  Option  d)  made  the  suggestion  of  improving  the  traceability  of 
products  by  forcing  companies  to  increase  the  transparency  of  the  production 
process  for  market  surveillance  authorities.  More  concretely,  the  Commission 
suggested  that  a  manufacturer  must  appoint  a  member  of  staff  responsible  for  
products from outside the EU, providing documentation on the products used in the 
production  chain  in  conjunction  with  the  introduction  of  a  registration  system  for  
manufacturers and importers (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 37). Finally, option e) referred 
to  inconsistencies  in  existing  legal  texts,  something  which  could  be  tackled  by 
modifying  them in  a consistent  way and/or  by creating a reference document on 
standard  terminology,  which  would  also  outline  how  to  reformulate  the  existing 
framework more consistently.
In the end, the Commission perused all options after the consultation apart from 
the  information  campaign  for  market  operators.  The  strengthening  of  market 
surveillance  authorities  was  realised  with  the  aforementioned  Regulation  No. 
764/2008  (EP and Council,  2008a). The establishment of the legal framework for 
minimum standards for the operation of national market surveillance authorities is 
laid out in the Commission's Decision No 768/2008/EC  (EP and Council,  2008c). 
More effective control mechanisms after a product has been placed on the Single 
Market are addressed in Regulation No 765/2008, Articles 15-29  (EP and Council, 
2008c).  The  information  campaign  for  market  operators was  deemed  to  be  too 
difficult to manage from the EU level because it would require a different campaign 
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for each Member State. It would have also not addressed the problem of intentional 
non-compliance.  On  the  issue  of  legal  inconsistencies,  the  comprehensive  and 
simultaneous overhaul of all Community product legislation was deemed not to be 
feasible.  Hence,  the  Commission  resorted  to  the  establishment  of  a  reference 
document, which would address both the most urgent problems for market operators 
(by clarifying the terminology) and outline how to streamline the whole EU regulatory 
framework  for  products  in  the medium term.  Agreement on these measures was 
highly consensual amongst participants from within the online consultation and from 
other  actors,  including  non-industrial  representatives.  Thus,  ANEC  (European 
Association for the Co-ordination of Consumer Representation in Standardisation) 
supported  'the  Commission’s  call  for  reinforced  market  surveillance  in  Member 
States' (ANEC, 2005, p. 1) although it was critical about other aspects of the policy 
package, as we will see.
Finally, on the issue of the CE marking, the Commission brought forward three 
options. Option a) suggested abolishing the CE marking because its meaning is too 
confusing. Option b) proposed a change to the meaning of the CE marking. The 
basic idea was to distinguish between CE markings on products that need testing by 
a notified body and CE marking on products where the manufacturer simply declares 
conformity  to  EU  legislation.  Option  c)  suggested  an  information  campaign  to 
improve the understanding of the CE marking, aimed at non-professional consumers.  
Finally, option d) went for the protection of the CE marking as a registered collective 
trade mark. 
As  both  business  and  authorities  have  been  using  the  CE marking  since  the 
mid-1980s,  the Commission discarded the option of  phasing out  the CE marking 
almost from the beginning 'due to its detrimental effects for both industry and the 
functioning of the internal market'  (DG Enterprise, 2007, p. 54). Also, the option for 
adjusting the meaning of the marking was dismissed on the grounds that 'any change 
will  not  correct  the current  situation of  misunderstanding,  but  only lead to  further 
confusion'  (DG  Enterprise,  2007,  p.  54).This  would  be  in  addition  to  negative 
consequences for EU businesses in the international market where the CE marking 
is more highly regarded than within the Single Market. 
Options c) and d) - an information campaign on the meaning of CE marking and 
the protection of the CE marking as a trademark - were seen as more promising, 
mainly because of the perceived lack of negative consequences for EU businesses. 
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In the final policy, Regulation No 765/2008, Article 30 (EP and Council, 2008b) and 
Decision No 768/2008 ANNEX I Articles R11-12  (EP and Council, 2008c) address 
the CE marking.
At the start of the consultation, the issue of the CE marking and, in particular, the  
original suggestion by the Commission of the option of abolishing the CE marking 
was arguably the most daring aspect. Although, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
the Commission was certain that the idea of abolishing the CE marking would be 
rejected, neither the online consultation nor the Impact Assessment report highlights 
this  controversial  aspect  of  the  2008  Goods  Package.  The  Commission's 
unwillingness to abolish the CE marking, however, could clearly be seen through all  
relevant  documents.  The  Commission  was  happy  to  suggest  abolishing  the  CE 
marking; yet, its motivation for doing so is unclear. It may have merely been a tactical  
device  as  the  Commission  never  included  a  convincing  concept  for  its  potential 
replacement. After all, the CE marking is not a gimmick and serves a purpose in the 
Single  Market.  This  lack  of  imagination  over  a  possible  replacement  for  the  CE 
marking arguably contributed to the almost universal rejection of the idea by industry  
representatives.  The Commission was  also unprepared to  include the suggestion 
from consumer organisations such as ANEC that if 'the best solution in order to avoid 
further  erosion  of  the  credibility  of  the  New  Approach',  (i.e.  abolishing  the  CE 
marking) 'was not feasible, then the second best option would be 'removing the CE 
marking from the product itself and to [sic] affix it on the technical file' (ANEC, 2005, 
p. 1). As the intention of the CE marking is not to give information to the end-user, 
putting the CE marking in the technical documentation is very much within the spirit  
of the New Approach (BEUC, 2007, pp. 1–2). Yet, from the industry's point of view, 
the CE marking had morphed into something else as the 'CE marking has also de 
facto  become  a  global  marketing  trademark  facilitating  sales  in  the  EU  and 
sometimes even in third country markets' (ORGALIME, 2006, p. 2) an advantage the 
industry did not want to jeopardise. This position on the CE marking was presented, 
amongst others,  by the European Engineering Industries Association, ORGALIME 
(Organisme  de  Liaison  des  Industries  Métalliques  Européennes),  a  major  player 
within  the  Commission's  consultation  regime  (representing  mechanical,  electrical, 
electronics and metalworking trade federations). In the end, it became the position of 
both  the  industry  and the  Commission.  Essentially  the  industry  profited  from the 
confusion of the meaning of the CE marking and Commission implicitly agreed to 
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persevere with this questionable status. Moreover, the industry's position included, 
for instance, the information campaign on the CE marking (ORGALIME, 2006, p. 3) 
which was rejected by consumer organisations on the grounds that after 20 years of 
confusion  and  complexity  an  information  campaign  directed  at  end-users  would 
simply not be effective (ANEC, 2005, pp. 1–2). 
The conflict over the CE marking is also interesting as it saw the only major clash 
between  consumer  organisations and industry  organisations.  The outcome is  not 
surprising  as  the  consultation  was,  without  doubt,  dominated  by  industry 
representatives (Micklitz, 2007, p. 19). In fact, the Commission detailed that only two 
organisations with a consumer background took part (ANEC and BEUC). 
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Part II: Action Plan on the Protection and Welfare of Animals  
2006-2010
The second case study deals with the 'Community Action Plan on the Protection 
and Welfare of Animals 2006-2010'. An Action Plan is a comprehensive overview of 
the Commission’s planned policy initiatives in a defined period of time. It does not  
constitute  EU  law  but  is  a  strategic  document,  often  including  a  declaration  of 
intended  policies.  The  Commission  adopted  the  'Community  Action  Plan  on  the 
Protection  and  Welfare  of  Animals  2006-2010'  in  January  2006  as  an  official 
communication from the Commission to the EP and the Council. The Commission 
expected that the Action Plan on animal welfare would be applied to a range of EU 
sectors (including Common Agricultural Policy, Research and Development) but also 
in relations with non-EU countries. In summary, the Action Plan suggested upgrading 
minimum  standards  for  animal  welfare,  promoting  research  and  alternative 
approaches  to  animal  testing,  introducing  standardised  animal  welfare  indicators, 
better informing animal handlers and the general public on animal  welfare issues 
and, finally, supporting international initiatives for the protection of animals. 
The aim of this second major part of chapter 5 is to place the Action Plan into the 
wider policy field of animal protection and the EU's somewhat notorious Common 
Agricultural Policy.  In particular, this second case study description elaborates the 
normative dimension of animal  welfare.  At  EU level,  animal  welfare has both the 
challenge and the advantage of an emerging policy area. The advantage lies in the 
possibility  of  starting  from scratch,  which  allows  for  a  broader  policy debate  and 
hence it offers the luxury of allowing a more fundamental debate on how to approach 
the matter in principle. This aspect is further promoted by the nature of the Action 
Plan as an outline of intended policies, which can, amongst other things, omit legal  
details. The challenge, of course, is to establish the policy field as a legitimate area  
for EU policy-making. The question for this research is, though, how the advantages 
and challenges of the emerging policy area are addressed in the online consultation.  
Undoubtedly,  the  policy  area  had  a  considerable  deliberative  potential.  Was this 
opportunity seized?
The  second  case  study  description  is  divided  into  three  parts.  The  first  part 
discusses  animal  welfare  as  a  policy  problem  for  the  EU  and  the  second  part  
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introduces animal welfare as a normative problem as it  may be perceived from a 
policy  actor's  point  of  view.  Finally,  the  third  part  looks  at  the  consultation  in 
conjunction with the Action Plan.
Animal welfare as an EU policy problem
Although animal welfare as an EU policy area is less established and developed 
when compared to the area of minimising technical trade barriers, it has not emerged 
out of a void. Clearly, from a single market perspective, the removal of borders and 
trade barriers have obviously had considerable impact on the use of animals and, 
therefore, potentially on their well-being. Moreover, and as in other areas of trade, 
the  increasing  competition  between  market  actors  since  the  Second  World  War 
across  nation  states'  borders  makes  standards,  which  increase  the  costs  of 
producing animal related products and research, more likely to be acceptable if more 
-  ideally  all  -  market  actors  have  to  adhere  to  these  standards.  The  problem of 
agreeing,  implementing  and  enforcing  higher  standards  of  animal  welfare  is 
exacerbated by the transnational character of trade relations. In principle, this makes 
it a valid candidate for EU-wide regulation (Knierim & Jackson, 1997). 
Policy-wise there are two major avenues to choose. One is to err in favour of 
animal  welfare.  This  benefits  animals  and people  who  prefer  a  high  standard  of 
animal welfare. The other is to err in favour of a competitive market, which tends to 
favours producers of animal related products and people with a preference for lower 
standards of  animal  welfare.  They refer  to  different  policy ideologies; on the one 
hand,  an  ideology  that  promotes  market  liberalisation,  on  the  other  hand  more 
stringent  regulation  based  on  post-materialism.  Market  liberalisation  stresses  the 
benefits  of  removing  restrictions  on  competition,  whilst  post-material  values,  in 
conjunction  with  a  ‘precautionary  principle’,  favour  a  more  stringent  regulatory 
approach (Young, 2005, p. 95). 
Historically, the EU (and its predecessors) tended to prefer the former strategy. 
Since its founding in 1957, animal welfare had not been substantially embodied in the 
treaties. The only basis for community legislation on animal welfare was in Article 43 
on Agriculture,  quoted when the protection of farm animals is concerned, and/or,  
Articles 100 and 100a on the Approximation of Laws, used in connection with the 
protection of experimental animals. Obviously, measures for animal welfare can been 
seen and used as a simple measure of decreasing the freedom of trade and as a 
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distortion  of  competition.  The  removal  of  trade  barriers  for  goods,  services  and 
people and the general rules of competition ensuring the equal treatment of market 
operators  are  among  the  core  and  exclusive  competences  of  the  EU  and,  in 
particular,  the Commission.  Therefore,  one Member  State  cannot  simply ban the 
import  of  an  animal  product,  which  has  not  been  produced  in  accordance  with  
national  animal  welfare  legislation.  Member  States  can,  however,  prohibit  certain 
production methods. A real world example is the production of foie gras (the liver of a  
duck  or  goose  fattened  by  force-feeding  corn),  which  is  prohibited  in  most  EU 
Member States, apart from France and Belgium. Yet, importing foie gras from France 
cannot be prohibited or limited on animal welfare grounds by other Member States 
(Bartels, 2005, pp. 694–696). Unsurprisingly, the Commission has been in favour of a 
competence widening, whilst Member States have been reluctant, arguing against 
EU competence expansion on the grounds of subsidiarity.
The  issue  of  animal  welfare  has,  however,  made  incremental  steps  towards 
becoming a genuine EU competence, especially since the 1990s and initially via the 
changing  Common  Agricultural  Policy.  The  policy  aim  of  the  EU  system  of 
agricultural  production originally focused on problems such as ensuring adequate 
supply,  reasonable  prices  and  stable  production.  The  first  European  Community 
legislation on animal welfare from 1974 was concerned with the stunning of animals 
before slaughter in order to prevent unnecessary suffering. Yet, on two occasions,  
non-legally binding annexes where made acknowledging the importance of animal 
welfare during the 1990s.  First,  at  the Maastricht Conference in December 1991, 
declaration No. 24 on the Protection of Animals was annexed to the Treaty on the EU 
(Treaty of Maastricht, 1992). Then in 1999, the 'Protocol on Protection and Welfare of 
Animals' was annexed to the EU Treaty as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). 
The protocol  itself  is  not  hard law and not part  of  the Treaty of  the EU but it  is  
regularly cited in the Commission's pre-Lisbon Treaty documents on animal welfare.  
It  basically  acknowledges  diverging  views  on  animal  welfare  in  the  EU  and,  in 
particular, highlights the ethical dimension – as opposed to the mere economic – of 
this  policy  by  saying  that  'Member  States  shall  pay  full  regard  to  the  welfare 
requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions 
and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites,  cultural 
traditions and regional heritage'. 
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Turning to the ratified Treaty of Lisbon (2007), it recognises animals as 'sentient 
beings' by stating in Article 13 that '[i]n formulating and implementing the Union's 
agriculture,  fisheries,  transport,  internal  market,  research  and  technological 
development  and  space  policies,  the  Union  and  the  Member  States  shall,  since 
animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, 
while  respecting  the  legislative  or  administrative  provisions  and  customs  of  the 
Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional 
heritage' (emphasis added). Hence, this Article 13 has potentially created a new legal 
situation in which animal welfare is a central cornerstone in the named EU policy 
areas. The significance of attributing sentience to animals will be discussed shortly. 
However, 'Article 13 does not imply any stronger legal obligation for the concerned 
policy areas to consider animal welfare (...). [It] puts animal welfare on equal footing 
with  topics  such  as  (...)  environmental  protection,  and  sustainable  development 
(Tjärnström, 2010, pp. 21–22).
From the Commission's side, animal welfare was put high on the agenda with the 
White Paper on Food Safety (EU Commission, 2000b) by integrating animal welfare 
into the food chain policy of the EU. This also took place in the Action Plan 'Animal 
Health Strategy 2007–2013'  (EU Commission, 2007c) and finally, in the 'Evaluation 
of the EU Policy on animal welfare (EUPAW) and Possible Options for the Future' for 
the Action Plan for 2011-2015. This document is arguably the most comprehensive 
document by the EU on animal welfare so far. It was published in late 2010  (DG 
Health, 2010). It  is the direct follow-up policy of the Action Plan analysed for this  
thesis. 
In the area of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, animal welfare considerations 
were reinforced by introducing the so-called 'cross-compliance principle'. The idea 
here  is  that  the  allocation  of  certain  agricultural  subsidies  now  depends  on 
compliance with animal welfare requirements. Whilst issues of food safety and quality 
are closely connected to farming, issues of environmental protection, sustainability, 
enhancing the quality of life in rural areas, the preservation of the countryside and the 
'proper  treatment'  of  animals  have also  been discussed in  the  context  of  animal 
welfare.  From  the  Commission's  perspective,  'European  consumers  increasingly 
focus on “clean and green” production methods and are attracted by the possible 
food quality, safety and animal health and welfare benefits of innovative production 
systems such as organic farming.  The mindset of  consumers and producers has 
145
undergone a seismic shift from merely preventing cruelty and avoidable suffering to 
animals, to instead becoming focussed on promoting their well-being and meeting 
their  most  important  needs'  (EU  Commission,  2006g,  pp.  11–12).  Moreover, 
Commission's staff, central for the animal welfare unit at the time of the consultation,  
published research which indicates that animals which 'are well-treated and able to 
behave  naturally  are  healthier  than  animals  treated  badly  and  whose  welfare  is 
compromised. Retailers are also recognising animal welfare as a constituent aspect 
of product image and quality, which creates a need for reliable systems for on-farm 
monitoring  of  animal  welfare  status  and  providing  guarantees  on  production 
conditions'  (Horgan & Gavinelli, 2006, p. 304). This is argument can also be found 
almost verbatim in an earlier official EU publication (EU Commission, 2002b).
In reality,  this means that the main factor in improving the standards of animal 
welfare lies outside of DG Health. The advantage of placing the Commission's animal 
welfare unit in DG Health (transferred from DG Agriculture in 1999) is that they can 
also  easily  address  the  welfare  of  non-farm  animals.  Moreover,  it  stresses  the 
independence and credibility of the EU's animal welfare output. Yet without doubt,  
DG  Agriculture's  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  the  main  financial  and  political  
framework with direct impacts on the welfare of farm animals (Buller & Morris, 2003, 
p. 221). Based on the major reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1999 there 
are two distinct pillars of support. Measures, which make up the first of these pillars 
are the traditional form of commodity payments and market intervention. Measures in  
the second pillar can be summarised under the title ‘Rural Development’  (Buller & 
Morris, 2003, p. 221). In essence, the policies of the pillars imply two different ways 
of dealing with  animal  welfare.  On the one hand there are 'those human actions 
towards animals that are arguably morally contestable but nonetheless operate within 
defined social norms' and on the other hand there are 'those that go above such 
norms to provide genuine welfare improvements and, crucially, other benefits' (Buller 
& Morris, 2003, p. 220).
In  the  first  pillar,  it  is  assumed  that  farmers  comply  with  existing  national  or 
European legislation on animal welfare, yet the payments rarely explicitly depend on 
compliance (Buller & Morris, 2003, p. 221). In contrast, the second pillar consists of 
measures that go beyond mere compliance with existing legislation to achieve certain 
desirable objectives. The Commission often refers to a list of aims associated with 
improving  animal  health  (which  also  play  prominent  part  in  the  case  study 
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consultation),  inter  alia  better  public  health,  better-tasting  food,  improvements  for 
rural development, environmental gains and better landscape quality (Buller & Morris, 
2003, pp. 221–222).
Moreover, the Commission aims to improve animal welfare through direct income 
payments. Direct income payments are also given under the condition that recipients 
must  keep  their  land  in  both  good  agricultural  and  environmental  condition  by 
complying with EU standards for the environment, food safety and animal welfare. 
Non-complying  farmers  are  penalised  by  a  reduction  of  direct  payments.  The 
downside of this strategy is that for such payments one needs a transfer system that 
is  geared towards achieving  non-economic  objectives.  This  requires considerable 
monitoring of what is happening on the farm in order to promote policy aims such as 
animal  welfare.  Rieger  comments  that  such  direct  payments  'are  regarded  as 
virtuous simply because they are not production aids'  and that '[f]unction-oriented 
direct  payments  are much better  suited to  legitimate the stream of  public money 
flowing to farms' (2005, pp. 171–72).
In a broader sense, the Commission's approach shifted from a 'value-for-money'  
approach, which has dominated the second half of the 20th century to a 'values-for-
money'  approach,  as  Lang  (2010,  p.  1814) puts  it.  These  shifts  are  also 
communicated  on  the  grand  stage  of  EU  politics.  Mariann  Fischer-Boel,  then 
European Commissioner for Agriculture argued that '[w]hen we play our cards right, 
we  can  get  a  premium  for  these  “qualities"',  and  deliver  'high  standards  of 
environmentally  friendly  land  management,  animal  welfare  and  public  health' 
(Fischer-Boel, 2008, pp. 310–311). Of course, the shift to a more ethical mode of 
production may not be a bold departure from the old post Second World War goal of  
producing  enough  food  cheaply;  it  may  simply  reflect  the  recognition  of  market 
realities  in  which  the  EU  production  of  agricultural  products  is  increasingly  less 
competitive when compared to international rivals (Lang, 2010, p. 1816). The EU and 
its regime of subsidising the agricultural sector is simply forced to look for a place for 
their  products in  the current  market and 'high standard'  products appear  to  be a 
viable option. 
Animal welfare as a normative problem 
In  broad  terms,  the  policy  area  of  animal  welfare  has  strong  similarities  with 
human welfare - or social policy -, which too, needs an ethical rooting with regards to 
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the concepts such as equality, liberty and (relative and absolute) poverty. Likewise, in 
practical  terms,  it  is  concerned  about  welfare  indicators.  Clearly,  the  number  of 
human welfare policies compared to animal welfare policies is much greater but apart 
from this gradual difference, the core distinctive feature, which sets the two apart is 
the state  of  mind attributed to  human beings and animals.  The status  of  human 
beings  as  sentient  beings  is  virtually  unchallenged  in  ethics,  while  the  status  of 
animals  as  sentient  beings  is  challenged.  The  (extreme)  ethical  position  that  an 
animal is a mere bio-mechanical automaton makes the concept of animal welfare 
meaningless – there is no such thing as poor or good welfare for non-sentient beings.  
Yet,  the  mainstream  position  within  western  society  is  that  some  animals  are 
somewhat sentient. The attribution of a consciousness and of feelings to animals by 
humans typically depends on the degree of domestication (pets and farm animals are 
seen  as  more  sentient  then  wild  animals)  (Bovenkerk,  Stafleu,  Tramper, 
Vorstemborscch, & Brom, 2003), their usefulness for human beings (the more useful, 
the more sentient), the type of species (endothermic animals, especially mammals 
and birds are seen as more sentient than haematocryal animals such as fish and 
insects). Size is also an issue; the larger animal, the more sentient it is said to be 
(Duncan, 2006). Thus, the perceived sentience of animals varies, whereas the ethical 
importance does not typically vary between different human beings.
The  concept  of  animals  as  sentient  beings also  implies  that  animals  have  an 
intrinsic  ethical  value.  There  are  also  extrinsic  ethical  concerns  or  instrumental 
concerns whereby means of improving the welfare of animals are actually means for 
other goals such as improving the environment  (Fraser, Weary,  Pajor,  & Milligan, 
1997, pp. 189–190), an aspect that is often emphasised by the Commission. Animal 
welfare policy primarily aims to improve the standard of life of certain animals and,  
not primarily, the standard of life for human beings. This is also the reason why the 
acknowledgement of the sentience of animals by the EU's Lisbon Treaty is crucial for  
the development of this policy area. It offers a legal nucleus in its own right, apart 
from the Common Agricultural Policy and the EU's environmental policy capacities. 
The attribution of sentience turns animals into legitimate objects of ethical concern. 
Broadly,  two major schools of thought can be identified. First,  there is the animal 
rights school of thinking. This school stresses the equality of all sentient beings and 
aims to abolish the distinction between 'human' and 'animals', thus making the latter  
'non-human persons' or 'non-human animals'. Therefore, human rights and animal 
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rights  are  in  principle  the  same.  Hence,  the  label  animal  rights  is  somewhat 
misleading and should rather be 'rights of sentient beings'. Just as with human rights, 
the animal rights school operates at the level of the individual (as opposed to society,  
population, ecosystem or species). According to the animal rights school, the use of 
animals by humans is, in general, ethically unacceptable.
While  the  animal  rights  school  is  logically  stringent,  the  competing  school  of 
thought  is  less  coherent,  yet  it  remains  the  most  common  ethical  approach  to 
animals. This school is often inaptly labelled as 'animal welfarism' (sometimes also 
simply 'animal welfare'). It is based on the premise that animals are not in the same 
ethical category as humans and therefore it is morally acceptable for humans to use 
animals. Yet, adverse effects on the well-being of the animal should be as minimal as 
possible.  Thus,  animal  welfare  becomes  an  optimisation  problem  between  the 
perceived utility of animals for humans and their perceived well-being. The - at the 
time, in 1974 -  libertarian philosopher Robert  Nozick summarised this position as 
follows: 'Consider the following (too minimal) position about the treatment of animals. 
So that we can easily refer to it, let us label this position "utilitarianism for animals,  
Kantianism for people." It says: (1) maximise the total happiness of all living beings; 
(2) place stringent side constraints on what one may do to human beings. Human 
beings may not be used or sacrificed for the benefit of others; animals may be used 
or  sacrificed for  the benefit  of  other  people or  animals only if  those benefits  are 
greater than the loss inflicted' (Nozick, 1974, p. 39). Garner suggests seeing animal 
welfarism as 'a compromise between regarding animals as having no direct moral 
standing  and  treating  animals  as  morally  equivalent  to  humans'  (2006,  p.  162). 
Moreover, '[a]ttaching intrinsic value to animals is not equivalent to according them 
moral equality with humans. Indeed, the conventional, or orthodox, position regarding 
the moral status of animals is that, because animals have some moral worth, it is 
wrong for humans to inflict unnecessary suffering on them, but, because humans 
remain  superior  morally,  it  is  equally  legitimate  for  humans to  inflict  suffering  on 
animals if there is a substantial benefit to humans likely to accrue' (Garner, 2010, pp. 
125–126).
The anthropocentric position of animal welfarism allows then to model the problem 
of determining the sufficient standard of animal welfare in basic economic terms. For 
instance, animal suffering is typically an externality on markets dealing with animal 
related products, i.e. they do not explicitly feature in the markets and so pose as 
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hidden costs. The preference of people for animal welfare is not considered in this 
market. Hence, the common approach is one of providing consumers comprehensive 
information about the animal welfare implications of their purchasing decisions. The 
economic implication is that the market will ensure that consumers purchase animal 
products,  which  will  maximise  their  individual  net  benefits  from  consumption.  In 
theory, this mechanism should maximise the human welfare in a given society. What 
it does not consider, however, are externalities caused by people’s consumption of  
animal products with a lower demand for animal standards and the connected higher 
animal suffering. This lowers the welfare of people with a higher demand for animal 
welfare.  This  argument  is  insofar  relevant  as  it  explains  the  Commission's  drive 
towards a more comprehensive food labelling system. 
Before implementing any legislation, the main problem for animal welfarism is to 
develop indicators in order to measure the welfare of animals. Only if we can judge 
the state of welfare of an animal, we will have the necessary information required to 
make a decision, which optimises the welfare of the animal and human benefit. In  
contrast, the main problem for the animal rights position is to develop a coherent set 
of norms, which then can be used to assess whether an animal is treated rightly or 
wrongly (and of course the legal infrastructure to do so). Arguably, though, the bigger 
challenge for  the animal  rights position is  to  lobby the public,  concerned parties, 
policy makers and so on, convincing them that their approach to animal welfare is the 
more appropriate one, since animal welfarism is by far the dominant position in the 
western world (Garner, 2005, pp. 15–16). Lobbying efforts are likely to be a particular 
challenge for this school of thought as the political movement for animal rights has 
gained some notoriety through its use of controversial and sometimes violent means 
of pursuing its causes. 
Ultimately the animal rights position sees sentience as the defining feature for the 
ethical nature of living beings (it is both the necessary and the sufficient condition to 
morally consider an animal in its own right), while the animal welfarism position sees 
sentience as  a  starting  point,  which  allows  us  to  consider  ethical  questions with  
regards to the well-being of  animals (it  is  only the necessary but not a sufficient  
condition to morally consider animal in their own right). 
In opposition to the animal rights position, proponents of animal welfarism see a 
morally  relevant  distinction  between  different  species  of  animals  and  humans  in 
features such as 'rationality, autonomy, moral agency, a language capability, free will,  
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self-consciousness'  (Garner,  2010,  p.  126).  The  aim  is  to  establish  a  distinction 
between a sentient being and a person, from which the morally inferior position of 
animals can be deducted. The crucial argument here is that animals are assumed to 
not being able to make moral decisions and cannot, therefore, possess rights (or 
duties for that matter). However, the implication of this distinction is that non-person 
humans – or marginal humans (for instance infants) - have the same moral status as 
animals, which is for most people hardly acceptable. 
Going deeper into the philosophical debate on animal welfare is beyond the scope 
of this thesis and we should settle for the observation that the animal rights position 
is  arguably  more  coherent,  while  only  a  minority  of  people  regard  this  as  the 
appropriate philosophical stance. In contrast, animal welfarism is less coherent as an 
ideology; however, it is by far the dominant ideology regarding animal ethics in the 
western world.  Garner summarizes the policy implications of  animal  welfarism as 
follows: 'Where it is held that exploiting animals is significantly beneficial for humans, 
the law permits it. No country in the world, for instance, has prohibited the use of 
animals for medical research or as a source of food' (Garner, 2006, p. 163).
The main challenge for animal welfarism is that although animals may be sentient  
beings they cannot comprehensively communicate their well-being to humans. This 
is  in  contrast  to  human  beings  who  have  developed  elaborate  ways  of 
communicating  their  well-being  and lack  of  well-being.  Animals  cannot  simply be 
interviewed so as to ascertain their feelings. There is, therefore, a need to develop 
welfare indicators. Yet, how should we define the welfare of animals (Webster, 1995, 
p.  6)?  Again,  this  is  a  wide  field,  which  first  needs  to  develop  an  idea  of  what  
well-being could mean and second how to measure it. The following section gives a 
brief overview of the main concepts. 
Animal welfare can be framed around the subjective experience of an animal. Yet 
subjective feelings can often fail to be comprehensively communicated by an animal. 
It is often difficult to answer questions regarding these subjective experiences. Fraser 
et al. give the following example: '[W]e might ask (a) whether keeping a bird in a cage 
reduces its welfare by depriving it of the pleasure of flying, or (b) whether prolonging 
the  life  of  a  sick  dog  reduces  its  welfare  because  its  suffering  outweighs  its 
enjoyment  of  living or  (c)  whether  keeping a cow in  a barn improves its  welfare 
because  the  protection  from  cold,  hunger  and  possible  injury  outweighs  the 
frustration and other negative experiences caused by confinement' (1997, p. 196). 
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These questions show why an animal's subjective experiences are relevant. At the 
same time they highlight the largely unsolved difficulties of natural science to develop 
an 'accepted method to quantify the pleasure experienced by an animal (example a)'  
as well as 'purely empirical means to balance suffering against enjoyment (example 
b)', including the challenge to combine 'different negative states into overall indices 
(example c)'  (Fraser et al., 1997, p. 196). Hence, other concepts are used to frame 
animal welfare, namely natural-living assumptions and biological well-functioning.
The well-being of an animal can be framed in terms of 'natural-living'. This position 
says that an animal's welfare depends on an environment in which an animal is able  
to show 'natural' behaviour and where it can live a 'natural' life (Fraser et al., 1997, p. 
191). However, 'natural-living' can also mean suffering and fear, e.g. from predators 
or the lack of food if 'natural-living' is based on a less romanticised version of nature. 
Moreover, what does natural living mean for an animal that has been domesticated 
over several hundreds of years? Moreover as Fraser et al. notes, how is the concept 
of  'natural  living'  able  to  tell  us  something  about  phenomena  like  analgesia,  
euthanasia and medication (1997, p. 193)?
The other mainstream concept for assessing animal welfare concentrates on the 
biological functioning of animals. If the animal is in a state within normal physical and 
biological  parameters,  then  there  is  a  high  level  of  animal  well-being.  Diseases,  
injuries and malnutrition hamper the biological functioning of an animal (Fraser et al., 
1997,  p.  196) and  are  therefore  decreasing  the  welfare  of  the  animal.  The  key 
challenge here is  to  actually  define functioning within  normal  parameters.  This  is 
because biological  functions change and adapt  all  the time,  'ranging from minor,  
routine adjustments, through to significant disturbance and abnormality' (Fraser et al., 
1997, p. 196).
The  inconsistency  of  the  animal  welfarism  approach  is  easily  highlighted  by 
showing conflicting animal welfare indicators. Fraser et al give the following example:  
Observer A, favouring a functioning-based conception, may conclude that the welfare 
of  a  group  of  sows  tethered  in  stalls  is  high  because  the  animals  are  well  fed,  
reproducing efficiently and free from disease and injury. Observer B, using a feelings-
based conception, concludes that the welfare of the same animals is poor because 
they give vocalizations that are thought to indicate frustration, and they escape from 
the  stalls  whenever  the  chance  arises.  Observer  C,  relying  on  a  natural-living 
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conception,  agrees  that  the  sows'  welfare  is  poor  because  stalls  are  unnatural 
environments which prevent the animals' natural behaviour (1997, p. 201).
The conflicting view on the ethically appropriate treatment of animals shows that 
there is need for on-going public reflection on this issue, or as Garnet puts it: '[a]s 
species we don't seem to be clear at all how we should treat non-human animals' 
(2005, p. 4). Moreover, there should be no doubt that in the context of animal welfare 
acceptable  or  unacceptable  treatment  of  animals  is  a  matter  of  choice,  which  is 
regulated by the state. It is therefore open to democratic process rather than a purely 
scientific assessment. Yet, there is surprisingly little academic work dealing with the 
political side of animal welfare both at nation state and EU level. This is even more 
surprising if we consider the substantial legislative and administrative resources that 
are used to protect the welfare of animals and the increasing involvement of CSOs in 
the  policy  networks  (Garner,  2002,  p.  395).  It  is  clearly  part  of  the  social  and 
economic reality that animals are used for various purposes. Garner argues 'that 
there is a genuine politics of animal welfare [i.e. welfarism] in the sense that what 
constitutes ‘unnecessary’ suffering is sufficiently vague to be open to debate. Indeed, 
the definition of ‘unnecessary’ has widened over the past thirty years or so to take 
into account changing public attitudes to animals that have, in part, been shaped by 
greater knowledge of the way animals can suffer. For example, (...) the most extreme 
forms of factory farming, such as battery cages, are being dismantled at the EU level 
as a recognition that they are regarded by many as unnecessary'  (Garner, 2010, p. 
125).
Online consultation process and content
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a main reason for choosing this case study 
was the popular response to the consultation. The closed questionnaire had 44.491 
participants  (DG  Health,  2006,  p.  1),  a  huge  number  compared  to  all  other 
consultations promoted by the Your Voice in Europe Website. As we will see in the 
next chapter, the DG was largely oblivious to this comparatively large number and 
how it was achieved. There could be a rather simple explanation for the large number 
of participants and the general unwillingness of the DG to praise this high turn-out as 
a  success,  this  being  that  the  same  people  may  have  been  completing  the 
consultation several times. The consultation itself included no mechanism to prevent 
or  restrict  multiple  participation  by  one  and  the  same individual  (for  example  by 
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creating an account  for  each participant).  As the research had no access to  the 
consultation's original data, this could not be investigated further. However, there are 
some weak indications supporting this assumption. The report on the follow-up online 
consultation on the Action Plan explicitly acknowledges co-ordinated responses due 
to  the  fact  that  'identical  comments  [were]  given by multiple  respondents.  As an 
example, this happened with a group of about 500 answers that referred to Directive 
86/609/EEC and viewed this as 'a business friendly law, scientifically obsolete, cruel 
to the defenceless' (DG Health, 2010, p. 117). The nature of co-ordinated responses 
suggests that individuals dissatisfied with the current state of animal welfare in the 
EU responded several times to the consultation. Similar behaviour is suspected in 
the thesis' case study consultation, too. Moreover, Quittkat in her quantitative study 
of  online  consultations  also  treated  the  high  number  of  participants  in  this  case 
cautiously. She explicitly excluded the animal welfare case in her calculation of the 
average participation rate of a closed questionnaire type consultation (2011, p. 662). 
Again, as we had no direct access to the raw IPM data we cannot substantiate this 
suspicion.  Nevertheless,  it  is  advisable  to  at  least  raise  some doubts  about  the 
unusually high rate of participation. 
As discussed in the harmonisation case, the IPM effectively provides a template 
which a policy officer can use to create online questionnaires.  The quality of  the 
questionnaires is entirely down to the policy officer and the support she or he has. 
The previously pointed out copy and paste nature of the IPM makes it relatively easy 
to produce a consultation based on previous consultations.  In the animal  welfare 
case  this  turned  out  to  be  particularly  easy  as  the  unit  commissioned  a 
Eurobarometer  survey on the same topic  (DG Communication,  2005),  which was 
published about six months before the online consultation. In scope and design the 
Eurobarometer was more complex but covered the same core areas of consultation, 
i.e. 'the welfare of farmed animals, purchasing behaviour and the welfare of farmed 
animals and animal welfare at the European level' (DG Communication, 2005, p. 2). 
For the Eurobarometer some 25.000 people were interviewed in 25 Member States 
between February and March 2005  (DG Communication, 2005, p. 2). Again, apart 
from the fact that the IPM does not promote accountability through its technology, the 
main  problem  with  its  copy  and  paste  approach  is  that  the  IPM  discourages 
intellectual investment into designing a consultation with a deliberative claim.
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Turning to the content of the online consultation, the following section discusses 
the  main  results  of  the  online  consultation.  As  it  was  mainly  based  on  closed 
questions in combination with a large number of participants, this summary is based 
on  the  DG  Health's  analysis  of  their  data.  The  consultation  was  open  between 
November the 11th and December the 20th 2005. Two thirds of the participants were 
female (66.4%)  (DG Health, 2006, p. 1), the age group of 18-29 year old was the 
biggest (33.5%), followed by the 40-55 years (27.3%) and 30-39 years (25.6%) (DG 
Health, 2006, p. 1). Half of the participants either came from Germany (25.3%), the 
Netherlands (12.7%) or  France (12%) (DG Health,  2006,  p.  2)  and unlike  in  the 
harmonisation case, 87.8% of the participants did not represent an organisation (DG 
Health, 2006, p. 2).
Turning the content of the online consultation, the following section discusses the 
main results of the online consultation. As it was mainly based on closed questions in 
combination with a large number of participants, this summary is based on the DG 
Health's analysis of their data. The consultation was open between November the 
11th and December the 20th 2005. Two thirds of the participants were female (66.4%) 
(DG Health, 2006, p. 1)(DG Health, 2006, p. 1), the age group of 18-29 year old was 
the biggest (33.5%), followed by the 40-55 years (27.3%) and 30-39 years (25.6%) 
(DG Health, 2006, p. 1). Half of the participants either came from Germany (25.3%), 
the Netherlands (12.7%) or France (12%) (DG Health, 2006, p. 2) and unlike in the 
harmonisation case, 87.8% of the participants did not represent an organisation (DG 
Health, 2006, p. 2). 
By far the most important area of the consultation was the rearing of animals for 
food and food related ingredients. Other uses included animal testing for scientific or 
(product) safety purposes and the use of body parts to produce chemicals, leather 
and fur. Less important in economic terms was the use of animals for leisure, sport  
and entertainment. Accordingly, the majority of the online consultation dealt with farm 
related animals and how to communicate animal welfare issues to the general public. 
The first part of the questionnaire asked about the perceived standard of animal 
welfare in the EU. Around two thirds of the participants rated the level of welfare of 
farmed animals as 'very poor' (35.4%) or 'poor' (29%). Only 1.9% of the responds did 
not answer the question (DG Health, 2006, p. 2). The questionnaire then went on to 
ask about the perceived welfare standards for a whole array of animals (including 
dairy cows, beef cattle, calves, sheep, goats, pigs, laying hens, chickens kept for 
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meat production, turkeys, ducks, geese, horses, rabbits, farmed fish and fur animals). 
The general perception of the state of animal welfare in the EU was mirrored in the 
response of  individual  groups of  animals.  In  most  cases,  their  welfare  was  rated 
'poor'  or  worse.  Sheep,  goats  and  dairy  cattle  formed  the  exception  to  this 
perception. In this case, around one quarter of the respondents chose 'moderate' as 
the appropriate category. The 'don't know' category was never chosen by more than 
6% of the respondents (DG Health, 2006, pp. 3–5). 
The second part then asked whether the participants believed more ought to be 
done to improve the level of animal welfare within the EU, to which the vast majority 
replied 'yes, certainly'  (78.4%) and 'yes, probably'  (9.7%) (DG Health, 2006, p. 6).  
The survey then went on to ask about specific groups of animals as before ('[m]ore 
specifically, for each of the following animals farmed within the EU do you believe 
that more needs to be done to improve their current level of welfare/ protection?'). 
The vast majority of participants believed that all  groups of animals needed more 
protection (DG Health, 2006, pp. 6–8).
The third part asked about 'important sources of information on the way animals 
are  farmed'  in  the  respondent's  country.  Three  groups  of  sources  can  be 
distinguished based on the results. In the first group, sources are deemed by a vast 
majority to be either 'important' or 'very important'. These include information from 
'films,  video,  television,  radio',  information  from  'books,  magazines,  newspapers, 
leaflets',  information  from  'the  internet',  information  from  'personal  experience  of 
visiting farms' and information from 'animal protection organisations'. In the second 
group, sources are deemed by a majority to be either 'not very important' or 'not at all  
important'.  These  include  information  from  'farmers’  organisations',  from 
'government',  information from 'shops,  supermarkets etc.',  from 'the food industry' 
and information  from 'food labels'.  The third  group consists  of  one item,  namely 
information from 'school/university'  where  there is  no prevalent  perception on the 
importance and replies are almost  evenly distributed between the four categories 
from 'very important' to 'not at all important' (DG Health, 2006, pp. 9–10). Again, the 
question  about  the  then  current  state  of  information  provision  was  mirrored  by 
questions on sources (same selection of sources as above) available for improving 
knowledge  of  the  way  animals  are  farmed.  Here,  nothing  was  discarded  and  a 
majority of respondents deemed all sources potentially 'useful' or 'very useful' (DG 
Health, 2006, pp. 11–13).
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The fourth part then asked about food labels and retailers, asking on the one hand 
whether  the  latter  provides  sufficient  information  on  animal  welfare,  which  was 
deemed to be insufficient by almost 90% of the participants (DG Health, 2006, p. 13).  
Most respondents, of course, wanted 'food products to be labelled more clearly to 
indicate  the  animal  welfare  conditions  under  which  these  products  are  sourced' 
(89.2%). In this context, the DG asked a couple of questions about the information 
provision of 'conditions of welfare (...) under which animals are farmed within the EU', 
which  again  was  deemed by almost  90% of  the respondents as insufficient  (DG 
Health, 2006, p. 11). Moreover, a vast majority claimed 'that a better knowledge of 
farming practices could influence decisions when purchasing food' (DG Health, 2006, 
p. 14).
The  fifth  part  deals  with  animal  welfare  outside  the  EU.  Almost  90%  of  the 
respondents believed that 'the EU should do more to promote a greater awareness of 
animal welfare (...) internationally' as well as that 'imported foods should be produced 
under conditions (...)' at least as high as those applied in the home country of the 
respondent (DG Health, 2006, p. 13).
The sixth part of the consultation was concerned with the benefits for humans of 
higher  animal  welfare  standards.  The  majority  of  respondents  agreed  that  food 
produced  to  higher  animal  welfare  standards  results  in  better  'food  taste',  'food 
safety',  'food  quality',  'animal  health',  'animal  productivity'  and  'more  ethically 
acceptable food products' (DG Health, 2006, pp. 14–15). The consultation here only 
addressed aspects that are directly relevant to consumers and producers and it did 
not ask about links with landscape and environmental gains or rural  development 
improvements. 
In  the  seventh  and last  part  of  the  consultation,  the  Commission  asked about 
concepts of animal welfare. Which concepts were regarded as particularly important? 
Not  surprisingly,  all  items  were  regarded  as  'very  important'.  These  items  were 
'access to the outside', 'exposure to natural light', 'sufficient space to move around', 
that 'movement should not be restricted by chains or tethers', that animals should be 
transported  and  slaughtered  in  a  humane  way,  the  ability  'to  display  natural 
behaviour', having 'contact with other animals', absence of intentional mutilations and 
that 'animals should be managed and handled by a trained and considerate person'  
(DG Health, 2006, pp. 15–16).
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The online consultation and the Action Plan
Ideally,  we would expect that the consultation results would be reflected in the 
central  document,  namely  the  Action  Plan  and  that  the  consultation  would  be 
referenced in accompanying documents to the Action Plan (as we saw in the Impact 
Assessment in the harmonisation case).  In reality,  however,  particular results  are 
hardly mentioned in any document and the existence of the online consultation is 
only referenced in generic terms. Moreover, the Action Plan touches on issues not 
even mentioned in consultation and vice-versa. This is not an unusual occurrence 
per se as policy-making rarely follows the idealised ways of the policy-cycle. Hence, 
there  is  seldom a strict  sequential  movement  from a  consultation  that  takes into 
account a wider spectrum of issues to a more focused policy paper. However, in this 
case it appears to be very plausible that the Commission omitted the hot button issue 
of animal testing, only to have it included in the in Action Plan. At the same time, the 
issue of animal welfare based on concepts of natural living featured prominently in  
the consultation but not in the Action Plan. Why it was not included in the Action Plan 
was not referred to officially by the DG. 
Strategically, the Commission aimed to expand its policy competence in the area 
of animal welfare while at the same time trying to advance on the basis of existing 
laws. On the one hand, the Action Plan sought to progress by increasing existing  
standards  and  efficient  enforcement  (upgrading  minimum  standards  for  animal 
welfare, see, for instance, the principle of cross-compliance). On the other hand, the 
remaining  four  areas  (promoting  research  and  alternative  approaches  to  animal 
testing, introducing standardised animal welfare indicators, better informing of animal 
handlers  and  the  general  public  on  animal  welfare  issues  and  supporting 
international initiatives for the protection of animals) suggest that the Commission 
wanted to mainly prompt a public information campaign.
Such  an  information  campaign  hardly  conceals  the  limited  capability  of  the 
Commission in relation to animal welfare due to the lack of a legal basis for a more 
comprehensive policy. As a reaction, the Commission took a particularly consumer 
orientated point of view. The highlighting of the role of animals in the food chain and 
the  enabling  of  consumers  to  make  informed choices  seems to  be  a  potentially 
promising way forward beyond traditional  regulatory activity.  The EU consumer is 
seen  as  a  potential  ally  for  the  Commission.  Not  surprisingly,  the  Commission 
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advertises its policies with the slogan from ‘farm to fork’. Ludwig and O’Gorman see 
this as a promising approach for 'detaching the issue of improving animal welfare 
from its pure “ideological” background and highlighting the interconnection with the 
daily use of natural resources' (2008, p. 388). This comment also gives us a clue as 
to why the consultation did not play a prominent role in the further policy process. 
There  are  several  features  that  make  the  consultation  results  unattractive  if  the 
Commission wanted to align itself with the average, 'not-ideological' EU consumer. 
First,  its  participants  were  predominantly  women,  second  the  large  majority  of 
participant  came  from  Western  and  Northern  Europe  (as  opposed  to  East  and 
Southern  Europe),  countries  which  are  known  to  have,  in  general,  a  pro-animal 
welfare population. Third, the large majority of respondents believed that they could 
judge  the  state  of  welfare  for  almost  all  presented  groups  of  animals.  Without 
spending time gathering knowledge on rearing circumstances of those animals, we 
would  expect  that  the  default  option  to  all  questions in  the  first  category  on the 
standards  of  animal  welfare  would  be  'don't  know',  as  it  is  unlikely  that  the 
Commission had, by chance, tapped into knowledge of around 40000 animal welfare 
experts.  It  seems likely  that  the  animal  welfare  consultation  was  a  'self-selected 
listener opinion poll' (known as a SLOP) Fishkin explains that 'respondents to SLOPs 
are  not  selected  by  scientific  random  sampling.  Instead,  they  simply  select 
themselves. They are predominantly those who feel more intensely or feel especially 
motivated.  Sometimes,  they  are  organized'  (2009,  p.  21).  Of  course,  the  core 
problem with SLOPs is that their results are 'neither representative nor deliberative. It  
offers  a  picture  of  raw opinion  that  is  distorted  and  partial  in  whom  it  includes' 
(Fishkin, 2009, p. 23). Fourth, the large majority of participants showed considerable 
mistrust towards the established institutions and commercial enterprises (as opposed 
to media outlets and animal welfare organisations) in the section on relevant sources 
of information on animal welfare. In conclusion, then, the pro-animal welfare stance 
of the consultation was very much an ideological one. 
From the Commission's side, the main underlying task was to establish animal 
welfare as a fully fledged area of EU policy making. As part of this wider strategy, the 
role of the Action Plan can be summarised as follows. Animal welfare is too complex 
for Member States alone. Therefore, it should be dealt with at an EU level. At the  
same  time,  animal  welfare  is,  even  for  the  Commission,  a  complex  issue  and 
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therefore the Commission needs a strategy for itself,  too. Hence the Commission 
wanted to produce an Action Plan.
To be more detailed, the Commission laid out the problems in the following terms. 
First of all, animal welfare is already part of the Commission's daily bread because 
'[a]nimal welfare is now accepted as an integral part of the Community’s “farm to fork” 
policies and is  one of  the strategic  priorities related to  the development  of  more 
sustainable food production policies' (EU Commission, 2006g, p. 4). Second, ethical 
concerns regarding the treatment of  animals,  is a '“cultural  attitude” for European 
society'. But not only 'the European society' but also EU treaties regard animals as 
sentient beings and are therefore worth protecting. Nevertheless, this is not easy 
because  –  and  here  the  Commission  quotes  the  OIE  (Office  International  des 
Épizooties,  today  known  as  the World  Organisation  for  Animal  Health):  'Animal 
welfare  is  a  complex,  multi-faceted  public  policy  issue  that  includes  important 
scientific, ethical, economic and political dimensions'. The Commission attested itself  
to have often tried to incorporate and balance these four dimensions but it not only  
believed that there is a need for even better coordination at EU level but that it is 
difficult  for  a  single  Member  State  to  address  the  challenges  of  animal  welfare, 
especially in the longer term (EU Commission, 2006g, p. 4). 
The Commission thought that the 'demand from Member States and stakeholders 
for relevant legislative and non-legislative future Commission initiatives is increasing' 
(EU Commission, 2006g, p. 7). Therefore the Commission wanted an initiative on 
animal welfare that outlines the actions in this field for the coming years, which needs 
to be performed 'in the most coherent fashion possible, taking into account the cross-
cutting  nature  of  some  issues,  their  European  and  international  dimensions  and 
values and the range of associated and inter-connecting competencies as distributed 
today  among  the  Commission’s  various  Directorates  General'  (EU  Commission, 
2006g, p. 5).
The report hinted at a couple of unanswered questions but the Commission chose 
to answer only this one: Where do we stand on the problem of animal testing? First  
of all, ethical aspects should be addressed but only as a last resort, according to the 
Commission. Before the Commission talked about ethics, it preferred to talk about 
the 'latest  available  scientific  information'  (EU Commission,  2006g,  p.  6).  On the 
issue of animal testing this meant mentioning the possibilities of reducing, replacing 
and  refining  animal  testing  procedures (the  so-called  3Rs principle),  of  imposing 
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stricter  reviews  for  testing  if  an  animal  has  closer  genetic  proximity  to  humans 
(chimpanzees, for instance) or even alternatives for animal testing. Finally, however, 
the Commission brought  itself  to saying:  '[T]he ability  to  use animals in  research 
under appropriate controls needs to be preserved in the absence of alternatives to 
animal experiments (…)'  (EU Commission, 2006g, p. 6). This statement, of course, 
also gives another  explanation (apart  from simply wanting to avoid a 'hot  button' 
issue) for why the issue of animal testing did not appear in the online consultation. 
Quite simply, the DG had already made up its mind before the Action Plan. There 
was simply no need for consultation.
Coming back to the initiative, it should have ideally achieved the following: first, 
producing an outline of the Commission's planning in the area of animal welfare as 
well  as  showcasing  the  historical  origins  of  the  Commission’s  policies  and 
summarising the then current state of EU animal welfare policies; second, ensuring 
'the  proper  exercising  of  responsibilities  under  the  Treaty'  as  well  as  paying  'full 
regard  to  the  welfare  requirements  of  animals  in  formulating  and  implementing 
Community  policies(...)'  (EU  Commission,  2006g,  p.  7),  without,  of  course, 
disregarding the subsidiarity principle; third, telling the rest of the Commission what 
activities in the field of animal welfare there are; fourth, to facilitate dialogue on the 
issue  with  everybody  who  was  willing  to  participate,  be  it  inside  or  outside  the 
Commission, indeed, be it inside or outside the EU.
Although  it  seemed  at  this  point  that  there  was  only  one  policy  option,  the 
Commission's paper presented three: first, to do nothing in particular at all; second, 
to produce a so-called non-paper for informal discussions with Member States and 
stakeholders or third, to issue an official communiqué in the form of an Action Plan 
(EU Commission, 2006g, pp. 7–8).
The option of keeping the status quo was dismissed outright because it  would 
have  meant,  according  to  the  Commission,  first,  neglecting  the  demands  of 
stakeholders  and  Member  States,  second,  that  the  Commission  would  be 
insufficiently responsive to the treaty protocol (drafted in 1999), third, that synergies 
originating  from a  more  coordinated  approach  would  not  be  realised  as  well  as 
efficiency gains within the Commission and fourth, that the Commission would have 
missed an opportunity to expand its competencies. 
After  establishing  that  something  had to  be  done,  the  remaining  options were 
either an Action Plan or an informal discussion paper. The latter was fought off by 
161
stating  that  an  informal  discussion  paper  would  not  be  appropriate  for  such  an 
important issue. Additionally, it probably could not achieve its stated aims. Therefore, 
the Commission opted for the Action Plan. The Commission believed that by writing 
an Action  Plan it  would  facilitate  a 'deeper  reflection,  debate and dialogue'.  This 
would  also  (ideally)  lead to  a  'consensus for  the  future  long-term initiatives'  (EU 
Commission,  2006g,  p.  8) by promoting the analysis  of  horizontal  animal  welfare 
issues and by stressing the importance of a more coherent approach across the EU 
Member States and within the Commission. Moreover the Commission believed that 
a  greater  impact  (compared  to  an  initiative  by  a  single  Member  State)  in  the 
international arena (beyond the EU) would be achievable if the EU had a coherent  
animal welfare strategy.
Leaving the bigger picture aside, what did the Commission actually propose in the 
Action Plan with its five actions? The first action - upgrading the 'existing minimum 
standards for animal protection and welfare (...) for species or issues that are not  
currently addressed in EU legislation', with a particular priority on 'designing EU rules 
in order to secure efficient enforcement (…)' (EU Commission, 2006h, p. 3) - appears 
vague.  However,  the  staff  working  papers  contain  more  details  about  the 
Commission’s ideas. In them, the Commission suggested the following points. First, 
while detailed minimum standards exist for some farm animals (the named calves, 
pigs and laying hens) there are no specific standards for important farm species like 
cattle, sheep and ducks. At the same time it is hardly justifiable on either scientific or  
moral  grounds to  claim that  cows  need less  protection  than pigs.  Moreover,  the 
Commission also feared losing its internationally leading role in the area because 
international  organisations like  the OIE or  the Council  of  Europe have started to 
address animal welfare more thoroughly. Second, the strategic paper on the Action 
Plan suggested incorporating animal welfare into other EU policy areas. The main 
area here is the reformed Common Agricultural Policy, especially measures foreseen 
under  rural  development  policies.  As  discussed  above,  this  shift  from  'value  to 
money' to values for money' had already happened at this point. The streamlining of 
policy areas was also well accepted in online consultation. In addition, there is a clear  
link between the online consultation and Action One (see part 1 and part 7 of the 
online consultation).
The second point  of  the Action Plan dealt  with  supporting research on animal  
welfare, 'to pay full regard to the welfare of animals in formulating and implementing  
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these policies in parallel with enhancing the development, validation, implementation 
and monitoring of alternative approaches to animal testing' (EU Commission, 2006h, 
p. 3). Again, the Action Plan did not suggest anything new here as the Commission 
had supported and initiated a number of research projects on animal welfare such as 
studies on consumer behaviour, other legal and ethical aspects of animal welfare or 
the welfare of a particular farm animal. Also, the EU's 7th Framework Programme for 
Research  and  Technological  Development  was  already  highlighting  the  issue  of 
animal welfare in various research contexts.
Apart  from the  existing  research  initiatives  supported  by  the  Commission,  the 
strategic paper accompanying the Action Plan called for the 'preparatory work for the 
establishment'  of  a 'European Centre-Laboratory for the protection and welfare of 
animals and the Validation of Alternative Testing Methods' (EU Commission, 2006h, 
p. 8). Apart from being a communication hub for animal welfare research (aimed at 
researchers and other professionals in the area), this centre should entrusted with 
the  development  and  the  standardisation  of  animal  welfare  indicators  (EU 
Commission,  2006i,  p.  8),  which  could be used on the  ground and as part  of  a 
possible  implementation  of  the  proposed  third  Action  of  the  Action  Plan  (on 
standardised  animal  welfare  indicators)  (EU  Commission,  2006h,  p.  3) The 
Commission  also  wanted  to  support  research  on  monitoring  systems  (such  as 
tracking  systems  in  combination  with  electronic  identification  and  other 
communication  tools)  for  the  implementation  of  animal  welfare  standards  which 
would  help  to  prevent  the  use  of  improper  facilities  beforehand  (as  opposed  to 
sanctions after a revealed breach of EU legislation). Here the Commission thought in 
particular of animal transportation issues (EU Commission, 2006i, p. 12). However, 
the  specific  implications  of  this  announcement  were  unclear  in  particular  if  we 
consider  that  Commission  founded  the  European  Centre  for  the  Validation  of 
Alternative Methods (EVAM) in 1991. While it may hinted at a competence expansion 
of the EVAM to areas of animal welfare outside animal experimentation (the centre's 
founding purpose),  this  expansion did  not happen in legislation that  changed the 
competence of the EVAM - Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used 
for scientific purposes (EP and Council, 2010). 
Again,  on  the  often  mentioned  3Rs  principle,  the  Commission  was  already 
supporting research, which had highly consensual qualities, on the one hand, to find 
alternatives for animal testing (the first R – replacement) and, on the other hand, 
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where it is still necessary, to reduce and to refine animal testing (the other two Rs).  
Maybe more interesting - while admittedly typical for the EU's consensus seeking 
policy style - is the fact that the Commission tried to get the industry on board early 
on. Pan-European business associations including such illustrious organisations as 
the  European Chemical  Industry  Council  (CEFIC),  the  European Crop Protection 
Association  (ECPA),  the  European  Association  for  Bioindustries  (EuropaBio),  the 
European Cosmetic Toiletry and Perfumery Association (COLIPA), the International 
Association  for  Soaps,  Detergents  and  Maintenance  Product  Industry  in  Europe 
(A.I.S.E.)  and  the  European  Federation  on  Pharmaceutical  Industries  and 
Associations  (EFPIA)  agreed  to  the  so-called  3Rs  Declaration  of  Brussels  (The 
European  partnership  for  alternative  approaches  to  animal  testing,  2006),  which 
basically  calls  for  the  implementation  of  the  3Rs.  As  already  discussed,  animal 
testing was not included in the online consultation. However, it featured prominently 
in the Action Plan. It is worth mentioning that the 3Rs Declaration was completely an 
industry  driven  initiative,  no  CSO  representing  pro  animal  welfare  concerns 
participated in it. Commission staff even co-authored an academic paper based on 
the declaration with an industry representative (Laroche, Lalis, & Brekelmans, 2007).
Regarding action number three, the introduction of standardised animal welfare 
indicators, the basic idea is compelling. In order to make the often quoted 'informed 
choice', the responsible consumer needs at least a clear labelling system indicating 
the welfare standard of a particular product (EU Commission, 2006i, p. 10). In order 
to have a coherent labelling system, one needs animal welfare indicators. At the time 
of  the  Action  Plan,  no  Commission  publication  went  beyond  this  common sense 
reasoning. The core problem, though, is how to establish these indicators? Without a 
doubt,  negotiations  on  welfare  indicators  between  the  Commission,  producers, 
consumer groups, the research community, animal welfare campaigners and so on, 
are a lengthy and cumbersome procedure and would probably start with the question 
of which products need welfare labelling at all. This is not to say that there was no 
welfare standard labelling going on (e.g. for eggs) but it was, and still  is, far from 
anything  the  Commission  suggested.  Interestingly,  the  aforementioned  point  of 
referring  the  standardisation  problem to  the  'European  Centre-Laboratory  for  the 
protection and welfare of animals and the Validation of Alternative Testing Methods'  
was not repeated under this heading. 
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While the issue of food labelling was touched upon in the consultation (part 4), the 
treatment  of  welfare  indicators  was  more  thoroughly  explored  and  fundamentally 
questioned in the consultation than in the Action Plan. The idea of building welfare 
indicators based on natural  living was included in the consultation but  not  in  the 
Action  Plan  (part  7).  Again,  this  omission  was  not  explained  officially  by  the 
Commission.
Action number four of the Action Plan - 'ensuring that animal keepers and handlers 
as well as the general public are more involved and informed on current standards of 
animal protection' (EU Commission, 2006i, p. 11) - also remains comfortably vague. 
Apart  from the platitude that an informed animal  handler/keeper and an informed 
general  public  are  the  best  advocates  for  animal  welfare,  nothing  spectacular 
happened  under  this  heading.  The  Commission  urges  itself  'with  the  support  of 
Member  States  and  relevant  stakeholders  (…)  [to]  define  a  proper  strategy  to 
communicate  to  citizens  on  the  issue  of  animal  protection  and  welfare'  (EU 
Commission,  2006i,  p.  13).  The  Commission  even  goes  so  far  as  to  'give 
consideration  to  the  establishment  of  a  specific  information  platform  on  animal 
welfare in order to nurture further dialogue and exchange of experiences between 
important stakeholders in the field of animal welfare' (EU Commission, 2006i, p. 13). 
The information campaign featured heavily (in part 3) in the consultation and also 
appeared in this form in the Action Plan. 
In the final and fifth point of the Action Plan - continuing to support and initiate 
further 'international initiatives to (...) create a greater consensus on animal welfare, 
including engaging with developing countries to explore trade opportunities based on 
welfare friendly production systems' (EU Commission, 2006h, p. 4) - more interesting 
points are addressed. On the one hand, the EU rallies for animal welfare standards 
beyond  the  EU,  whilst  on  the  other  hand  higher  welfare  standards  can  mean a 
competitive disadvantage for the EU economy. Therefore, the Commission should 
lobby internationally for the allegedly high EU standards on animal welfare because if 
every country were to have the same high standards, these could no longer be a 
source of competitive disadvantage. Platforms for such international initiatives are 
the  EU's  bilateral  relationships  in  the  area  of  agricultural  trade.  In  addition,  the 
Commission, on behalf of the EU, should press for higher standards in international  
organisations.  The  strategic  report  names  the  OIE  and  the  WTO  in  particular. 
Regarding the WTO, the report  points  out  that WTO agreements do not  mention 
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animal welfare and that there have been no disputes on this issue yet. In addition, an 
interesting proposition of the strategic report is the suggestion of promoting animal 
welfare in developing countries in order to create trade opportunities for them. This is 
based on the observation 'that extensive and sustainable agricultural systems, with 
good  standards  of  animal  welfare,  are  still  the  predominant  form  of  livestock 
production in many developing countries' (EU Commission, 2006i, p. 16). This issue 
was also included in the online consultation in part 5.
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Concluding remarks
Scholars from political  studies and economics have given the issue of product 
harmonisation a great deal of academic attention. In comparison, the area of animal 
welfare appears almost neglected and it is often only a footnote in discussions about 
the EU’s policies on agriculture and the environment. Yet, the public appears to be 
gripped at certain times by the issue of animal welfare. 
Generally, the harmonisation of harmonisation measures is viewed as change for 
the better. Thus, Renda et al. argue: 'The 2008 ‘goods package’ consists of a cluster 
of three EC regulations and one EC decision (...). The smooth acceptance, indeed 
strongly positive co-operation of the EP and Council, is a most encouraging signal for 
the  better  working  of  the  internal  goods  market.  Business  associations  are 
enthusiastic about the package. The most important change in the package is the 
decisive  cost  and  uncertainty  reduction  for  businesses  when  relying  on  mutual 
recognition for intra-EU market access'  (2009, p.  67).  In a similar vein, Pelkmans 
concludes that '[t]he 2008 Goods package (...) on the improvement of the New and 
Global  Approach  stands  out  as  an  excellent  example  of  how  useful  “creeping 
integration” can actually be (…)' (2011, p. 6). However, he is wrong in claiming that 
'[t]he [2008 Goods] package has rightly been applauded by all stakeholders, a rare 
event in Brussels'  (2010, p. 2), as consumer organisations substantially disagreed 
with core elements of the package.
The echo to the animal welfare case is mixed. An evaluation of the Action Plan by 
the  Committee  on  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  of  the  EP in  March  2010 
summarised that '[t]he vast majority of the measures contained in the current – albeit  
still  none too ambitious – Action Plan have been implemented satisfactorily'  (EP, 
2010,  p.  12).  Pro-animal  welfare  groups were  disappointed that  the upgrading of 
'existing  minimum  standards  for  animal  protection  and  welfare  in  line  with  new 
scientific  evidence  and  socio-economic  assessments  and  (...)  simplification  and 
clarification  of  the  existing  legislation  where  reports  and  experience highlight  the 
need for revisions or updating' (Animals’ Angels, 2009, p. 16) did not happen. Others 
criticised the lack of compliance with existing animal welfare laws throughout the EU 
as  a  basic  problem  that  needs  addressing  even  before  any  upgrading  issues 
(Compassion in  World  Farming,  2007). The NGO Compassion in  World  Farming 
argues that the Action Plan is insufficient because it does not address the lack of 
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enforcement. On the other hand, industry representatives such as the European Fur 
Breeder's Association (EFBA) found no reason to object to the Action Plan. On the 
contrary, it stated that it 'welcomes and supports the review of the European Action 
Plan on animal welfare 2006-2010' and that the EFBA 'pro-actively contributed to the 
public consultation launched by the Commission (...)' (EFBA, 2009).
Unlike  legislation  in  the  harmonisation  case,  the  animal  welfare  case  had  an 
explicit  communication  and  participation  agenda  aimed  at  the  wider  public.  The 
Action Plan wanted to 'engage EU citizens and the EP as well as the EU civil society, 
stakeholders and policy-makers in a wider debate on the place of animal welfare in 
our society and the importance given to this issue' (EU Commission, 2006g, p. 10). 
Was the  online  consultation  able  to  deliver  and engaged EU citizens in  a  wider 
debate on animal welfare? 
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Chapter 6: Case Study Analysis
Drawing upon the hypotheses developed in chapter 4, this chapter discusses and 
compares the results of the two case studies on the basis of the interview data. What 
are the main differences and similarities between them? What are the reasons for 
these similarities and dissimilarities? Are they based on similar causal factors? What 
can we conclude are the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches? 
Moreover, as the case studies were selected for their dissimilarity, do the differences 
between  them  affect  and  help  to  explain  the  legitimacy  potential  of  online 
consultations?
It turns out that the reality of the Commission's policy-making is messier than we 
assumed  in  chapter  3.  In  particular,  this  chapter  challenges  the  assumption  of 
chapter  3  that  the  Commission  is  a  promising  candidate  for  participation  in 
policy-making due to its long tradition of policy consulting with outside actors. It has 
become clear that the implementation of the online consultations is not informed by 
the  problems  and  challenges  of  creating  input  legitimacy.  Ultimately,  both 
consultations  failed  to  create  a  participation  arena  that  is  able  to  deliver  input 
legitimacy. In comparing the two case studies, this chapter analyses the consultation 
process in relation to the operation of the Commission's policy-making machinery. 
The literature is full of examples of messy policy making - the classic text here is 
Wildavsky and Pressman's  (1984) ironically and opulently entitled 'Implementation: 
How  Great  Expectations  in  Washington  Are  Dashed  in  Oakland:  Or,  Why  It's 
Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic 
Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to 
Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes', first published in 1973. Unlike in this 
US-American  case,  however,  we  focus  on  the  tension  that  arises  within  an 
organisation  –  the  Commission  – which  has  historically  been  geared  towards 
output-legitimacy  and  thus  struggles  much  more  to  implement  the  procedural 
requirements to achieve greater input-legitimacy.
Chapter  6  is  structured  as  follows.  The  first  part  tests  the  hypothesis  about 
prerequisites for meaningful participation within the Commission against the empirical 
data; the second part looks at the issue of accessibility in technological terms; the 
third part analyses the second set of hypotheses on meaningful  transformation of 
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inputs  within  the  Commission;  the  fourth  part  tests  the  hypotheses  concerning 
participants and is followed by a concise conclusion.
Hypothesis 1: Accessibility of the participation arena
The first hypothesis is concerned with the degree of accessibility to the arena of 
participation and assumes that the more inclusive and the higher the level of public 
awareness,  the  more  legitimacy  potential  a  consultation  can  claim.  Clearly,  the 
challenge of accessibility can be approached from different angles. First, there is the 
awareness of the problem. Indicators for this can be found at the level of individual  
staff  in  the  Commission  but  also  at  the  organisational  level.  How do  procedural 
arrangements  deal  with  the  issue  of  accessibility?  Is  it  part  of  the  criteria  when 
organising consultations? Does the design and use of these measures address the 
issue? This obviously includes measures that were not implemented. The subject of  
what could have been done and what aspects need improvement are key parts of the  
conclusion  of  the  thesis.  Second,  and  arguably  more  importantly,  how  does 
awareness of the accessibility problem affect the design of the participation arena?
With regards to the question how the Commission deals with  the challenge of 
accessibility  to  their  consultations,  the  data  was  able  to  shed some light  on  the 
following  five  indicators:  first,  actively  approaching  individual  citizens;  second, 
reaching out beyond Brussels; third, adapting a consultation to different participants; 
fourth,  on  the  issue  of  whether  educational  material  was  provided;  and  fifth  on 
accessibility as a guiding principle of the consultation. The overall picture of the data 
is clear: Consultations are inaccessible for participants who have no background in 
the Commission's consultation regime.
One striking difference between the two consultations was that the animal welfare 
case had a much higher rate of participation compared to the harmonisation case. 
Regarding the accessibility issue, this raises two questions: First, did the two DGs 
adopt different strategies in creating public awareness or was the different rate of  
participation mainly down to the nature of the policy? Second, does each DG offer an 
explanation for the high/low turnout rate?
This research could not identify any striking procedural differences between the 
two consultations. The higher rate of participation in the animal welfare case was not 
caused by making the arena of participation relatively more accessible. The interview 
data here is relatively clear. Both DGs did not adopt different strategies for creating 
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awareness.  Their  most  important  and  successful  approach  was  to  mobilise  their 
'usual suspects'. In the harmonisation case interviewee (E, 3) recalled the process: 
'We put the consultation on Your Voice in Europe, there was a press release, we sent 
messages to the national experts, to associations which are normally interested in 
following our work, alerting them that the consultation was going on, and then we 
sent it to the sectoral groups which then further distributed it'. The situation in DG 
Health  was  very  similar:  'The  only way  of  making  this  popular  was  in  informing 
stakeholders in different Member States and in Brussels. Normally,  this is quite a 
vast number, around 50 organisations or so – some of them local, some of them 
international and so we had to cope with different kinds of publics' (emphasis added) 
(S, 3). Again, the interview partner assumed that the above mentioned organisations 
were multiplying the call for participation, as summarised by this response: 'The first 
round of dissemination would be through our stakeholder groups. These are often 
large  networks  with  their  own  membership  base  and  they  would  then  send 
information down to their membership base' (S, 3). 
The approach is incomplete when it comes to achieving accessibility on at least 
two grounds. First,  it  completely relies on organisations participating and creating 
further public awareness via their respective membership bases. This idea of CSO 
actors as democratic  transmission belts  has been dismissed in  chapter  3  as not 
viable. Both consultations made no attempt to address citizens directly as potential  
participants. Moreover, regarding 50 organisations as a vast number is problematic.  
If the aspiration is that the consultation should actually reach as many participants as 
possible from outside the Brussels cosmos, disseminating the call for participation via 
50 organisations is a small number. In another interview (in DG Health), probing the 
number of contacted organisations, the interviewee suggested that 30 to 50 of the 
initially  contacted  organisations  is  an  acceptable  number  because  '[o]therwise  it 
would be unmanageable. These are groups that physically meet in Brussels. They 
have their own dynamics and working procedures' (S, 3). This practice indicates that 
the  online  aspect  of  the  consultation  regime  is  not  the  driving  factor.  This  also 
challenges the assumption that online consultations are easily adaptable to different 
numbers  of  participants  and types  of  participants,  which  was  elaborated in  more 
detail  in chapter 3.  Physical  presence in Brussels still  seems to be of paramount 
importance even for online consultations. The advantages of having consultations 
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that do not require physical presence were therefore diminished by the way in which 
the two DGs disseminated the call for participation.
Regarding  the  relatively  high  rate  of  participation  (both  compared  to  the 
Commission's  online  consultations  in  general  and compared,  in  particular,  to  the 
harmonisation case), DG Health was surprised. The idea that animal welfare was a 
hot media topic at the time was openly dismissed, as this reply suggests:  'It  was 
always  a  struggle  to  get  the  media  to  accept  the  issue  because  of  a  lack  of 
understanding. Also, the political line of the Commission was not clear so resources 
were dispersed and the lack of clarity did not help to rally support from outside [the 
Commission]. So the big popular response was not down to a particular issue at the 
time - on the contrary' (S, 2). Interview partner (S, 5) stated simply: 'The high turnout 
was  quite  surprising,  even  for  us'.  Interview  partner  (S,  4) offered  a  different 
explanation, possibly affected by his own enthusiasm for the topic: 'It is clear that we 
have a huge and wide number of people interested. This is symptomatic. We saw the 
number of letters, the contributions from the web, emails. The second important issue 
is  that  the EU and the Commission are having a leading role and I  think this is  
important in the world wide scenario. So – conclusion – the number of people is  
justified in my view because of the leading role we have. And for the people to take 
part in an important moment, historically for this area and that is probably the reason 
for spreading the news of this' [sic].
Unquestionably, a high number of communications from people outside Brussels 
may indicate a pressing problem, or at least a problem that receives attention from a 
wider  public.  A participant  could reason that  the policy impact  of  such a 'historic  
paper' is worth the participation costs. Yet,  it  is questionable that the participants'  
motivation was rooted in an analysis of the Commission's role and the conclusion 
that, via the Commission, they would be taking part in a historical moment for EU 
animal welfare policy-making. Interviews with participants showed that the work of 
the Commission is only marginally monitored and they gave no indication that their  
reasons for participating were to be seen in a historical context.
Issue salience (or the lack of it) is given as another reason for the high turnout. 
Regarding the harmonisation case an interviewee argued: 'And then of course the 
subject is quite technical as such, and more for the experts than for the individual' (E, 
1). Interview partner (E, 2) suggests that regarding the harmonisation case '[i]t is the 
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best [tool] that we have, the best we can do and 280 replies on a technical subject is  
not bad, it is the normal output. I think that this is just the limit of the tool'.
In fact, in both cases no attempts were made to reduce the expert nature of the 
subject by disseminating accessible information. 'You quickly enter a very technical 
issue and if you are not an expert then it is difficult to find an answer'  (P, 5). This 
observation did not lead to any consequences. Education was not a concern for any 
policy officer. Apparently, if one lacks the expertise, then the Commission does not 
regard it as its duty to provide accessible information.
All that we have just said suggests that the higher rate of participation was indeed 
down  to  the  nature  of  the  policy.  Assuming  that  participants  use  a  cost-benefit  
calculation  to  decide  whether  to  participate  or  not  in  an  online  consultation,  the 
nature of the policy has an impact on both sides of the calculus. First, if the policy 
impact were perceived as a benefit arising from participation (the higher the impact of 
policy on the political systems, the more the benefits of participating) then it would be 
more rational to participate in a consultation, which would potentially have greater 
policy impact. Second, the more self-efficacy a participant has, the more likely she or 
he  will  participate.  Hence,  a  consultation  that  deals  with  a  policy  where  less 
specialised knowledge is needed (or where more knowledge is in the public domain) 
and therefore more individuals have a working knowledge of the issue and higher 
self-efficacy, the less costly it is to participate. Therefore, we would expect to see 
higher  rates of  participation in  those consultations where  less prior  knowledge is 
required. This leads to a simple two by two table for classifying consultation cases 
from the perspective of the participant.
Policy Impact
Ability to contribute meaningfully
High Low
Low Animal welfare case Least desirable case for 
participation
High Most desirable case for 
participation
Harmonisation case
Table 13: Cost-benefit calculation
The policy impact  in the harmonisation case was likely to be, from the outset, 
much bigger.  The rational  participant  may choose a consultation where providing 
input is less resource-intensive, due to the nature of the consultation policy.  This 
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would  favour  the  animal  welfare  case.  Therefore,  for  an  individual  who  chooses 
between participating in those two consultations only on the grounds of policy impact, 
both cases are cross-cutting within this classification and are similarly attractive for 
participants. We can assume that information on the animal welfare case is more 
widely disseminated due to the fact that the issue is more media friendly (i.e. it is  
more evocative, it  creates easier television-friendly pictures and refers to tangible 
objects in the real world - as opposed to abstract safety standards). This assertion is 
based on the 'accessibility bias' argument which suggests 'that information that can 
be more easily retrieved from memory tends to dominate judgements, opinions and 
decisions,  and  that  in  the  area  of  public  affairs,  more  accessible  information  is  
information that is more frequently or more recently conveyed by the media' (Iyengar, 
1990, p. 2). 
This  leads  to  the  question:  Which  effect  is  more  important  for  cost-benefit 
calculation within a population – the costs of participation or the benefits of policy  
impact? The design of this study does not allow us to comprehensibly address the 
issue of how to assign a weighting factor to the cost-benefit calculus for participation 
with  regard to the Commission’s  online consultation.  If  we only compare the two 
cases in this research, then the costs of participation appear to be more important 
than the policy impact. 
Nevertheless, with regard to accessibility, this calculus is crucial for the design of 
participatory measures in policy formulation. In the case of the Commission's online 
consultations we can assume that the policy impact of a consultation is a given. It is a 
feature from the outset. The policy impact of an Action Plan is, in itself, difficult to 
predict as it is unclear which policy intentions will manifest into substantial policies.  
The degree of policy impact becomes more difficult to judge if we take into account  
that the aim of the Action Plan was also to establish animal welfare as a competence 
for  the  Commission.  In  contrast,  the  policy  impact  of  a  proposed  directive  or  
regulation  is  comparably  more  predictable.  The  assumption  here  is  that,  from a 
participant's perspective, a document stating intended polices is less important than a 
directive, which will become hard law.
It is of course difficult to criticise DG Health for opening consultations on an Action 
Plan on the grounds that it has potentially less policy impact than a directive. Yet,  
compared to the policy impact, the amount of previous knowledge is indeed less of a 
given as the participation arena itself can be a platform for learning (which is - as 
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discussed  in  chapter  2  and  4  -  also  one  the  main  requirements  of  deliberative 
democracy).  Clearly,  the Commission should not  engage in  'dumbing down'  their 
consultations.  However,  improving  access  to  relevant  knowledge,  especially  for 
individuals with  no expert  background,  is central  here and therefore,  accessibility 
means lowering the costs of participation by making sure that technical issues are 
understandable for people who do not have a background in the area. Fishkin for  
instance,  in  his  deliberative  polling  events,  suggests  making  sure  that  an  expert 
prepares briefing materials for participants and that they are also instructed on how 
to use this expert information within the participation arena (2009, p. 107). With this 
in mind, then, the question is whether the DGs have made attempts to lower the 
participation  costs  for  people with  less  background knowledge.  We have  already 
seen that this was not case regarding educational  material,  or,  with  adapting the 
consultation to different participant groups. The idea of adapting a consultation to 
people with  different backgrounds is not new or alien to the officials responsible:  
'What we sometimes do is to make questionnaires for different addressees. But here 
[in the harmonisation case] we didn't have different versions' (E, 4). Later the same 
interviewee  revealed,  however,  that  in  her  DG  this  mainly  means  addressing 
particularly small and medium-sized enterprises as opposed to larger corporations – 
again hardly a shift towards a citizen-centred view of participants. In addition, there 
are no guidelines on how to adapt consultations for a wider audience. It appears that 
decisions are in the hands of the policy officer in charge.
Concerning the indicator as to whether accessibility itself is a guiding principle in 
designing consultations, the following picture emerged. When discussing the reason 
why an online consultation is set-up in the first place, the interviews revealed a sort of  
shot gun tactic. Regarding the animal welfare case, one interviewee informed me that 
'[m]ainly we used all  [consultation] means available. First,  the Eurobarometer was 
considered a consultation; then we considered the different meetings with working 
groups, with representatives from the stakeholders as consultations, representatives 
of the Member States. It was not the first web consultation by the Commission and 
we followed certain guidelines. But at that time, it was really the beginning of web 
consultations'  (S,  2).  Actually,  IPM  had  started  a  long  time  before,  in  2001.  In 
contrast,  the  interview  partner  (P,  5) in  the  harmonisation  case  had  a  clear 
understanding of the accessibility potential and problem: 'We put all of our discussion 
papers on the internet but of course you have to be aware of our website. In this way,  
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we  are  quite  transparent  but  we  do  not  reach  the  wider  public.  These  [online]  
consultations are meant to fulfil the objective of reaching the wider public'.
It appears that, in particular in the animal welfare case, the online consultation was 
one part of a wider one-way communication strategy: 'I  would never leave out an 
opportunity to have a wider web based consultation. And I am sorry that we cannot  
do it even more because the Commission was not built to provide communication' (S, 
5).  The  same  interviewee  responded  regarding  the  difference  between  online 
consultations and other types of consultation that '[t]he online [consultation] is more 
spontaneous (…)'  (S,  5).  Another  interviewee went  so far  to  say that  'I  have  no 
recollection of time where consultations were done in any other way [than online]' (S, 
3). It turned out that the interviewee meant that organising meetings has been done 
electronically since the beginning of the 2000s and hence is done 'online'. 
In essence, what the policy officer here suggests is that accessibility is achieved 
by offering different  consultation channels,  yet,  actively  reaching out  to the wider  
public is not achieved due to talking to the 'usual suspects'. It seems that there is a 
genuine lack of understanding of the potential importance of online consultations for  
reaching out to the wider  public.  This was also reflected in a statement from the 
interview partner in the harmonisation case: 'We already did closed consultations 
with  the  industries  (...).  They  come  and  see  us  regularly  and  they  get  a  lot  of  
feedback'  (P, 5). In addition, although the interviewee mentioned certain guidelines 
(without  being  able  to  specify  them  on  the  spot),  he  was  quite  happy  that  the 
consultation process has become less rigidly organised: 'The Action Plan was part of 
a procedural consultation that was not as much formalised as today. It was done with  
stakeholders  selected  on  the  basis  of  their  relationship  to  the  DG.  It  was  not 
formalised in specific stakeholder committees as it is nowadays. We also created, for 
the first time within the Commission, an inter-service group in the area of Animal 
Protection from different DGs' (S, 2).
In case of the animal welfare policy plan, the guidelines were often perplexing for 
the  interviewee.  In  2002  the  Commission  committed  itself  publicly  to  building  an 
intranet  website  that  would  provide  'Commission  staff  with  practical  guidance, 
including examples of best practice including 'a help-desk facility using a mail-box, to 
which  staff  can  send  questions  on  the  application  of  the  general  principles  and 
minimum  standards'  (EU  Commission,  2002a,  p.  13). Referring  to  the  specific 
measures outlined I  was  assured that  '[w]e  have  been assisted  quite  strongly in 
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producing this  consultation by the IPM people.  I  can tell  you that  the process is 
extremely  sophisticated.  We  have  several  quality  checks'  (S,  2),  implying  that 
assistance  was  provided  but  in  the  form outlined  in  the  'General  principles  and 
minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission'  (EU 
Commission,  2002a).  The  same  interviewee  was  not  aware,  however,  that  the 
responsibility for IPM had shifted from DG Market to DG Digit in the period between 
the consultation and interview. The situation was similar in DG Enterprise: 'I am not 
aware of the existence of (...) guidelines, yes we had them but best practices and 
examples … [pause] … if they are there we do not use them' (P, 5). 
The issue of technical accessibility is also riddled with problems. The design of the 
Commission's website intends that citizens visit the Your Voice in Europe website 
and are directed from there to the individual consultations hosted by individual DGs. 
It  is the gateway to participate within the Commission. The research showed that 
there is a communication deficit between people hosting the Your Voice website and 
the leading unit  for  online consultations.  We will  see this  in the next  part  of  this 
chapter.
Accessibility and technology
The issue at  stake is  straightforward.  If  nobody finds  a  consultation  then it  is 
impossible for anyone to participate in it. And therefore the accessibility problems of 
the Commission’s online consultations start with the obscurity of the main access 
point of the ‘Your Voice in Europe’ website, even for the Commission itself. Interview 
partner (E, 3) confessed 'I am not sure if every European [Commission] official knows 
about the YVIE website'. It may be worth noting that this is a statement that is easily 
transferable to any other group of relevant actors and, in particular, to the citizenry. 
Moreover, in the same interview the interviewee mused, 'I wonder who really knows 
about the website your Voice in Europe' (E, 3).
The relative obscurity of  the Your  Voice website  and its low priority within  the 
internal workings of the Commission also has consequences for the main gateway to 
the  Commission’s  online  consultations.  An  interesting  example  of  the  caveats  of 
technology was the mystery disappearance of  consultations.  At  its  heart  was the 
phenomenon that some consultations disappeared from the Your Voice in Europe 
Website at the end of the consultation period. An example for this was the 2008 
consultation on animal trapping, hosted by DG Environment (EU Commission, 2008).
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In itself,  the publishing procedure for a consultation page in the ‘Your Voice in 
Europe’  website  seems straight  forward.  The DG Market  web-team manages the 
updating  of  the  ‘Your  Voice  in  Europe’  website.  It  gives  a  title  for  every  new 
consultation  launched by the different  DGs.  These titles  are simple  links  to  their 
websites.  Initially,  part  of  the  ‘Your  Voice  in  Europe’  portal  was  developed  and 
managed by people within DG Market as was the responsibility for the IPM. In spring 
2009,  this  was transferred  to  DG Digit.  DG Digit  is  an Internal  Services DG (as 
opposed to  DG Market,  which  is  a  classic  policy DG) based in  Luxembourg  (as 
opposed to policy DGs, which are based in Brussels). Individual DGs decide on the 
consultation period 'but there are minimum standards to be followed: The minimum 
consultation period required is 8 weeks. If the 8-week period is not respected, DGs 
should explain their reason and publish this justification alongside the announcement 
of the consultation' (M, 1).
The design of the Your Voice in Europe page suggests that one can follow the  
progress of a consultation from open to closed on the website by looking under which  
heading it is  grouped. The perception that consultations are archived on the Your 
Voice in Europe page so that participants can refer back to them is not correct, as 
one interviewee explained (M, 1). The ‘Your Voice in Europe’ website in fact does not 
archive  individual  consultations  (the  consultation  itself  is  on  the  DG’s  website). 
However,  more  troubling  than  the  lack  of  archiving  was  the  phenomenon  that 
consultations that had once been open disappeared altogether from the website – or, 
to be precise, links to the consultations disappeared. The fact that something odd 
was going on with the website became apparent during the early stages of research 
for this thesis as it was not transparent which past consultations were promoted via 
the ‘Your Voice' website. Therefore, the question arose as to why old consultations 
were disappearing from the Your Voice in Europe consultation page. 
An initial assumption was that the individual DG decides on how long (if at all) a  
closed consultation and possible outcomes are listed on the consultation pages of 
the 'Your Voice in Europe' website. This was not the case, however. After the web-
master  team  understood  the  issue  (there  was  some  confusion  arising  from  the 
difference between 'closed consultations' and 'closing consultations'), the web-master 
appeared to be genuinely puzzled: 'What you say sounds quite strange to me. In 
general all consultations promoted through Your Voice in Europe are archived under 
"closed  consultation"  when  their  closing  date  comes.  If  you  are  sure  that  old  
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consultations promoted though Your Voice in Europe have been removed from the 
site, could you tell me which ones actually disappeared so that I can check with my 
web-masters and try to understand the reason?' (M, 3).
Even before giving an example for a disappeared consultation, the mystery of the 
disappearing consultation was solved: 'I just spoke with the web-master and got more 
information  about  this  issue.  Actually  you  are  right:  there  are  a  number  of 
consultations which are removed from the site when they are closed. This is because 
the local  DG doesn't  ask us to  put  the consultation in  the "closed consultations" 
section.  If  we  don't  receive  any instructions  from them,  we  assume that  the  link 
pointing to the final page won't work any more after a certain period, and we remove 
the link from Your Voice in Europe (…)'  (M, 1). Hence, the procedure is to move a 
link from an open consultation to the closed consultation section of the website once 
the consultation ends. This does not happen if the home DG asks not to leave their  
consultation link on the Your Voice in Europe page. Moreover, some links to closed 
consultations are removed after  some time from the  website  if  the  DG does not 
provide a link to the follow-up results or the link to the follow-up results does not point  
to a valid page of the home DG. 
Since this interview the situation has changed. The design and management of the 
Your  Voice  in  Europe  website  has  been  altered  which  is  partly  a  result  of  the 
research process for this thesis. Shortly after the problem had been understood by 
the DG Market unit a further email announced the change of the website: 'When the 
consultation  is  over,  they  have  to  send  another  email  asking  us  to  remove  the 
consultation  from  the  "open  consultations"  section  and  put  it  under  the  "closed 
consultations" section. If they don't send us instructions, we remove the consultation 
from Your Voice in Europe. However, yesterday we discussed this within our web-
team and we came to the conclusion that there may be other users, like you, who are 
interested in having a record of all the consultations promoted through Your Voice in 
Europe. Therefore, we have decided to change our procedure. Starting from now, we 
will move all the consultations from the "open" to the "closed consultations" section, 
unless DGs explicitly ask us not to do so. We risk maintaining links that don't work 
any more but  at  least users will  have a full  list  of  all  the consultations promoted 
thorough  Your  Voice  in  Europe.  We  would  also  like  to  reintegrate  ancient 
consultations  in  the  "Closed  consultations"  section  (...)'  (M,  2).  Indeed,  since 
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September 2009 the website has changed accordingly. Appendix IV and V contain 
screenshots of the old and new designs of the website.
Apart from internal organisational mishaps, the above raises the question of why 
some DGs do not want to have their results linked to the Your Voice in Europe page.  
When this question was raised, the policy officer, who was communicating with DG 
Market,  was  again  surprised.  On  the  mystery  of  disappearing  consultations,  an 
interviewee suggested this  explanation:  'The problem with  the Commission is  the 
high fluctuation of staff. So, in those cases it could be that the person responsible left  
before the results were published and the new person didn't know that he or she had 
to communicate with [DG] Market' (S, 1). Another suggestion made by a policy officer 
was: 'I think this is quite bizarre because if you decide to carry out a consultation then 
it is quite logical to publish the results. What could happen is that – we had some 
criticisms on another consultation – some people think that a consultation is that  
badly done and then they make it disappear so it does not have an influence on the  
decision-making process. So maybe someone thinks that the questions were biased 
– a result of outside pressure resulting from bad consultation. In our case we thought 
that some comments were not justified but kept them' (P, 5). Neither of the two case 
studies of this thesis, however, had any issues with disappearing links and both were 
promoted via the Your Voice in Europe website.
Related to the issue of the disappearing consultations was the phenomenon that 
some but not all, consultations were promoted via the 'Your Voice in Europe' website, 
whilst  other  consultations  -  although  targeting  a  wider  public  –  were  not. 
Consultations not promoted via the ‘Your Voice in Europe’ website only appeared on 
the web-pages of the individuate DG. Quittkat  hint  at  the problem by mentioning 
'inconsistencies' (2011, p. 258), while Hüller (2010b) seems not to acknowledge the 
phenomenon at all. However that may be, neither could shed any light on why this  
was  happening.  Interview  partner  (M,  1) from  DG  Market  offered  the  following 
explanation: '[A]ccording to internal rules, all DGs should promote their consultations 
on  Your  Voice  in  Europe  without  exception.  If  some  DGs  don't  publish  their 
consultations on Your Voice in Europe this is due to mistakes or it is simply due to 
the fact that we are still in a transitional phase as the new template for publishing 
consultations  has  only  recently  been  introduced  across  the  services  of  the 
Commission'  (M,  1). After  a  couple  of  emails  in  conjunction  with  disappearing 
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consultations, the web-master also suggested that this was down to communication 
problems between DGs. 
Further  unusual  activities  were  noted  on  the  website  during  2008  -  a  sort  of 
'reverse case' of the disappearing consultations issue. Here a consultation that was 
grouped under the heading 'closed' was actually open. A possible explanation could 
be that a) the consultation was just re-opened or the consultation time was prolonged 
(the  Your  Voice  in  Europe page  claimed that  the  consultation  had very  recently 
closed) or b) another consultation was launched from the website so that basically 
two  different  consultations  had  the  same  web  address.  Other  explanations  are 
possible, too. Of course, a simple communication mishap or technical hiccup could 
also provide a valid explanation. As this issue was outside of the scope of this thesis, 
no  further  investigations  were  made.  What  remains  clear  though  is  that  the 
maintenance  and  organisation  surrounding  the  supposed  main  gateway  to 
participation within the Commission is flaky and sometimes incoherent. 
These issues must have been relevant since the beginning of the project in 2001. 
It  appeared that  before the exchange of  emails  in  the course of  this  project,  the 
relevant unit within the DG was not aware of the problem. This can be seen as an 
indicator of how little scrutiny and attention the website gets both from outside and 
inside. 
In summary, the evidence gathered here speaks a clear language. In both cases, 
the arenas were inaccessible for the large majority of potential participants who were 
not based in Brussels, as illustrated by this table:
Concept Indicator Harmonisation Case Animal Welfare Case
Public 
Awareness
Actively approaching 
individual citizens 
no no
Reaching out beyond 
Brussels
no no
Inclusiveness
Adapting consultation to 
different participants
no, but idea has been 
discussed
no
Educational material 
provided
no no
Accessibility as guiding 
principle of the consultation
partly no
Table 14: Indicator overview accessibility
The  chance  to  use  internet  technology  to  lower  the  transaction  costs  for 
participating was, generally speaking, not seized.
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Hypothesis 2: Transformation of inputs
The second  hypothesis  deals  with  the  transformation  of  inputs.  Ultimately,  we 
wanted to know if inputs for the consultation matter for policy-making. Indicators of  
meaningful transformation are how inputs are reviewed and how the transformation 
process  is  communicated  back  to  the  participation  arena.  With  regard  to  the 
meaningful transformation of inputs, any impact of inputs on the Commission's policy 
formulation is  the central  concern.  What does the Commission do when it  takes 
stewardship  of  the  inputs?  Are  the  inputs  transparently  gathered and published? 
Second, how are they processed and then fed into a draft policy and is feedback 
given including criteria as to why some inputs are included and others not?
The first hypothesis discussed the impact of a policy as a contributing factor to the 
cost-benefit calculation of participants. With regard to the transformation of inputs, 
this  part  shifts  the  focus,  instead,  to  the  impact  on  policy.  Concerning  the 
Commission's duties concerning the transformation of inputs, the interview data was 
able to shed some light on the following indicators for the concept of policy-impact:  
First, on agenda setting; second, on policy-contestation; third, on changes to policy 
proposals based on consultation inputs. For the concept of feedback the following 
two indicators were sought: First, criteria on why an input has been accepted or not;  
second, whether feedback was given via the internet. The overall picture of the data 
is clear – the consultations had, at best, a very marginal influence (if at all) on the 
policies in both cases. Hence, at the end of this section we will discuss some of the  
data referring to the question of why this form of consultation was used at all.
The  first  indicator  for  the  policy-impact  concept  is  the  issue  of  policy  agenda 
setting. While the overall agenda of the consultation is set from the start, the question  
of what issues to include and what to omit is a central part of the policy process. Both 
policy  areas  in  themselves  need  to  be  further  refined  into  units  that  are  more 
manageable before entering the participation arena. Although the agenda setting is 
somewhat  outside  of  the  participation  arena,  it  is  nevertheless  crucial  for  the 
outcome.  Thus,  the  genesis  of  the  agenda  setting  and  the  influence  of  online 
participation  is  an  indicator  for  the  meaningful  transformation  of  inputs,  although 
chronologically preceding the main participation action. 
How then did the two DGs handle the question 'how was the agenda set for the 
consultation'? In the case of the Product Harmonisation legislation, the process was 
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ongoing: '[T]he first [2002 consultation, see Chapter 5] was more to see whether we 
identified the right problems. It was done to select the elements that we wanted to 
review' (E, 3). This assertion seems plausible and the outcomes indeed suggest that 
the agenda for the 2006 consultation was influenced by this 2002 consultation. It 
should be noted, however, that none of the interviewees from the Commission were 
in charge of this earlier consultation, yet one interviewee (E, 1) also suggested – with 
regard to the agenda setting process - that '[i]t  is an ongoing communication and 
consultation process with stakeholders (...) so it doesn't really make sense to single 
out one form of consultation'. When further probing where the relevant input for the 
agenda setting came from meetings with ministry experts of Member States were 
singled out: 'We have these meetings even if we are not in the process of drafting a 
policy, so we have a good idea on the daily problems. Plus, we have the industry 
bringing  up  certain  problems  …  and  consumer  organisations.  It  is  an  ongoing 
process on which we build the first draft and then these online consultations confirm 
this'  (E,  1).  Moreover,  interviewee  (E,  1) suggested  -  with  regard  to  the  online 
consultation agenda -  that  the '[a]genda setting was already done,  it  is  more we 
found there [is] a problem, now give us some input'. This indicates that factors other  
than  the  2001  consultation  are  the  main  driving  factors  behind  the  consultation 
agenda  setting.  It  also  suggests  that  traditional  channels  are  more  relevant.  In 
practice, the procedures outlined above suggest that it is not the citizens or CSOs but 
the Member State experts who set agendas for the online consultations.
In the animal welfare Case, the process of agenda setting for online consultations 
was  even  more  insulated  from outside  influence  as  the  agenda  was  set  by  the 
Eurobarometer.  Interviewee  (S,  2) explained:  'We used  the  Eurobarometer  as  a 
template for the IPM'. Interviewer: 'So you employed "copy and paste"?'. Interviewee 
(S, 2): 'Well,  I'd prefer 'was informed by the Eurobarometer questions'.  Moreover, 
'[t]he  topics  of  the  consultation  were  set  by  us  in  the  beginning.  It  comes from 
cooking together all the various pieces of information from that period, which were all 
very new for Europe at that time. Before that, we only had one consultation on the 
transportation of animals - actually another one with a large number of participants. 
The other consultations before the Action Plan were very limited' (S, 2). Interviewer: 
'Who decided on the topics?'  Interviewee:  'It  was [DG] SANCO on all  the issues 
raised by the Eurobarometer in particular about a report prepared by the Commission 
on  animal  welfare  in  third  countries'  (S,  2).  However,  interviewee  (S,  5) also 
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suggested that  the agenda set  by the Eurobarometer was reinforced through the 
online consultation results: 'The web consultation was quite sophisticated in terms of 
results,  showing  that  Eurobarometer  results  were  quite  reliable  -  particularly  that 
consumers were not able to understand some problems and felt a certain kind of 
frustration ... something needed really to be done for the welfare of animals. But also 
in the area of enforcement and enforcement in third countries - this is then prioritised 
into an Action Plan. We had to translate the frustration into a concrete line of actions. 
So we came up with the five initiatives.' While this was certainly not agenda setting, it 
can best be described as a form of agenda structuring.
Overall,  in  both  cases  the  agenda  setting  was  almost  completely  carried  out 
internally and was largely insulated from outside influence. In the case of the product 
harmonisation, a previous consultation offered an opportunity to participate in the 
agenda setting via the internet. The importance of this is, however, unclear as the 
interview  data  suggests  that  various  forms  of  formal  and  informal  face-to-face 
consultations were more important for the process. In the case of animal welfare, no 
traceable external input on the agenda was uncovered by the research. 
The  second  indicator  for  the  concept  of  policy  impact  is  the  issue  of  policy 
contestation. Did the consultation incorporate aspects of choices between different 
options  and  did  this  lead  to  disagreement  between  participants  and/or  the 
Commission? Did certain aspects of the consultation become political in the sense of 
responding to conflicting views on policy issues with dialogue? Was this intended or  
promoted by the DG?
On the question of policy contestation, interview partner (P, 5) pointed towards the 
issue of the CE marking: 'We had a bit of political discussion on the CE marking (...). 
Especially  consumer  organisations  claimed  that  there  was  confusion  about  its 
meaning, saying it was misleading. Here the consultation helped because there was 
a  clear  option  given  to  abolish  it  or  not.'  The CE marking  was  highlighted as  a 
controversial issue in the early policy drafting stages before the online consultation:  
'In the preparatory stages, this was probably the most debated issue: the CE marking 
issue.  Consumer  organisations  seem  to  care  but  not  the  consumers,  based  on 
studies within the Commission. The consumer does not look for it. He does not base 
a decision on it. Only the very well informed consumer and consumer organisation 
looked into it but not the average consumer.' This argument also led to the rejection 
of the consumer organisations'  second best option (incorporating the CE marking 
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only in the product documentation and not on the product itself). Confusion over the 
CE marking is an advantage beyond the EU for EU manufacturers while consumers 
outside of the EU are not a prime concern for the Commission. Hence, the outcome 
of the consultation was anticipated, although, as interviewee (P, 5) pointed out, 'with 
the CE marking we were a bit wondering what would happen, expected it to get a bit 
political and it got a bit political afterwards in the negotiations'. In the end, the views 
of the Commission were confirmed by the consultation. 'If the response on that hadn't 
been that clear I think we would have had to rethink our policy there. Honestly, for me 
I didn't see any better option [than keeping the CE marking]. I think we selected the 
most reasonable solution. Inside the Commission, that was never an issue. It was 
just a thing that consumer organisations raised'  (P, 5). The policy officer appeared 
content with  this outcome and that it  did not become too 'political':  '[I]t  was quite 
helpful because if the consultation justifies you and your thinking that is quite good' 
(P, 5). We will go into more detail about the merits and pitfalls of de-politisation in the 
conclusion of the thesis.
In the animal welfare case, no contestation was identifiable. On the contrary, all  
key interview partners pointed out the harmonious situation while  working on the 
document.  Speaking  about  the  process  of  consultation,  interviewee (S,  2) 
emphasised that '[w]e needed political clearance on the issue. Anything that could 
affect the political line of the Commission requires the cabinet of the Commissioner is 
expressing its views, first'. The main worry here was not to disenchant anybody and 
to stay clear of controversy. The lack of contestation was seen as an advantage. 'An 
online consultation has of course the advantage that you ask the question that you 
what to ask. If you do it differently, say with a stakeholder meeting, everybody can 
say  what  they  want  to  say'  (S,  4).  As  the  consultation  was  based  on  the 
Eurobarometer  (DG  Communication,  2005),  which  was  arguably  the  greater 
achievement for the unit, the uncontroversial state of the consultation was assured. 
'Each member of the steering group had a priority of what should be in there. Were 
different DGs diverging on relevance? I have to say we had such a good managing 
group, representatives from different DGs so that the process was not difficult' (S, 2). 
Two interviewees,  (S, 5) and (S, 2), also suggested that there was also no internal 
contestation: 'The process was more sophisticated compared to others but thanks to 
the good work together, the final inter-service consultation and the adoption, we were 
having only a very small delay, just for some procedural issues. I don't remember any 
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major problems. No contestation – the options were sufficiently wide to be endorsed 
by all  DGs from DG Research to DG Environment and Agriculture'  (S, 2). This is 
even more surprising given the possibilities for normative disagreement on animal  
welfare, which were discussed in chapter 5. Arguably, the avoidance of contestation 
was  also  aided  by  not  including  animal  testing  in  the  online  consultation,  as 
discussed in the previous chapter.
The third indicator for the concept of policy impact is whether the resulting policy 
paper  has  changed  due  to  the  consultation.  While  it  is  easy  to  argue  that  the 
consultation somehow influenced the final policy, the question of whether it made any 
decisive difference is more revealing. The research on the two case studies again 
showed  little  difference  between  the  cases:  The  consultations  had  no  traceable 
impact on the policy proposals. All  interview partners agreed that the consultation 
itself did not influence their policy paper: 'Would the policy look different in central  
parts  without  the  consultation?  Honestly,  no.  I  mean  our  polices  are  made  by 
consultations but it is not necessarily the IPM consultations. It is not by the IPM tool 
that we get sufficient information'  (P,  5).  This again suggests that other forms of 
consultations are more important than the online consultations. In the case of the 
animal welfare, one interviewee (S, 2) avoided answering the question of whether he 
shared the view of the majority of participants, saying that the state of animal welfare  
in the EU is poor by replying, '[w]e agree with the statement that it is important to 
improve the standards of animal welfare.' Directly related to the change of policy was 
the  question  of  whether  new  ideas  were  brought-up  through  the  consultation. 
Interviewee (P, 5) answered: 'Honestly, I must admit there was nothing surprising or 
new in it. The reason for this is probably that the people who were responding to this 
were the same we have been in consultation [with] already'.
The second concept for meaningful transformation is the provision of feedback on 
the inputs. Indicator for this concept is, first, the existence of transparent criteria: Why 
were some inputs included and others not? Second, are these criteria accessible via 
the internet? Both consultations did not communicate why some inputs were taken 
on board and others not.  Moreover,  on the question of criteria for accepting and 
rejecting inputs, interview partners of both case studies pointed out that there was no 
need for that. 'Was there a need to find criteria what to include or not to include? I  
think nothing came up, what we thought we might have not included [sic]. Criteria, I 
mean of course if we get something back that is really justified then I think we would  
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reconsider our approach; there we would have taken it into account because we want  
to make a good proposal with which the main stakeholders are happy and work with' 
(E, 1). Moreover, '(...) there are no established criteria in advance. I would also say 
that we were quite confident that we would be confirmed as we already did consult  
widely before' (E, 1). The animal welfare case had its own approach on picking the 
‘right'  inputs.  One interviewee  (S,  2) argued:  'Some contributions were  discarded 
because  they  were  simply  not  seen  [as]  functional  to  any  of  the  Commissions 
policies.'  Interviewer:  'Such as?'  Interviewee  (S,  2): 'Well,  there were  requests to 
raise the issue of animal welfare in WTO. But we decided to go for international co-
operation in bilateral  agreements.  So raising the issue with  WTO was discarded. 
Another example, many contributions pushed for clearer standards and legislation 
(...). However, logically they should be based on welfare standards [and] on welfare 
indicators and we thought it was easier to have a more flexible approach that would 
rapidly endorse scientific progress'. This may be a valid argument but, as such, was 
not explained publicly.
The question of feedback was, in both cases, tied to the Impact Assessment of the 
policy. As the Impact Assessment is a procedural requirement of many EU legislation 
ventures, a report needs to be compiled. In the harmonisation case, this report was 
partially based on the various consultation inputs. The report was produced by the 
same people in charge of the online consultation and provided a comprehensive view 
of how the DG saw the policy issue and options and included the views of various 
participants.  In  principle,  therefore,  participants  had  the  possibility  of  receiving 
feedback on how the Commission valued the comments, as well  as the views, of 
other participants. That is, if they went on the website of the DG and downloaded the 
said document. However, this detailed feedback report including the stance of the 
Commission was not provided in the animal welfare Case. 'In effect it [the Impact 
Assessment report]  does not  exist.  For  that  period,  it  was not  mandatory for the 
procedural  work  to prepare a formal  Impact  Assessment.  So it  is  not  developed. 
Logically we consider supporting documents as an IA [Impact Assessment]. The IA 
was of course done without following the procedures, we did not prepare the IA to be 
published  together  [with  the  Action  Plan]  as  it  is  today'  (S,  2).  Thus,  the  DG 
deliberately decided not give any form of detailed feedback for people outside of 
Brussels because the interviewee believed it was not mandatory to do so. It is worth 
noting that impact assessments were introduced in 2002-03, all undertakings of the 
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EU's within 'Legislative and Work Programme' were required to compile an Impact 
Assessment (Cecot, Hahn, Renda, & Schrefler, 2008, p. 405).  It is true though that 
new guidelines for conducting Impact  Assessments were rolled out in June 2005 
(TEP, 2007, p. 3). Interviewee (S, 5) described the process as follows: 'Then we had 
responses from all sides and then we put together the number of options, we saw 
that they were integrated... [pause]. It was some sort of Impact Assessment process 
in which we looked on the analysis of the inputs and what were the most convenient  
options to keep alive - with the vision of improving animal welfare in Europe. The 
questions on the web and on the Eurobarometer were wider in terms of possibilities 
so we had to develop it from there. We had to read between the lines'. Here again, 
the process and the result of 'reading between the lines' was not made public. Thus,  
in the case of the animal welfare consultation no feedback was given to participants 
who were not part of the offline consultation regime of the Commission. 'Feedback 
was  given  in  the  supporting  documents  for  the  Action  Plan  and  then  at  several 
meetings, on the Council and the Parliament, and then replying to letters. There was 
not more than this because we did not have so many complaints about this. Nobody 
said why didn't you consider this' (S, 2). This form of inter-institutional feedback was, 
of course, also provided in the Product harmonisation case. Thus, in cases where 
feedback was provided it  took place, for the world  outside of Brussels,  in a non-
transparent or inaccessible way.
Generally, the process of transforming the inputs into a policy proposal was not 
documented in  procedural  terms.  The question of  whether  feedback needs to  be 
provided on why an input has been included or not was seen as unnecessary. The 
possibility  of  a two-way communication process was not seized.  Participants who 
were not part of the 'offline' consultation regime were, in effect, talking to a black box.  
Yet, these reactions are probably even more understandable if you consider that the 
consultation had virtually no impact on the policy, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
Overall and contrary to theoretical expectations, if we look at the transformation of 
inputs it appears from the outside that in the harmonisation case more efforts were 
made to assure input-legitimacy. 
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Concept Indicator Harmonisation Case Animal Welfare Case
Policy-impact Agenda setting Low, via perversions 
consultation
None, actively avoided
Policy-contestation Minimal (CE marking) None, actively avoided
Change of the policy proposal No No
Feedback Criteria why something is included None None
Internet accessible feedback 
given
Yes, via Impact 
Assessment report
None
Table 15: Indicator overview meaningful transformation
This of course leads us to the question of why the DGs initiated online consultation 
at  all.  For  all  its  frankness and clarity,  the following excerpt  of  interview material 
(related to the harmonisation case) is worth transcribing here in full: 
Interviewer: 'So the strategic aim of the consultation was to receive confirmation of  
the established views within the DG?' 
Interviewee (E, 1): 'Yes'. 
Interviewer, presenting the same interviewee with a paraphrased statement of US 
academic Bevir ('[S]ystem governance is, for all its talk of inclusion and participation, 
primarily about securing consensus for policies and delivering them effectively' (2006, 
p. 429)): 
(E, 1): 'I think he has got a point here. I would subscribe to it. After all, it is these 
people [government officials] who have to work with it.' 
Even  more  revealing  regarding  the  incentives  for  using  a  consultation  is  this 
comment prompted by a question on the added value of online consultations: 'It is an 
easy tool for us. A Commission official preparing a proposal has to keep to certain 
deadlines. It is easy because otherwise if [I] use a consultancy I [would have] had to 
make a call for tender. First of all,  writing the call for tender and everything, then 
select between the different contractors, undergo half a year process and then you 
are  not  happy with  what  the  consultancy is  doing.  So  it  [an  online  consultation] 
facilitates our life. If it is the most appropriate tool for consulting ... I am not sure' (P, 
5).
Hypothesis 3: Legitimacy belief of participants
The third hypothesis centres on the direct impact of participation on the legitimacy 
belief of participants. Central factors (stake and salience, efficacy) of an individual 
cost-benefit calculation are based on the theory of vested interests. After leaving the 
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participation  arena,  acknowledgement  of  impacts  is  crucial  for  understanding  the 
impact on the legitimacy belief, too. Indicators for the concepts of salience and stake 
are the degree of personal relevance and personal consequences related to policy. 
The  key  indicator  for  efficacy  is  self-attestation.  Finally,  the  indicator  for 
acknowledging impacts  is  whether  participants  followed the consultation after  the 
submission of inputs. 
One of the main problems when talking about the participants’  side of online 
consultations is the relative absence of data about individual citizens as participants 
in them. Like other research on this topic, this thesis mainly produced original data on 
CSOs as participants. The research design is not aimed to deliver conclusive results 
on the legitimacy belief aspect of online consultations. Nevertheless, interview data 
from the participants of the two consultations was gathered. On the one hand, to 
shed some light onto the legitimacy belief aspect and on the other hand to provide a 
contrast with  the views of the Commission, which were given proportionally more 
attention in the empirical research. Accordingly this part of chapter 6 is split in two 
sections. The first part complements the previous parts on the Commission, while the 
second part discusses the interview material in light of the participants' hypotheses.
With  regard  to  how participants  became aware  of  the  consultation  and  in  the 
context  of  the  efforts  by  the  Commission  to  achieve  this,  three  aspects  are 
noteworthy.  First,  no  respondent  in  either  case  used  the  Your  Voice  in  Europe 
website to access the respective consultations. The website went unmentioned by 
nearly all respondents apart from one (P, 5). This supports the assumption that the 
Your  Voice  in  Europe  portal  does  not  deliver  what  it  is  supposed  to  deliver.  It  
furthermore  supports  the  assumption  that  outside  scrutiny  is  indeed  low,  as 
suggested in the technology discussion of this chapter. Neither did this result offer 
much promise for the idea of spontaneous participation as mentioned by interview (E, 
1) from the Commission: 'Someone who might have bumped into our consultation 
and thinks, "oh that is interesting, I might participate" '.
Second,  in  the  harmonisation  case  the  interview  data  indeed  supports  the 
statement of the policy officer which, suggests that, for the most part,  their usual 
clientele  took  part.  A  typical  statement  regarding  the  relationship  between 
participants and the Commission was: 'I stay in close contact with the policy officers 
responsible so I learnt about the consultation from DG Enterprise' (P, 1).
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Third,  two  participants  in  the  animal  welfare  case  were  people  who  read  the 
emailed newsletters of a disseminating organisation and clicked on the link within the 
email newsletter (P, 7) and  (P, 6). The interesting point here is that this behaviour 
supports the transmission belt idea that CSOs educate their membership base and 
members  subsequently  become  active  in  EU  politics.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the 
dismissal of the transmission belt idea as discussed in chapter 3. However, with low 
numbers of respondents for the empirical research on this issue, this finding is of 
course inconclusive. Another channel of dissemination mentioned in an interview was 
the email equivalent of word-of-mouth, i.e. personal email sent to the participants by 
a friend (P, 5).
The previous part of this chapter argued that participation input had no significant 
impact on the policy outcome. But if the participation input was of a low quality, can 
we  blame  the  Commission  for  disregarding  it?  In  the  harmonisation  case,  no 
interview partner  had a bad word  to  say about  the  participants.  The impression, 
which they gave was more of customer/service provider relationship ('we have our 
usual clients, who know us very well') (E, 1). In addition, in the animal welfare case, 
the  quality  of  the contributions was  not  an issue per  se as  this  response to  the 
question of participation inputs and their quality suggests: 'Some contributions were 
too specific and some of them were not really what we were demanding. So we had 
to filter some. Some were quite useful regarding animal welfare labelling' (S, 2). It is 
worth noting, too, that it is of course not considered opportune to criticise participants 
in front of an external researcher.
Also both Commission officials  (E, 3) and participants  (P, 5) questioned whether 
IPM consultations are the best way to consult in terms of producing relevant inputs In 
the case of the animal welfare consultation, the lack of impact was seen even more 
critically, with clear signs that the lack of genuine participation can backfire and have 
negative consequences on the legitimacy belief. Participant (P, 5) voiced his criticism 
in the following stark words: 'If they really care about stopping further animal abuse... 
I mean, I am sure this poll wasn't an effective way to do it. Personally, I think the EU 
doesn’t give a damn about animals and for me this so-called consultation proved it. I  
deeply despise animal cruelty but things like this will only make it worse. Things like 
this trap people with the idea that they can do something by clicking something on 
the internet'. In a similar vein another participant (P, 6) commented, 'I think it's rigged. 
This is all a bit of scam to keep the people calm.' Nevertheless there were also more 
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positive comments on the Consultation: 'Why did the Commission not deal with [the] 
conundrum of pets versus other animals, head-on? Literally, billions of farm animals  
suffer daily but people only seem to care about their fluffy pets. But I do accept, it 
was an effort to bring animal cruelty to the public and raising public awareness of the 
suffering of all non-human animals that are oppressed and suffering’ (P, 7). 
In the harmonisation case similar concerns were raised over the  'predetermined' 
nature of the IPM consultations, yet a more careful wording was chosen: 'Questions 
have to be open (otherwise you get the impression that the Commission has already 
made up their mind and the consultation is only to justify a decision already taken 
before), there must be sufficient time (associations need to organise their response 
internally)' (P, 2). Also, another participant of the harmonisation case suggested that 
the  IPM  format  was  too  restrictive  and  bound  by  the  Commission:  '[O]nline 
consultations can be tricky as you can often only tick "yes" or "no" and the questions 
already speak for themselves. I mean that they are formulated in a certain way and 
because of  that  they already have  a  certain  tendency and  are  not  neutral.  This 
means that it is sometimes difficult to explain a position in every detail' (P, 1).
Moving beyond this participant-led assessment of the Commission and coming to 
results for the participant hypothesis, indicators for stake, salience and efficacy were 
sought.  Second,  and  in  terms  of  the  meaningful  transformation  of  inputs,  the 
indicators for the recognising of, and acknowledgement of, impacts were used as 
outlined in the hypothesis. 
Concerning the salience and stake component of the decision to participate, this is 
linked, in the harmonisation case, to the professional backgrounds of the participants. 
A typical reply referred to the role of the whole organisation in a policy area: 'Our 
industry  sector  is  regulated  under  the  New  Approach  so  the  consultation  was 
relevant for  us and we would like to be involved in the shaping of the legislative 
landscape that affects our member companies' (P, 1). As these people are monetarily 
rewarded for giving the policy issue prominence in their belief system, this aspect is 
not likely to be overly meaningful with regard to the impact of consultations on their  
legitimacy belief. 
In the animal welfare case, replies to the salience questions were more diverse. 
'Curiosity' (P, 6) and to 'see what it's like' (P, 5) were mentioned, as were to 'make a 
difference' (P, 6) and the expectation that it is 'a good thing' (P, 7) Also, a history of 
campaigning (P, 5) was mentioned and support for 'animal rights'  (P, 5). Moreover, 
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some of the more pronounced comments related to the animal welfare case cited 
above suggest  that  for  these participants the issue of animal  welfare  has a high 
saliency. In contrast with the harmonisation case, salience in the animal welfare case 
appeared not to be tied to material rewards. The interesting question of how salient 
the  issue  of  animal  welfare  was  with  non-participants  could,  of  course,  not  be 
answered.  Also,  the question of  how the salience of  the issue varied across the 
collectivity of participants is unanswered by this research. However, it is likely that 
most  potential  participants  never  got  into  the  predicament  of  deciding  against 
participation as they were not even aware of the existence of the consultation. 
The issue of  the benefits of  participation as personal  consequences (or stake) 
was, in the harmonisation case, seen in the context of the organisational aims of the 
participant. Also, the question of whether – apart from on the professional side – they 
had  any  personal  stake  in  the  consultation  was  routinely  denied.  This  further 
supports the assessment that participants in this case were paid for regarding the 
issues of the consultation as personally relevant. 
Interestingly  one  interview  partner  from  the  participants'  side  also  made  the 
suggestion that the IPM made his working life easier, an opportunistic argumentation 
surprisingly similar to the one sported by DG Enterprise: '[I]f you write a report for  
your members, it is always important to show that you were actively involved with EU 
politics – these IPM hosted exchanges are an easy way to achieve this' (P, 2). This 
reply was triggered by the question of whether there was anything the participant 
would like to comment on further, criticise or add. In contrast, the responses in the 
animal welfare case to the question of whether the participant expected any direct 
consequences from participation were more diverse, ranging from 'none at all',  to 
'can't remember' and 'feeling good because having done something that hopefully 
matters to the right people.' Stake was mainly seen here as affecting personal well-
being. 
If we look at the broader picture, salience and stake as the perception of relevance 
of an EU policy is rooted at the level of the individual. However, the shaping of the 
perception of relevance does not take place in a societal vacuum. If the individual 
perception of relevance is conceptualised as a political attitude then, according to the 
classic view of attitudes (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954), three of the main 
factors shaping this attitude are rooted in the private realm - peers, parents and 
education. If we only take those three factors into account, the perception of 
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relevance can be seen as an individual lifestyle choice. In a simplified view of liberal 
democracy, they are not primarily in the political realm and hence should not be 
addressed by the state with political power (although agents with political power may 
of course engage as one amongst other actors in a communication process about 
lifestyle choices). However, the fourth actor in shaping political attitudes links the 
private dimension with the political dimension, the media and the public sphere. 
Whilst the other three factors are not irrelevant (Ottati, Steenbergen, & Riggle, 1992), 
the mass media can influence the salience citizens attribute to policy issues. 
The main function of the media in relation to  political attitudes is to define which 
issues are worth considering from a virtually endless list. The mass media sets the 
agenda on what people think about (and, much less, changes the attitudes of people 
by providing content and opinions). This is probably the most universally accepted 
role of the media for political attitudes. In addition, various authors (such as Entman, 
2004; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Reese, Gandy, & 
Grant, 2003) suggest that the media frame a policy issue on the agenda. Framing 
refers to the  process by which the media interprets a policy issue and provides a 
narrative for the policy issue in the context of classic conflict lines and/or political 
cleavages within a society.
In a broader approach, Koopmans and Erbe attribute five functions to the mass 
media in the EU context:
'First, in the absence of direct communicative links, European actors, issues, and policies 
have to be made visible by the mass media, and it is in this public forum that they may gain (or 
fail to obtain) public resonance and legitimacy (legitimation function). Second, (...) European 
policy-makers must depend for their information about the desires and concerns of the 
citizenry on the communicative channels of the mass media (responsiveness function). Third, 
and conversely, the public can build its opinion about the distant European institutions and the 
complexities of multilevel policies only to a very small extent on direct personal experience 
and therefore must also rely on how Europe becomes visible in the mass media 
(accountability function). Finally, participation of citizens in the European policy process 
usually also requires access to the mass media. Although a small number of resourceful and 
well-organised actors may gain access to European policy-makers directly (e.g., in the context 
of the Brussels lobbying circuit), most forms of citizens’  participation through NGOs, civic 
initiatives, and social movements can only indirectly influence policy-makers by way of the 
visibility, resonance, and legitimacy they may mobilise in the mass media (participation 
function)' (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004, p. 98).
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Arguably, the internet in general and online consultations in particular contest the 
position of traditional mass media as the sole facilitators of communication between 
policy makers and the citizenry: First, online consultations allow policy makers to 
probe for 'information about the desires and concerns of the citizenry'  (Koopmans, 
2004, p. 2). Second there is a wealth of information on the internet to develop an 
'opinion about the distant European institutions' and their policies. Third, in principle 
online consultation allows direct participation in the policy process. What the internet 
has not achieved is what Koopmans and Erbe call the 'legitimization function' (2004, 
p.  98), i.e. making EU policies and the online consultations as an arena of 
participation visible.
Although an online consultation allows direct interaction between citizens and 
political actors, it cannot work in a communication void. Forming an attitude towards 
participating in online consultations can only work if information about the political 
process is available in the public arena (McNair, 2003, p. 18). In the case of the EU, 
various scholars (Hüller, 2007; Meyer, 1999; Sifft, Brüggemann, Königslöw, Peters, & 
Wimmel, 2007) ascribe it a 'publicity deficit', i.e. the EU does not attract the amount 
of attention that its policy making powers would warrant.
The mass media has been blamed for not informing citizens adequately about EU 
policy issues. Risse and Kleine went so far as to claim that the 'fundamental 
legitimacy problem of the EU is the lack of a fully politicized and transnational public 
discourse on EU policies and politics as a pre-condition for a developed European 
democracy beyond the nation-state' (2007, p. 70). Risse and Kleine's argument is 
convincing as long as we do not acknowledge that a fully politicised public sphere is 
a  rare  sighting  even  in  nation  states.  A  more  promising  approach  is  to  look  for 
similarities in the historical development of the public sphere at EU level and in nation 
states. If the EU is a democracy in the making it is worth pointing out that the nation 
states and their democracies did not start with fully politicised public spheres either.  
Nevertheless, the weak European public sphere is, of course, not only a problem for 
the legitimacy potential of online consultations. Also, the reforms based on expanding 
the competences of the EP are affected by this problem as discussed in chapter 1.
One problem appears to be that the established mass media does not pay much 
attention to consultations. This has been highlighted in a conference paper by Altides 
and Kohler-Koch, which analyses the transmission function of CSOs. They 
investigated how effective CSOs are in creating print media attention. They conclude 
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that '[n]either do CSOs engage particularly energetically in conveying the content of 
EU consultations and their participation therein to their members or the larger public. 
Nor does national (print) media give coverage to civil society participation in EU 
consultations, even if relevant information is provided. If the media take up a 
controversial issue the diversity of views is reduced to the conventional cleavage 
lines. Thus it is plausible to assume that publicity is mainly shaped by the (national) 
communication traditions of the media system and not by the input from CSOs. 
Consequently, in our assessment CSOs have only a limited role to play in 
strengthening EU accountability' (Altides & Kohler-Koch, 2009, p. 15). They see their 
results as confirmation that CSOs do not fulfil the transmission function and not as 
confirmation that print media do not cover EU politics adequately.
In  the  broader  discussion  of  the  legitimacy  belief  in  the  context  of  stake  and 
efficacy, the problem is not so much that participants may have professional interests 
in a consultation as suggested by the interview data but the fact that due to unseized 
opportunities for designing an accessible participation arena and a lack of media 
attention,  many EU citizens may not  have had the chance to  make an informed 
choice about  participation or non-participation,  simply because they did  not  know 
what issues were at stake.
Moving on to the indicator of efficacy, this was, in the harmonisation case, tied to  
expertise and organisational background. In terms of efficacy, the replies often had a 
generic touch as this statement suggests: 'I hope it was relevant as we represent a 
sector that is regulated under the New Approach, meaning that we are stakeholders 
that are affected and have something to say'  (P,  1). It  is  likely that  the time lag 
between the interview and the act of participation made accurately answering this  
question difficult. Also, it should be noted that a bit of simple 'mouse clicking' was well 
within  the  ability  range  of  participants  in  the  animal  welfare  case.  Interviewed 
participants could not remember either whether they had provided additional input or  
written comments or denied having done so. 
However,  beyond  the  simple  'button  clicking'  consultation,  efficacy  in  the 
deliberative process quickly becomes a literacy issue. The beauty of participating in 
policy making as a citizen is to experience the state at work - first hand. If we follow 
Max Weber's verdict that 'political domination in everyday life means public 
administration' this means a welcome blurring of the lines between rulers and the 
ruled. But it also poses unique challenges because one of the core values of public 
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administration and something elemental in the 'rise of bureaucracy' (again an allusion 
to Weber) was the ability to communicate in written form, which itself rests on the 
ability to read. Hence, in terms of barriers to participation, we can expect that the 
higher the literacy level of an individual, the lower the cost of participation; or the 
higher  the literacy level,  the higher  the efficacy of  participant  and the higher  the 
likelihood  of  participation.  Arguably,  e-participation has an additional threshold, 
associated with the use of computers, something that is  usually referred to as ICT 
literacy (or computer literacy or, more generally, media literacy).
One can argue that a prerequisite for meaningful participation in an election are 
passive literacy skills –  i.e. the ability to listen and read. In contrast, online 
consultations require active literacy. Meaningful participation in an online consultation 
is hardly imaginable without the ability of the participant to read, write and understand 
abstract texts. We must ask then, given the requirement of active literacy, what 
proportion of the EU population can or cannot participate in online consultations. 
The Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD) 
conducted the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) during the mid-1990s using 
a multi-dimensional approach leading to a 5 point scale of literacy. It is meanwhile a 
common scale also adopted by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and their measurement of literacy worldwide. In the IALS, 
literacy is measured operationally in terms of three domains - prose literacy, 
document literacy and quantitative literacy. Based on these domains, five levels of 
literacy are defined:  Level 1 indicates people with very poor skills.  Level 2 
respondents can deal only with material that is simple, clearly laid out, and in which 
the tasks involved are not too complex. It identifies people who can read but test 
poorly. Level 3 is considered a suitable minimum for coping with the demands of 
everyday life and work in a complex, advanced society. It denotes roughly the skill 
level required for successful secondary school completion and college entry. Levels 4 
and 5 describe respondents who demonstrate command of higher-order information 
processing skills (OECD & Statistics Canada, 2000, p. xi, 2000).
In total 22, countries took part in the IALS of which 15 were, or later became, EU 
Member  States (Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Italy, France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Belgium – only the Flemish Community – and Poland). The other non-EU 
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Member States were Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Chile, USA, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
We can safely assume that at least a level three literacy is needed for meaningful 
participation in online consultations. Although now 15 years old, the results of this 
survey are quite sobering with regard to the ability of general population to 
meaningful participate in online consultations. According to the OECD, '[i]n 14 out of 
20 countries, at least 15 per cent of all adults have literacy skills at only the most 
rudimentary level, making it difficult for them to cope with the rising skill demands of 
the information age' (OECD & Statistics  Canada, 2000, p. xiii). Also better scoring 
countries (with less than 15 per cent of adults at the lowest level of literacy, namely 
the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the Netherlands) have a sizeable literacy 
problem. Even in the highest scoring country, Sweden, 8% of the adult population 
has a severe literacy deficit in everyday life and at work. The report concludes that 
'even the most economically advanced societies have a literacy skills deficit. 
Between one-quarter and three-quarters of adults fail to attain literacy Level 3, 
considered (...) as a suitable minimum skill level for coping with the demands of 
modern life and work' (OECD & Statistics Canada, 2000, p. xiii). 
The results of the IALS were later confirmed by the OECD's research on functional 
illiteracy. A person is regarded as functionally illiterate who, although having received 
formal education, nevertheless has an insufficient reading and writing level for coping 
with everyday life (Eme, 2011, p. 753). Again, EU wide data on functional illiteracy is 
scarce. According to the Human Development Report, between 8- 22% of the literate 
population is functionally illiterate  in  Europe  (United  Nations  Development 
Programme, 2009, p. 180). The Commission's 2009 figures based on the  OECD's 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) estimated that 24.1% of 15-
year-olds in the EU have a 'poor' reading ability (EU Commission, 2009b, p. 11). 
In summary, if we assume that since the publication's report the literacy level has 
improved or at least stagnated in most EU countries this means that about 25% of 
the EU population cannot participate in EU e-consultations, regardless of other 
factors. In the light of these findings, it is worth recalling what Atkinson et al phrased 
as  their  recommendation  30  for  the  development  of  the  EU:  'There  should  be 
investment in the development for use in the EU monitoring process of measures of 
literacy and numeracy,  reflecting their  relevance both to  skill  levels  in  the labour 
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market and to  social  participation'  (Atkinson, Cantillon, Marlier,  & Nolan, 2002, p. 
169, emphasis added). 
Arguably, there is another language related barrier. Although the key consultation 
document  is  usually  published  in  most  official  languages,  many  of  the  working 
documents  are  only  available  in  one  or  two  of  the  EU's  working  languages (i.e. 
English, French and German). These documents are essential for the process as 
they often include the only feedback provided by the Commission. In practical terms, 
it means that the consultation process is conducted predominantly in English. At the 
same time only about 40% of EU citizens (in the EU 15) claim to speak English, and 
far fewer will have adequate writing skills (Nugent, 2006, p. 5). The other 60% would 
be systemically disadvantaged. 
Additionally, online consultation brings with it at least one other potential barrier: 
Technology and the ability to use technology. After all, access to the internet is a 
basic condition for participating in online consultations. With this is mind, what do we 
know about internet usage in the EU? First, there are no real surprises in the 
empirical literature. This literature shows that certain socio-economic and 
demographic groups are less likely to use internet related technology (for one of the 
early texts reviewing literature see Rogers, 2001; and for more recent overview see 
Tsatsou,  2011). Those  on  low  incomes, those  with  lower degrees of formal 
education, the elderly, the disabled and those who live in rural areas are all less likely 
to use internet technology. Additionally, being a woman and/or belonging to an ethnic 
minority correlates with a lower likelihood of internet usage. It is worth mentioning, 
though, that consistently the most relevant factors for predicting internet use have 
been income and education (which in turn reinforce the lack of equality of online 
consultations). These phenomena are summarised in the term 'digital divide'. The 
digital divide is used to describe the disparity between people or organisations with 
effective access to ICTs and those without sufficient access (Zhong, 2011, p. 736). 
The term normally refers both to technical preconditions (physical infrastructure, 
computers etc.) as well as personal resources (literacy, IT and communication skills).
Apart from socio-demographics, what else do we know about rates of ICT access 
and use in the EU? In a nut shell, around 60% of EU inhabitants have access to the 
internet at home. Data on European Union internet penetration is available both from 
the Commission and from the Internet World Stats site. The latter estimates that in 
2011 75.5 % of the EU population had access to the internet (Internet World Stats, 
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2012). The Commission has published a variety of surveys on this topic. In 2008, the 
'E-Communications Household Survey' found out that '[t]he majority of European 
households (57%; +3 points) have a computer and nearly half of the household 
population now has access to the internet (...). The main reason by far for not having 
an internet connection (49% of all households) is a lack of interest among household 
members (50%) (…)' (DG Communication, 2008, p. 6). Cost-related reasons for not 
having the internet at home were the other main reasons named by 15% of 
respondents  (DG Communication, 2008, p. 67). This survey was repeated in 2011 
and then 68% of households had access to a computer while household internet 
access rose to 62% (DG Communication, 2011, p. 9).
The technology aspect should not be overplayed. At the moment, we can expect 
that the spread of ICT will continue. Prices for ICTs will decrease even more rapidly if 
seen  in the context of online consultations.  Compared to other content rich 
application, it is mostly text based. Computers built in 2002 are readily capable of 
dealing with the technological demand of online consultations, while the technology 
of 2005 is available today for a fraction of the prices prevailing in 2002. Access to ICT 
will probably be ubiquitous in the near future throughout the western world, much like 
written information and books are cheaply available today nearly everywhere in the 
western world. We can think here, for instance, about the spread of public libraries. 
And much like printed information the question is much less one of accessibility, 
affordability or availability but of personal skills and the ability to use them. In short, 
literacy and, probably to a lesser extent, computer literacy is, and will be, the main 
challenge for online consultations. 
However, are low literacy levels not only the beginning of the problem? Is expert 
knowledge not another, much bigger, threshold for participation? After all, most 
citizens are not experts about a given policy proposal by the Commission. Is expert 
knowledge a necessary pre-condition participating in a consultation? The following 
section argues against this assumption. 
First, it is not clear what constitutes an expert. In a general approximation of what 
experts are we could describe them as people who have extensive knowledge, ability 
and skills in one area - may it  be swamp cabbage growing, gas pipe welding or 
gravitational indifference. Their expert status must be recognised by peers and/or 
certain authorities and/or the public. Falter suggests that only someone who knows 
more about a subject than 99% of the population and more than 75% of his or her 
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peers in the field should be called an expert (2008,  p.  77).  Although he gives 
seemingly clear criteria for how to establish the expert status of an individual, it would 
be rather difficult to gather the relevant information to dismiss or confirm her or his 
status. Even if we can establish what an expert is (probably with the help of an expert 
on experts), the bigger problem is that experts do fail. Research by behavioural 
economists and psychologists (notably the 2002 Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic 
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman) have highlighted the 
fact that people in general and experts in particular 'do not exhibit rational 
expectations, (...) use heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders, exhibit 
preference reversals, make different choices depending on the wording of the 
problem, and suffer from problems of self-control' (Boumans,  2008,  p.  390). 
Boumans concludes that '[a]fter an impressive series of experiments and tests 
carried out [sic] the last few decades, the view arose that rationality is tough for all, 
skilled field experts not excluded' (2008, p. 401). Tetlock reports that in the political 
realm  experts  perform  just  as  badly  as  in  other  fields.  'Who  experts  were  - 
professional background, status, and so on - made scarcely an iota of difference to 
accuracy. Nor did what experts thought - whether they were liberals or conservatives, 
realists or institutionalists, optimists or pessimists (Tetlock, 2005, p. 20). Kahneman 
claims that 'in long-term political strategic forecasting, it's been shown that experts 
are just not better than a dice-throwing monkey' (Luscombe, 2011). 
Second, a proposal that will result in a moral decision does not need necessarily 
require expert knowledge to engage. Casebeer  and  Churchland  suggested  that 
'moral reasoning deals with cognitive acts and judgements associated with norms, or 
with facts as they relate to norms' (2003, p. 171). Moreover, the difference between 
moral decisions and technical decisions is a gradual one. Participating by giving a 
moral reasoning on what the EU ought to do, aims to produce a norm, improving life 
for human beings in the EU. Nevertheless, moral reasoning is improved by 
knowledge about an issue. There is no substantial difference between moral 
reasoning and empirical reasoning. In fact, one can argue that ultimately all policy 
consultation depends on moral reasoning because the aim of a consultation is to find 
the best policy choice. Hence, there is no convincing reason to outsource policy 
decisions exclusively to experts. At  the  same  time,  there  is  evidence  for  the 
competence of non-experts. Coleman and Blumler emphases findings that report that 
there are no substantial differences in the verdicts of legal experts (i.e. judges) and 
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groups of lay legal practitioners (i.e. juries) in jury trails where a judge was asked to 
produce separate verdict (2009, p. 29).
On the contrary, the sociologist Ulrich Beck considers the over-reliance on 'the 
expert', besides the desire for a simple yet authoritative method for generating 
knowledge, as one of the underlying problems of democracy in western society. By 
delegating societal problems to 'the experts', citizens are in danger of losing their 
sense of efficacy of being able to effectively learn and act on different issues. He 
fears that because citizens surrender their own responsibilities and powers, decisions 
are made with less reference to human qualities (Beck, 1997,  pp. 15–23; Cottle, 
1998). This phenomenon is also well documented in the practical aspects of legal 
systems. Caudill and LaRue found out by using the sociological output of the field of 
Science Studies that the actors in the legal system tend to idealise scientific 
knowledge. It is regarded as some form of pure truth, which is in un-mediated 
congruence with the 'real world' and detached from individual and/or social influences 
and interests (Caudill & LaRue, 2006; Mnookin, 2007).
Hence, the main difference between an expert and non-expert in an online 
consultation setting is that the expert has easier access to relevant information and 
knowledge due to her or his training, mind-set and professional network. Therefore, 
we would expect that the participation threshold for experts is lower than for 
non-experts. The underlying claim here is that anyone with a certain degree of 
literacy can become an expert. From the participant’s side, the key challenge of an 
online consultation is therefore not expert knowledge but the fact that participation 
requires literacy. Above all, let us not forget that politicians are not experts either. 
Coming to  the last  indicator  of  the participants'  hypothesis,  acknowledging the 
impacts, it became clear that a 'professional participant' was not one participant but 
rather a representative of his/her organisation which participates on behalf of a group 
of  people:  'Several  people  within  our  association  and  also  member  companies; 
difficult to say how many exactly. We informed all member companies, we have more 
than 3000, and all departments within the association, 39 departments (...) input was 
gathered in meetings of working groups, via personal contact, emails etc. I estimate 
that about 20 people gave input' (a reply by (P, 1) to the question, 'how many people 
were  involved  in  drafting  the  reply  to  the  Commission?').  Hence,  impact 
acknowledgement took part on two levels: first, on the direct impact of participants 
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and second on the assessment of the impact, not only by the participant him- or 
herself but also by organisations that where represented by the participant.
Moreover,  in  the  harmonisation  case,  participation  was  not  a  one-off;  two 
interviewees,  (P,  3) and  (P,  1), also  mentioned  participation  in  other  forms  of 
consultation forms by the Commission. Additionally and as expected, the work of the 
Commission was followed in the policy area the organisation was involved, as stated 
by two respondents, (P, 2) and (P, 1). In contrast, in the animal welfare case none of 
the interview partners stated that they made any attempt to see what was emerging 
out of the consultation personally but interviewee (P, 6) suggested that 'Four Paws' 
(an animal  welfare organisation,  see Four  Paws,  2011) will  keep him informed – 
something that again hints at the transmission between the EU, CSOs and individual 
members. All in all though, it appears that for most participants the consultation was 
a 'fire and forget incident', as suggested by this comment 'I haven't thought of the 
outcome until you contacted me' (P, 5).
One interviewed participant of the animal welfare case made a direct suggestion 
on  how  to  improve  the  participation  experience,  referencing  an  idea  some 
businesses have introduced as customer charters: 'I haven't thought of the outcome 
until you contacted me. Wouldn't it be nice to be kept informed? Also, I believe there 
are no rules of engagement. There is no charter of participation ... kind of telling me 
how it works from my perspective' (P, 6). 
In conclusion and based on the interview data the direct impact on the legitimacy 
belief  of participants in the harmonisation case is relatively high compared to the 
animal welfare case. However, this comparison is misleading in so far as it compares 
representatives of businesses and CSOs with citizens. If their professional behaviour 
or life compartmentalisation has consequences on their legitimacy beliefs regarding 
the EU, is unknown. The following table gives an assessment of  the named four 
components of the participants' hypotheses. 
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Concept Indicator Harmonisation 
Case
Animal Welfare 
Case
Salience and stake Statement of personal relevance Yes, via their 
organisation and as 
part of their 
enumeration
Yes
Personal consequences related 
to policy
Indirect, via their 
organisation
Unclear
Efficacy Self-attestation Yes Unclear
Acknowledgement 
of impacts
Following the course of the policy 
cycle
Yes None
Table 16: Indicator overview of participants hypothesis
Concluding remarks
An interview partner told me that after a cursory reading of my email requesting a 
research interview he was wondering why I wanted to talk about IPMs with him – as,  
in his area of expertise, the acronym usually refers to 'Integrated Pest Management'. 
This little anecdote is representative of the attitudes of Commission staff - even if 
they associated IPM with the internet tool. Online consultations are at best a tool,  
which makes working life, in some regards, more convenient. In contrast, the input  
legitimacy aspects of online consultations in general do not form an important part of 
the officials’ everyday working lives - certainly not when compared to the grandiose 
words and promises of the key publications of the Commission on EU governance.
The training of staff encountered appears not to be geared towards providing an 
accessible  arena  of  participation.  Inputs  in  the  participation  are  processed  non-
transparently and do not alter  the policies in question. Basic documents outlining 
guidelines on aspects of  participation seem either  non-existent  or inaccessible  to  
staff. At the end of a research interview, interviewee (E, 1) was so kind as to search 
for those documents on the intranet and the pages of the Secretariat-General. She 
could not find them, commenting that '[o]ne of the problems is that there is much on  
the  Commission  in  the  web  but  it’s  very  badly  structured...  we  have  the  same 
problem on the inside' (E, 1). 
It is amazing that a researcher coming from the outside with a theoretical interest 
in input-legitimacy was able to point out some very simple organisational issues. This 
was  especially  apparent  in  the  inter-DG  communication.  Without  exception, 
personnel  confronted with  the disappearing links issue were  baffled.  None of  the 
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policy officers knew that responsibility for the IPM had been moved from DG Market 
to  DG  Digit.  It  shows  once  again  that  it  comes  down  to  the  gritty  aspects  of 
implementation. It is amazing how very basic issues can affect the whole process, 
something that confirms that researchers have to look on the ground at the actual 
implementation, even before addressing the challenging aspects of deliberation. Only 
if these small but essential issues of the process – how it is set up and transforms 
inputs - are addressed by the Commission, then it does make sense to talk about 
how to ensure that the process of deliberation in itself is improved, as this is likely to  
be an even bigger challenge. The reality of the Commission's online consultations 
has to contend with other issues such as the simple accessibility of the consultation 
and not only the quality of deliberation. 
At same time, this is of course another example of why technology - in itself - will  
not solve socio-political problems. On the question of technology and what it can do 
for an organisation, it is simply not an automatic process and will not make policy 
formulation fully automated or ‘interactive’.  This is despite what interviewee  (S, 3) 
tells us, namely that everything should be neat and tidy because '[s]ervices generally 
use the IPM format because then it is easier [to] analyse replies and to summarize. 
Also,  there  is  a  special  template  that  has  been  approved  to  use  across  the 
Commission. Once the template is used, the Consultation automatically appears on 
the Your Voice in Europe website. If a service makes an open consultation, which is 
rarer because it  is  more resource intensive to go through the answers,  this then 
would only appear on our website, the respective DG. It would be put up on  Your 
Voice in Europe if pro-actively requested'.
It is worth noting that the assertion that a consultation will only appear on the Your 
Voice  website  if  actively  requested  is  at  odds  with  information  provided  by  DG 
Market,  which  stated  that  all  public  consultation  should  appear  on  the  website. 
Confronted with  a  different  account  from  the  DG  Market  web-master  team,  the 
respondent backed down from this self-confidently stated argument that everything 
happens  automatically.  The  potentially  worrying  aspect  here  is  that  an  outside 
researcher was able to tell  the staff  how their own process works in reality.  This 
statement on IPM technology exemplifies the policy officer’s viewpoint:  'DG Market 
trains you how to create questionnaires and it is up to you. I thought it is an automatic 
process – isn't that the reason why we have it? The idea of the website is to have 
central point for online consultation so I take it for granted. That's [the] essence of 
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that because otherwise I put it only [on] our [DG’s] website. For me that problem did 
not rise at all'  (E, 1). This comment is also insofar revealing as it suggests that the 
interviewee sees online consultation mainly as a device that makes her working life 
easier. 
The central promise of internet technology with regard to online participation is that 
one can meaningfully participate without physically being in the arena of participation, 
thereby lowering the transaction costs for participation. However, if nobody finds the 
arena of participation because a single link does not appear on the central website  
than the technology cannot deliver on this main promise (although in principle two-
way communication is possible). Yet, the even bigger problem is, as we have seen 
above, that nobody cares about the website – none of participants interviewed for the  
research  used  the  Your  Voice  portal  as  a  gateway  for  the  participation  arenas. 
Despite the idea of having a 'one stop shop' for the Commission, online participation 
ventures  that  cut  across  the  lines  of  DGs are  potentially  promising  for  attracting 
participation, although in reality participation is centred around individual DGs and 
their individual consultation regimes. Online consultations have not departed from the 
Brussels-centric view of doing consultations in the Commission. 
A  somewhat  surprising  result  in  the  context  of  theoretical  issues  is  that  the 
harmonisation case made a relatively bigger effort to address issues of accessibility 
and the transformation of inputs. The following two aspects offer an explanation for 
this. First, DG Enterprise regards itself as an open DG. Interviewee (E, 1) pointed out 
that the guidelines on how to consult the public originated in their DG ('[t]his DG is 
very  strong  on  Impact  Assessment  and  the  consultation  was  part  of  the  Impact 
Assessment. Therefore, the [DG] Enterprise's view is already quite strong in these 
general guidelines'). Hence, there may be a stronger culture of consultation in DG 
Enterprise  compared to  DG Health.  Second,  the  harmonisation  case led  to  hard 
policy in one of the core areas of EU legislation competence. It seems plausible that 
procedural  requirements  are enforced more strictly  within  the DG in  such cases, 
anticipating greater outside scrutiny. This corresponds with interview data. Staff from 
DG Health suggested that consultation requirements were partly a loophole to jump 
through ('The Action Plan was part of procedural consultation that was not so much 
formalised as it is today'  (S, 2)), bearing in mind that in principle both consultations 
took part roughly at the same time so procedural requirements should have been 
similar, while interview partners from DG Enterprise emphasized the usefulness of 
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fulfilling requirements in order to support the proposal. Both aspects, the less rigid 
handling of consultations and the fact that the Action Plan was not a hard policy did  
not help participants to use the internet for an open exchange, although the goal of  
the consultation was to produce a coherent  policy outlook,  which would favour  a 
political debate as it did not have to determine technical details.
In order to achieve input legitimacy via direct electronic participation in the policy 
process,  greater  clarity  is  needed  in  defining  both  the  goals  and  dimensions  of 
participation. Input legitimacy will not be achieved if participation is merely seen as a 
means to achieve output-legitimacy oriented aims. If participation itself is not seen as 
an end in itself, input legitimacy is not within the reach of the Commission. 
This leads on to the question of whether one can burden the Commission with the 
task of creating input legitimacy while a) being streamlined towards output legitimacy 
and b) having at its disposal the same amount of resources as before? The answer is 
probably  not.  Can  the  Commission  deliver  input-legitimacy  via  its  online 
consultations? Maybe - but it is unlikely in an organisation that is understaffed and 
overworked (Levy, 2006). Instead online consultations are actually used as a tool for 
enhancing  output  legitimacy,  as  the  cheaper  option  compared  with  hiring  a 
consultancy firm.
The  more  general  question  is  whether  an  institution  –  that  by  its  design  and 
functions is trimmed to deliver output legitimacy – should be burdened with the task 
of creating input legitimacy. While this thesis argued in favour of such an idea, it also 
identified one of the major shortcomings – that the people working on the ground 
neither are trained nor see it as their main duty to work and think in terms of input  
legitimacy. This also implies that their usual clientele does not complain as they are 
still being served. At the same time reaching out is not a priority. The opportunities 
provided by the internet are not embraced, also because the usual subjects use up 
all institutional resources and provide all the services and so both sides are happy 
with the status quo.
Policy officers of course have an incentive to keep participation rates low. Clearly,  
protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam states in point 9 that the Commission should consult all 
interested parties (see also Bouwen, 2007, p. 270). Indeed this seems to be a crucial 
requirement. Interview partner (E, 1) on the Harmonisation cases informed me that in 
the past they received complaints about unbalanced consultations. Thus, there is no 
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incentive to offer wider participation beyond including input from representatives of all  
sectors and actors with possible diverging interests. Input that goes beyond sector 
representation causes more work for the policy officer,  whilst  possibly not adding 
much to the justification of the proposal. 
Is  there,  then,  any  hope  for  a  more  participant-orientated  approach  to  online 
consultations?  This  comment  by  interviewee  (S,  2) suggests  so:  'It  is  not  that 
developed by the Commission because it is not part of the normal way of acting. We 
have to dedicate resources to communicate and consult in the DGs. But I saw the 
change and I suppose it will develop even further. In fact, there is clear evolution day 
by day and it is clear that we still don't have sufficient resources. So it is a question of  
priorities'. 
Thus, based on the overall  assessment that online consultation are unlikely to 
provide input legitimacy for the EU in the current set-up, the final concluding part of  
this thesis will give an outlook on what might be within reach for the Commission's 
online consultation and their input legitimacy potential, if it were to make it a priority 
and devote more resources to it.
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Conclusion
The final part of this thesis summarises the research results as well as providing 
room for wider reflections. This research began with the aim of exploring whether 
online participation offers a sound opportunity to help tackle the EU's input legitimacy 
problem. Key theoretical assumptions made it appear promising to study online 
participation in this context, as we discussed in the first three chapters. After the 
theoretical considerations and questions were forged into an empirical case study 
research design in chapter 4, the real world examination commenced. High hopes 
concerning the potential of online consultations and their capacities to create input 
legitimacy were dashed by the research findings presented in chapter 6 after chapter 
5 extensively discussed the policy background of the two case studies. 
This conclusion is divided into three parts. The first summarises and reviews the 
results, the second part outlines the limitations of  the research and the potential 
further research, while the third and final part looks beyond the two case studies and 
asks what challenges the Commission faces when using e-participation in 
policy-making. This last  part also makes suggestions for improving the current 
regime. 
Review and summary of the results
The previous chapter 6 discussed in depth the empirical findings of the thesis 
against the background of the main theoretical assumptions on accessibility and the 
transformation of inputs. The following three tables from chapter 6 briefly summarise 
the analysis in relation to the three hypotheses used to examine the input legitimacy 
potential and the positive impact on legitimacy belief respectively. The first 
hypothesis suggested that the more accessible a consultation, the more input 
legitimacy it potentially bears. The hypothesis on accessibility is sub-divided into the 
aspects of creating public awareness and inclusion. Both factors contribute positively 
('the more x... the more y') to the input legitimacy potential, as do all other factors in 
the remaining three hypotheses.
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Concept Indicator Harmonisation Case Animal Welfare Case
Public 
Awareness
Actively approaching 
individual citizens 
No No
Reaching out beyond 
Brussels
No No
Inclusiveness
Adapting consultation to 
different participants
No, but idea has been 
discussed
No
Educational material 
provided
No No
Accessibility as guiding 
principle of the consultation
Partly No
Table 17: Accessibility hypothesis
The testing of the second hypothesis (the meaningful transformation of inputs) 
produced the following results.
Concept Indicator Harmonisation Case Animal Welfare Case
Policy-impact Agenda setting Low, via perversions 
consultation
None, actively avoided
Policy-Contestation Minimal (CE marking) None, actively avoided
Change of the policy proposal No No
Feedback Criteria as to why something is 
included
None None
Internet accessible feedback 
given
Yes, via Impact 
Assessment report
None
Table 18: Meaningful transformation hypothesis
The two concepts for assessing the meaningful transformation of inputs are the 
provision of feedback and the policy impact of the consultation. 
While the previous two hypotheses  have concentrated on analysing the inner 
workings of the Commission, hypothesis 3 was  used to analyse the participants of 
the consultations. This also shifts the focus from increasing the legitimacy potential 
(of institutional arrangements) to the positive impact on the legitimacy belief of the 
citizenry.
210
Concept Indicator Harmonisation 
Case
Animal Welfare 
Case
Salience and stake Statement of personal relevance Yes, via their 
organisation and as 
part of their 
enumeration
Yes
Personal consequences related 
to policy
Indirect, via their 
organisation
Unclear
Efficacy Self-attestation Yes Unclear
Acknowledgement 
of impacts
Following the course of the policy 
cycle
Yes None
Table 19: Participants hypothesis
Based on the results of this thesis, the input-legitimacy potential of the 
Commission's online consultation in its current form is negligible. Input legitimacy is 
not a prime concern, neither for the citizens nor for the Commission. This of course 
stands in stark contrast to the official line of the Commission: 'Democracy depends 
on people being able to take part in the public debate. To do this, they must have 
access to reliable information on European issues and be able to scrutinise the policy 
process in its various stages' (EU Commission, 2001a, p. 11). Yet, based on the 
analysis of the two case studies, there is no culture of inclusive participation aimed at 
individual citizens in the Commission's online consultation regime. Although the 
Commission's officials encountered in the course of the research for this thesis are 
by no means blind to ideas of widening the participation base, there is no evidence 
that they facilitate an inclusive consultation process beyond the confinements of 
Brussels, nor provide a meaningful transformation of online inputs that could be part 
of a deliberative process. Beyond realm of online consultations this finding is backed 
up by a recent study by Hooghe on how Commission staff conceive their institution's 
role.  She  comes  to  conclusion  that  '[n]ew  public  management  reforms,  which 
prioritize  management  over  initiative,  and  EU  enlargement,  which  triggered 
unprecedented  personnel  turnover  and  multiplied  policy  challenges,  have  further 
eroded the Commission's sense of purpose' (Hooghe, 2012, p. 104). 
Instead, online consultations are an instrument used to make the working life of 
policy officers easier. A prime example of this is the harmonisation case where an 
explicitly stated reason for carrying out the online consultation was that it would be 
cheaper and faster than a traditional consultation –  cheaper and faster that is, in 
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comparison to a commissioned analysis by an outside consultancy. For a traditional 
consultation, a DG has to publish a tender, which is inherently more cumbersome to 
administer than an online consultation.
Even policy aspects that appeared to provoke policy contestation were not what 
they seemed. In the case of product harmonisation, the most unconventional topic 
included was that of abolishing the CE marking. The Commission staff included this 
in the proposal for the consultation as a test balloon, expecting it to be rejected. In 
fact, this is exactly what happened. All organisations apart from a  few consumer 
groups wanted to keep the CE marking as it was. From the Commission’s point of 
view, the interesting point was not so much that it was rejected but the fact that they 
suggested an idea that they thought would never achieve a consensus. This can be 
seen as typical behaviour of a group of people who have their own view of their role, 
mainly in the sense that they know things and they run things. Unquestionably, their 
technocratic belief is fuelled by the perception that they have access to  a body of 
knowledge, which allegedly puts them in a unique position to understand the 'true 
content' of the policies at stake (Kalu, 2001, p. 313).
Increasing accessibility to the participation arena is a particularly significant issue 
for the Commission. Yet,  it  lacks  a coherent strategy, which aims to 'maintain a 
dialogue which is as open as possible' (EU Commission,  1993b,  p.  1;  see also 
Mendes, 2011, p. 112). This is because DGs and 'different services are responsible 
for their own mechanisms of dialogue and consultation' (EU Commission, 2012b). 
Therefore, every DG handles its online consultations differently so that a prospective 
participant has to learn a new participation pattern for each DG. The way in which 
DGs and the Your Voice website staff handle online consultation makes it rather 
difficult to find these consultations. Additionally, the Your Voice website had several 
inconsistencies, mainly because of the lack of communication between DGs and the 
Your Voice staff. 
In summary, the Commission did not attempt to overcome problems of 
communication with the public by adopting web technologies with a decent user 
interface, especially since more and more people lack the patience to use 
sub-standard interfaces when they are increasingly accustomed to the good interface 
design of major technology firms. On the contrary, the whole situation is comparable 
to a government that calls an election but does not tell the people where the polling 
station is. Experienced citizens can always make a good guess as to where to find it 
212
but for the rest it may be too time consuming even if they want to vote. In short, the 
whole system is designed for the 'experienced user'.
The situation is similar regarding the mechanisms used by the Commission to 
provide feedback. There are often detailed arguments as to  why some ideas are 
included and others not. The problem is rather that feedback on the consultation is 
often not to be found at the same place as the consultation itself; even more 
problematically, feedback is often hidden in other documents. Again, the system is 
streamlined towards the 'experienced user'. On top of that, there is an inherently 
serious delay between input provision and the provision of feedback notwithstanding 
that Commission itself aims to give some form feedback via the internet within 15 
working days (EU Commission, 2002a, pp. 21–22).
In both cases, invitations to participate only went out to the 'usual suspects', i.e. 
the established CSO networks orbiting around the work of a  DG. Hence, the 
threshold for participation was already high through  the  sheer lack of publicity. 
However, creating more publicity might not tackle the problem of selective 
participation. Abels argues in the case of the Commission’s online consultation that 
'lowering thresholds is not enough, it requires also incentives for participation. I argue 
that this strategy does not really improve the situation, since the majority of citizens is 
neither aware nor prepared to participate in consultations (even if participatory 
thresholds are lowered) because they typically require technical and specialized 
knowledge. Therefore, only “interested citizens” can be activated (...)' (2009, p. 25).
Neither consultation had a significant influence on the policy formulation process 
or the policy agenda. In the animal welfare case, this was never intended. Agenda 
setting took place long before the consultation. In the case of product harmonisation 
only pseudo-options where given. From the beginning, the Commission staff had 
very clear ideas regarding the best options for  tackling the issues. These were 
merely confirmed by the consultation. Agenda setting had taken place in previous 
consultations. The interviews with staff showed  the widespread opinion that the 
consultation did not bring out new insights. Moreover, all the issues of the animal 
welfare consultation were already included as topics in a Special  Eurobarometer 
survey of 2005 (DG  Communication,  2005) and  then  slight  modified  in  a  2007 
Special  Eurobarometer  (DG Communication,  2007) for  which  the  field  work  took 
place in autumn 2006. In all fairness though, the follow-up Action Plan did have an 
extensive  and  relatively  transparent  consultation  process,  including  an  online 
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consultation.  Afterwards  a  very  thorough  Impact  Assessment  report,  that  also 
included detailed arguments for policy choices, was published by DG Health. The 
results were published in a report (DG Health, 2010) produced by two consultancies 
(GHK and ADAS).
Because consultation inputs provided online have no substantial impact, the 
problem of how to deal with controversial inputs internally does not arise, i.e. the 
question of what happens if a consultation input is disputed within the Commission. 
This problem was pointed out by interview partner (O, 3) from DG Legal: 'The internal 
decision making process is a dynamic process, which is supposed to be “one voice”. 
This dynamic process includes the different interests of DGs that are involved in the 
decision making process and who will try to influence it. In the case of a Green Paper 
or Action Plan for the public, particular lobby groups and Member States will reply 
and, only rarely, individual citizens. (…) The European Commission has a 
hierarchical structure, which means that ideas have to be communicated to the head 
of unit in order to make them heard within the European Commission. The next step 
is to propose it to the cabinet. The result of this process is not necessarily the original 
idea'.
Summing  it  up,  the  main  empirical  findings  in  relation  to  the  core  research 
question, i.e. if online consultations are a viable mechanism to create input legitimacy 
are  as  follows.  First,  the  Commission  does not  create  enough awareness  for  its 
online consultations outside Brussels. Second, the design of the consultations is not 
inclusive. Third, online consultation do not have any significant impact on the policy.  
Fourth, although feedback is given, it is inaccessible for people who are not familiar 
with the Commission’s online consultation regime. Therefore, the legitimacy potential  
of  the  Commission’s  online  consultations  in  its  current  form  is  negligible.  The 
following  figure  gives  a  schematic  overview  of  the  causal  mechanism  of  main 
findings.
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The results of this thesis also pose a question about the Commission's motivations 
when it comes to online consultations. As others have noted (Broscheid & Coen, 
2003; Zittel, 2008; Zittel & Fuchs, 2007), the Commission has a strong tendency to 
try to widen its competences, although it lacks de jure competence to acquire more 
competences (or so-called competence-competence). Acquiring more competences 
is, in particular, relevant for policy areas where the Commission’s powers have a 
weak treaty base.
Policies without, or with only a weak treaty base, are in special need of other 
mechanisms of legitimisation. One Commission strategy is to seek the help of actors 
outside of the EU's institutional framework, namely CSOs and experts. Also, the 
Commission can try to mobilise a wider public and go campaigning. Zittel described 
this approach of a top-down mobilisation of societal actors as 'participatory 
engineering' (2008, p. 120). The basic argument is that the weaker a treaty base for 
a particular policy is and the greater the wish of the Commission to expand this 
policy, the higher the rate of mobilisation of outside actors and entities; conversely, 
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Figure: Causal mechanism of (not) creating input legitimacy 
the stronger a treaty base for policy is and the lower the wish of the Commission to 
expand a particular policy, the lower the rate of mobilisation of outside actors and 
entities. This argument offers an explanation for the mobilisation of the consultations 
in both case studies. The rate of outside mobilisation was high in the case of the 
animal welfare consultation – a policy with a weak treaty base – and low in the case 
of product harmonisation – a policy with strong treaty base.
The results of this thesis also raise the question how they reflect on the overall 
digital agenda of the EU. It would not be advisable to dismiss large parts of the EU's 
digital agenda based on the findings presented here. The results of this thesis with  
regard  to  the  democratic  potential  of  the  Commission’s  online  consultations  are 
sobering. One might say that the Commission set itself a Herculean task and while  
tackling it, did not fare as well as the famous Greek demigod. But at least it tried. 
However,  the scale of the challenges was clear early on and is known within the 
Commission  (Fassian,  2012).  Hence,  it  is  clear  that  priorities  for  the  EU's  digital 
agenda are  to  be  found elsewhere  and not  in  the  area of  legitimacy and digital 
democracy. Overall, the results suggest that the EU's digital agenda is still stuck in a 
technology  and  economically  driven  perception  of  the  information  society,  which 
gives market-oriented measures the highest priority. One of the latest developments 
supporting  this  view  is  the  demise  of  DG Information  Society  and  Media  which 
became DG for Communications Networks, Content and Technology on the 1st of 
July 2012 (DG Connect, 2012). In comparison to its predecessor DG Connect almost 
solely focuses on technology, infrastructure and economic issues.
The missed opportunities for deliberation and politicisation
Clearly, online consultation did not lead to any policy learning for the Commission 
in either case. This is one of the core criteria for successful deliberation but there was 
hardly a meaningful exchange between participants and the Commission. The mere 
'offer of commenting on policy drafts' is not enough for a positive legitimacy effect.  
Deliberation did not take place in the online participation arena. Whilst this was true 
in both cases, it was especially disappointing in the animal welfare case as it was 
chosen in particular for its comparatively higher deliberative potential, given its less 
technical nature. Of course, as neither case provided room for engaging in wider 
debate, we should ask whether it is really fair to blame the animal welfare case for 
not addressing fundamental issues such as  animal rights. The harmonisation case, 
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while discussing mechanisms for preventing unwanted market distortion, did not 
discuss the merits and pitfalls of a market based economy and the possibility of 
alternatives. This is because there is probably no support for this systemic change 
within the elites and the wider European population. In the same vein, changing the 
treatment of animals based on ideas of animal rights philosophy is a comparable 
systemic shift within the societies and economies of Europe but it was not included 
either. After all, only a minority of people strongly dislike the idea that the primary 
distribution of wealth and income is achieved by using market mechanisms.
The animal welfare consultation’s  aim was to improve the welfare based on an 
anthropocentric concept of animal welfare. The animal welfare case did not have to 
burden itself with policy specific issues. Hence, there was the chance to discuss the 
underlying philosophy of a policy area. Arguably, although animal rights as a practical 
concept is without much chance of realisation in the near future, its value as a 
regulative idea should not be underestimated. From the viewpoint of animal 
welfarism, it is likely that an ideology that opposes an anthropocentric view of 
animals has something to say even for the goals of animal welfarism. Similarly, in the 
development of market based societies, rival ideologies played a crucial role in 
ensuring that income is not solely determined by market mechanisms. A secondary 
round of income distribution is often based on needs and a state-directed intervention 
in the market based economy by taxation and other mechanism of the welfare state 
is common. These adaptations of the market economy owe their existence partly to 
rival ideologies. Hence, even seemingly outlandish concepts such as animal rights 
have the potential to contribute to a mainstream ideology. The main difference 
between the consultations with regards to animal welfare and market economy is that 
the former case provided every opportunity of it being incorporated into the debate 
whilst the harmonisation case did not. Of course, the bigger picture may well be more 
complex, as the political pressure, the general line of the Commission and/or 
mechanism of non-decision-making (Lukes, 2005) may all play a part here.
In  a  broader  perspective,  neither  consultation  advanced  the  agenda  of 
politicisation  of  issues  and/or  citizens.  The  politicisation  implies  that  previously 
non-negotiable  issues  become  negotiable  and  decidable,  i.e.,  these  issues  are 
dragged out  from non-political  arenas to  be  subjected to  public  contestation  and 
scrutiny,  where  decisions  have  to  be  justified  also  with  the  help  of  democratic 
processes. The politicisation of people implies that citizens or groups of citizens who 
217
have previously been disinterested in politics and excluded from it become engaged 
in  political  debates  and  turn  into  political  actors.  In  the  most  general  sense, 
politicisation  is  the  realisation  that  established social  norms,  social  practices  and 
social  relations  are  contingent  rather  than  sacrosanct,  that  things  could  also  be 
different,  and  that  citizens,  individually  and  collectively,  have  political  agency  by 
means of which alternatives can be explored and implemented (Blühdorn, 2006a, p. 
313). Seen form a politicisation agenda, the Commission's online consultation regime 
comes close to what Crouch describes as an institutional arrangement that has 'little  
interest in widespread citizen involvement or the role of organizations outside the 
business sector' (2004, p. 3) and where online consultations are simply a 'means of 
encouraging the maximum level of minimal participation' (2004, p. 112).
If  we  turn  to  the  particularities  of  online  consultations  and  the  challenges  of  
deliberation from the participants side we have to ask what are the consequences for 
the input legitimacy potential of online consultations if 25% of the citizens cannot take 
part in this form of democratic governance simply because they lack the literacy to do 
so. What does it mean if 25% of all those affected by political decisions are not able 
to have an influence on the process of formulating policies? The issue here is not 
that everyone should contribute but that a significant minority is not even theoretically 
able to contribute although they are citizens of the EU. 
The lack of equality of participation is the single most serious challenge for the 
input legitimacy potential of online consultations. To put this into perspective, we can 
compare online consultations with elections. In an election, the central act of 
participation – casting a vote – is open to all regardless of the socio-economic and 
literacy status of individual. Every electoral system aims to ensure the equality of 
each vote. As long as other votes are not counted, each and every single vote has 
the same weight. In  reality, there are of  course  various factors  that violate this 
principle. For instance, the UK has constituencies with different voting populations 
(Curtice, 2010). The German general elections have the peculiar phenomenon of so-
called excess mandates where because of the number of directly elected MPs in a 
federal state a party can win one or more seats in parliament in excess of the number 
of  the seats to which it  would be entitled on the basis of its share of total votes 
(Behnke, 2003). 
After the counting of votes, the equality of the vote disappears because the value 
of the vote depends on the total distribution of votes between the electoral choices. In 
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many majoritarian and proportional election systems, if a voter did not vote for the 
winning candidate, party or coalition his or her vote is lost. This is very clear in the 
UK's first-past-the-post system. In contrast, electoral systems based on preferential 
voting try to minimise this form of loss of equality.
We can expect similar effects regarding a contribution to an online consultation - 
the relevance of an act of participation depends on other contributions. Moreover, we 
can also expect that the relevance of a contribution depends of the communication 
ability of the participant. This in turn strongly depends upon his or her 
socio-economic and literacy status. In  contrast,  the  participation  process  in  an 
election  does  not  strictly  require  that  a  citizen  be  literate.  Oral  and  visual 
communication can be enough to form an opinion about  different election choices. 
And,  even more essentially,  the central  act  of  participation does not  require  any 
literacy skills – casting a vote can arguably be done  without the ability to read or 
write. The participation threshold for this arena is low. By sheer design, participation 
in elections is a rather inclusive process compared to  the much higher  'entrance 
requirements' for online participation.
If we accept this argument, there is no easy way to overcome this problem for 
online consultations. For their advocates, the first line of defence would be to stress 
the fact that in comparison to elections, literacy levels only make  a gradual 
difference. Likewise, various election studies have  shown that the  possibility of 
casting a vote rises with socio-economic status (Hill, 2011, p. 28). Disproportionality 
in voter turnout is linked 'to privilege, as those who are already marginalised find 
themselves even further disadvantaged through the effective exclusion of their 
interests and priorities from the political sphere' (C. Fischer, 2011, p. 38). Although 
compulsory voting could be a counter strategy to ease disproportionality in voter 
turnout, this is obviously not an option for public participation in policy making as the 
act of participation is far more complex. Arguably, efforts to educate citizens on how 
to effectively participate may drive the process towards higher equality, as well as 
ensuring that inputs are treated equally by the Commission before they are 
processed. 
Limitations of the research and further research
In this second part, we look at the limitations of this research project and thesis. 
Prima facie, there are two main limitations: first, the lack of scope with regard to the 
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examined cases and second the lack of data on participants. If we do not change the 
focus of the research interest, i.e. the input legitimacy potential of the Commission's 
online consultations, then there are two main avenues for further research. The first 
is to engage more broadly in the Commission's online consultation regime. After all, 
the picture that emerged here is based on two case studies and may be grossly 
distorted taking into account a larger number of cases, which is steadily growing. 
This would also imply broadening the scope of the research by analysing online 
consultations in quantitative terms, which would require a robust scale for measuring 
the input legitimacy potential in order to handle a greater number. 
The second main weakness of this research is the lack of data on participants. 
Hence, it appears to be advisable to expand on this aspect in potential future 
research and in doing so shift the focus from input legitimacy to legitimacy belief. 
However, apart from a purely descriptive purpose, this approach is only fruitful if the 
main result of this thesis –  the low legitimacy potential of online consultations – is 
weak or invalid. This is because comprehensive research on participants is 
comparatively more resource intensive than research on legitimacy potential and 
therefore only makes sense if the Commission fulfils its obligation to create 
accessible arenas of participation that are, in principle, able to meaningfully transform 
the inputs of participants into policy. Only then is it justifiable to look into the specifics 
of EU online participation. Of course, the generic analysis of political participation is 
not affected by this assertion. On the contrary, insights from the online political 
participation studies are needed to improve the consultation regime.
Another line of inquiry could focus on how online consultations are embedded in 
the wider consultative regime of the Commission and in particular across different  
DGs. It is a potentially promising approach as many DGs have developed their own 
consultation culture with specific links and commutation patterns with societal actors. 
This may be particularly fruitful for researching inter- and intra-organisational power 
struggles in the context of deliberative attempts to create input legitimacy.
The future for e-participation Commission policy-making
The third and last part of the conclusion provides an outlook for the future of 
e-participation in the Commission's consultation regime. First, we look at lessons that 
can possibly be learnt from the case studies by making suggestions for low cost 
improvements, which do not alter institutional arrangements either  within or outside 
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the Commission. These suggestions are presumably easier to implement in the 
current format of the consultation regime. Second, we suggest a best case scenario 
for improving the input legitimacy of consultations based on the underlying problems 
of the current set-up and, based on this, we discuss whether it is worth improving the 
input legitimacy potential of online consultations.
The following suggestions are based on the results of this thesis and are intended 
to foster incremental changes in the consultation regime. Democracy is by design not 
the simplest solution to the challenges of government and legitimate rule and 
compared to voting, participation in policy-making is not the simplest solution to the 
challenge of democratic legitimacy. The government has to make sure that 
participating does not become more cumbersome than it already is. And here the 
Commission's online consultations fail miserably. The suggestions presented here 
will not change the big picture of online participation but may change the consultation 
regime in the long the run for the better. Whilst ultimately the resources required for 
expanding online consultation regimes are necessary so that they deliver input-
legitimacy on a grand scale, a first step is to make sure that on the smaller scale, the 
regime is, in principle, able to deliver input legitimacy.
The first realistic aim is  to  have  a  coherent  and more  accessible  website.  An 
interview partner from a Brussels-based think tank suggested that the Commission 
has to go even further with their websites: 'The Commission's site is a failure. It is a 
very inaccessible, rather user-unfriendly site. You would never go there in your free 
time, which should [be the] aspiration for this site...  to be so user friendly so that  
people go there in their spare time'  (O, 1). Of course, it is debatable whether the 
Commission's web presence should aim to become a political edutainment site, so 
attractive that people visit it regularly in their free time; yet as a guiding principle, it is 
worth considering. It is also worth noting that rework of the site in September 2009 
was a step in the right direction.
The next realistic aim is to establish a more transparent long term communication 
process between participants and a DG (especially for people who do not take part in 
'offline' consultations) that moves beyond the linear input/output model envisaged at 
the moment by the Commission's consultations. The schematic model of 
policy-formulation within the Commission (initial paper –  consultation input –  policy 
draft) is not valid for the 'offline world', where ideas and concepts are discussed and 
bounced backwards and forwards – or, as Neyer (2003) claims, are deliberated with 
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all the legitimacy implications - across many levels and meetings. Nevertheless, in 
principle, online consultations still follow this scheme. Hence, a more comprehensive 
approach to governance and communication via the internet is needed.
In practical terms, this would mean communicating policy development through 
devices such as email newsletters - 'in governance: from the policy officer's desk' - a 
weekly or bi-weekly email update which provides both official updates as well as the 
views of someone from within Brussels. It should be noted that whilst  informing 
groups of people is already the task of many policy officers, the reporting often takes 
place without publishing reports/communiqués –  although sometimes minutes and 
notes can be found, possibly accidentally in some case, on the internet. Ideally, such 
an email  would highlight the  latest developments and, maybe, responses or 
clarifications to the policy question, references to further documents on the web or 
relevant  literature. Additionally, it should address the participation possibilities, 
including in-person opportunities to connect. The addressees of such newsletters 
(other forms are of course possible, including fully fledged multi-channel response 
and content managing systems) would be people who had already signed up to that 
arena of participation. Moreover, the policy officer in charge should make sure that 
contributions of other participants are be easily accessible to all who are interested. It 
should also be noted that such a degree of transparency might be controversial 
within the Commission.
The measures outlined above would increase the input legitimacy potential of the 
consultation primarily after a participant entered the arena of participation. They 
would aim to improve the meaningful transformation of inputs. However, the bigger 
challenge is to attract citizens to enter the arena in the first place. Both strategies of 
raising the benefits of participation and lowering the costs of participation are worth 
considering. In terms of lowering the cost of participation, first and foremost, a DG 
must make the rules of engagement as clear as possible, i.e. explaining what the DG 
expects from participants and what participants can expect from the DG. It  would 
include highlighting what is at stake and why the DG values the participation. This is 
also important for any prospective participant in order to assess, ex ante, both the 
cost and potential benefits. In practical terms making it easier to participate should 
include measures such as providing reference material for people with different levels 
of expertise in addition to a code of practice for participants. Second, framing online 
consultations both as opportunities to influence policy and as learning opportunities is 
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one of the more unusual attempts for targeting participants outside of Brussels. 
Online consultations can be used as educational tools especially in the area of 
secondary education and university education. This approach, if encouraged by the 
Commission may also overcome the problem of poor media attention vis-a-vis the 
EU whilst targeting a relevant group for participation. A prominent example of this 
approach is Canada's Foreign Ministry and their 'Policy eDiscussions' (Potter, 2009, 
p. 167). 
The overarching aim is to have policy officers who understand the participation 
arena from the perspective of a participant, i.e. they are not part of the 'Brussels 
bubble', trying to establish a long term relationship whilst avoiding reinforcing the 
simplistic messages of advertising and political campaigning. The latter is especially 
relevant for the inside support of policy officers who would stress the importance of 
participation as opposed to mere communication. The challenge is to promote 
participation and not only communication as this is not about selling policy but about 
selling the idea of participatory policy-making. In essence, this means reducing the 
comparative advantage of being within the 'Brussels bubble' by essentially expanding 
it.  Strategically,  the medium term objective would be to create a narrative of the 
Commission's online consultations for participants, EU officials and the media.
The next step would be to look for improvements on a bigger scale. The aim of 
imagining the best of all worlds is not to draw up a fantasy world of a possible EU but 
rather to show the limitations of e-participation. For the sake of the argument, let us 
assume a best case scenario regarding the environment for online consultations (see 
also Shane, 2012, pp. 1–2 for his utopian scenario). The Commission would increase 
the accessibility of its online consultations in a top-down approach by streamlining 
access to all DGs. The influence of online participation in the consultation procedures 
would be legally backed-up and therefore bottom-up policy impact would be credible. 
Online consultations and other, more traditional, forms of consultation would be well  
integrated. The policy officers on the ground would  see themselves both as 
facilitators of policy and facilitators of democracy. The Commission's communication 
specialists would not only focus on selling a policy to its audience but also encourage 
participation in the policy-making. People would have the possibility of reading about 
the EU consultations because they would be newsworthy in the mass media. Both in 
the online and offline world have for a where participants meet and can exchange 
arguments. The mass media would  report the process by even highlighting 
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interesting contributions. At the  same time, Member  States  would amend the 
curriculum for citizenship classes so as to teach people how they can effectively 
participate, not only in EU consultations but  also in other e-participation tools at 
national and sub-national levels. A range of CSOs would  produce informative 
material and manuals for participating in consultation procedures and thus the EU 
online consultation and European public sphere would be able to grow organically. 
First, on the question of legally binding structures, on the one hand the 
Commission's approach of not making the consultation legally binding and generally 
trying to avoid an 'overly legalistic' (Craig, 2010, p. 69; EU Commission, 2002a, p. 
10) approach enables it, in principle, to adapt the consultation regime towards a more 
meaningful participation which is independent of other actors. On the other hand, the 
lack of legally binding structures seriously decreases the legitimacy potential of the 
regime. This argument – as outlined in chapter 3 – is based on the assumption that 
the  possibility of meaningful participation already  creates legitimacy potential,  not 
only actual participation. We could argue that the  absence  of  legally binding 
structures is  a problem that can be easily overcome. As discussed above, 'legally 
binding'  refers  to  measures  that  first  bind  the  Commission  to  initiate  an  online  
consultation and second, that the synthesized input of an online consultation has to 
be the position that the Commission, after the formulation stage, introduces into in 
the policy process with  the  other  major  EU institutions. A  possible  side  effect  of 
making the online consultation procedures legally binding in such a way is that the 
process becomes more significant for the Commission's personnel. Nonetheless, it is 
important to remember that in contrast to elections, where input legitimacy does stem 
from securing the equality of votes, the online consultations' legitimacy potential 
depends more  on the quality of participation and less on legal safeguarding. In a 
situation where a consultation has a high degree of participatory quality and no legal 
safeguards for securing impact, the process still has legitimacy potential. In contrast, 
in an election with a high rate of participation (i.e.  voter turnout) but no legal 
safeguard, the input legitimacy potential would be negligible. 
One might argue that the development of legally binding structures and patterns of 
participation may evolve over time and therefore does not pose a substantial 
dilemma.  It is more an issue of polity change. The dilemma between legitimacy 
based on deliberation and elitism is more severe and  resource  intensive  to 
overcome.  Fishkin's  attempts  to  reconcile  inclusive  participation  with  high  quality 
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output with his deliberative polling approach can give us a glimpse of the scale of the 
task (Fishkin, 2009, pp. 159–196).
We can assume that around  25% of EU citizens are not able to participate in 
online consultations, even if they wish to do so. Surely, the participation threshold for 
online consultations could  be lowered to a certain degree, which would allow more 
people to participate. Yet, the literacy requirements for participation cannot be 
lowered without jeopardising the legitimacy potential as the quality of dialogue is the 
essential factor in establishing the legitimacy potential of online consultations. So 
either we have a scenario where input legitimacy potential is low because a 
considerable minority of citizens are unable to have an influence in the forum for 
policy contestation, or we have a scenario with a low input legitimacy potential 
because the participation does not fulfil minimum criteria for deliberation. While we 
could relativise the elitism dilemma by referring to other phenomena of elitism in the 
functioning of democratic societies, it does not increase the input legitimacy potential 
of online consultations.
Hence, even if we believe CSOs can provide a democratic infrastructure; even if 
we believe in the effectiveness of citizenship education; even if we assume that the 
Commission (let alone its consultations) is more than a medium sized fish in the vast 
media ocean, there are considerable obstacles to overcome for this strategy for 
creating input legitimacy. 
Another suggestion is to consider  the online consultation avenue as an act of 
desperation. After all, the EU is running out of ideas for tackling the democratic 
deficit. The EU and Commission, however, already have forums for elite deliberation. 
It is not clear why the EU needs another one. Therefore, we can ask the question of 
whether the Commission is the wrong institution – in terms of a history of fixation on 
output legitimacy, lack of resources and conflicts with other EU institutions –  to be 
undertaking such a project. Is it worth the effort to improve the online consultation 
regime on input legitimacy grounds?
From the traditional engineering mantra 'strong, light, cheap –  pick two' the 
Commission has a similar problem. As an analogy, the options for the Commission 
are 'output-legitimacy', 'input-legitimacy' and 'cost effectiveness' and there is a sound 
reasoning behind the Commission's choice  of 'output-legitimacy' and 'cost 
effectiveness'. If we put the conclusion into two sentences we might say, first, that 
online consultations do not  contribute to  the input  legitimacy of  the EU and that, 
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second, it is inefficient to improve the online consultation regime on the grounds of 
input legitimacy. In doing so, we hint at what Dahl calls the 'democratic dilemma'. He 
sees trade-offs between 'the ability of the citizens to exercise democratic control over 
the decisions of the polity' and 'the capacity of the system to respond satisfactorily to  
the collective preferences of its citizens' (1994, p. 28). However, as Blühdorn points 
out, the situation is not as simple as Dahl suggests: 
'The  enhancement  of  efficiency  neither  automatically  implies  a  reduction  of  democratic 
qualities,  nor  are  improvements  of  the  latter  necessarily  achieved  at  the  expense  of  the 
former. Democratic qualities may be beneficial for the efficiency of a process or system but 
they may also be detrimental  or  not  affect  its  efficiency at  all.  They are beneficial  if  they  
enhance the ability of a system to fulfil its specific function without increasing the required  
inputs. They are detrimental if they either reduce the system’s output or necessitate a higher 
input in order to keep the output at the same level. Therefore, any talk of a direct contradiction 
or trade-off between democracy and efficiency is misleading. Whilst there may well be a direct  
trade-off  between  the  inclusiveness  of  decision  making  and  the  effectiveness  of  decision 
making, it would be entirely wrong to regard democracy and efficiency as opposite poles on 
the same scale' (Blühdorn, 2006b, p. 78). 
In this sense, this conclusion was an attempt to gauge in advance, albeit in a 
necessarily  superficial  manner,  how  much  the  reform  of  the  online  consultation 
regime could potentially add to the EU’s input legitimacy and how much it would cost  
and may distract from effective and efficient policy making. Finders argues that such 
a weighing up is difficult, if not impossible (2006, p. 183). Naturally, the future of e-
democracy in the European Union and its use by the European Commission is not  
easy to predict. It will depend inter alia on the evolution of technology and its use, the 
changing patterns of political participation and of political identities and the shifting 
perception  of  the EU's  democratic  deficit.  After  all,  democracy is  an open-ended 
project – in particular in the case of the EU and in the context of digital media.
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Exemplary interview matrix for EU officials 
Version Animal Welfare case
I am looking in my PhD at consultation procedures within EC as a means of creating input legitimacy 
for the EU. I am particularly interested about what will happen if input is gathered via the 
internet. One of my case studies is the consultation for the 'Action Plan for Animal Welfare 
2006 - 2010'. This is in short the reason why I am here today. 
Could you describe in a few sentences what were your key duties in drafting the Action Plan? 
  offline/CSO/Citizens online/CSO/Citizens 
1/3 
  
  
Specifically in the 
Case of the Action 
Plan 
Consultation approach 
of the DG 
  
  
  
  
  
Prerequisites for 
meaningful 
participation 
  
  
How did you decide that the consultation 
was to be opened for a wider public? 
−                  Who decided? Which process? 
Which organisations were mainly taking 
part? 
  
  
How come that so many people seemingly 
without organisational background took part 
in this online consultation? 
How was the consultation promoted beyond 
the EC? 
  
How does the DG seek awareness? Are they 
campaigning for a particular consultation? 
  
−                   Selection of topics opened for 
a consultation process? 
−                  Who decided? Which process?
Selection of topics opened for a consultation 
process? 
At which point of the policy making 
process did you (or the commission) 
decide to open a consultation? 
Who decides? Which process? 
Who decides that a consultation is 
open for the public or exclusively for 
stakeholders? 
Which priority had the proposal 
compared to other things going on at 
that time? 
−                    Was sind die grauen?
How did online consultation 
interlink with outer consultation 
exercises? 
You used a closed questionnaire 
type of consultation as well as open 
questions where people could write 
a contribution in response to your 
consultation document. How come? 
Did the closed questionnaire bring 
up anything surprising? 
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−                  What about marginalized 
group topics? 
−                  Who decided? Which process? 
  
Is there strategic use of consultations? 
  
From your view, how relevant were the 
inputs of the consultation relative to 
other inputs provided? Relevant could 
be supporting existing views or bring 
up new/overlooked insights? 
  
In general, which significance have 
consultation for the DG? 
How often does input provided trough 
consultation challenge implicit/explicit 
viewpoints of the DG? 
  
What is your impression of the 
Communication skills of participants? 
Such as literacy skills, tolerance of 
ambiguity, efficacy … 
  
  
  offline/CSO/Citizens online/CSO/Citizens 
2/3 
  
Specifically in the 
Case of the Action 
Plan 
Consultation approach 
of the DG 
  
  
When DG takes over 
the stewardship of the 
inputs… 
  
What are prerequisites 
for the meaningful 
transformation of 
inputs? How do inputs 
transform to policy 
impact? 
What guidelines are  there a consultation process 
has to follow in your DG – apart from the 
guidelines laid out in the EC's document on 
'General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the 
Commission'? 
  
The same document states 'A Commission 
Intranet website will provide Commission staff 
with practical guidance, including examples of 
best practice.' Does it exist? Do you/ your DG 
use it? 
Has the DG developed their own best practice 
cases? 
  
What's happening with the contributions 
Who is processing them and how? 
What are criteria for input to be included/ not to be 
included? 
How are the inputs 
recorded? 
For how long? 
Where are they published? 
For me also interesting is the 
aspect whether they are 
accessible for me as an 
outside researcher 
Esp. the single contributions 
were once online but it seems 
they disappeared from the DGs 
website. What are the reasons 
for this? 
  
Are you concerned about the 
representatively of the 
participants input? 
Should The EC be concerned 
about it, or is it more relevant 
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Who selects relevant contributions/comments? 
How would you define “relevant”? 
Process of summarising the contributions: How is it 
structured? 
Which criteria do you use for summing up 
contributions? 
  
How does the DG give feedback on the 
gathered and processed input? 
In which form? 
Does the DG communicate criteria why some 
inputs are included or why not? In which ways? 
What is the binding structure of using the 
contributions for policy drafts? If it is non-
legally, is it morally binding? 
Where do summaries/contributions go to in case 
they are not used for policy drafts? 
Who else uses these 
summaries/contributions? 
Is the public actively informed about results 
after a closing date? 
for the EP? Is the quality of the 
input more important than to 
make sure that there is no 
socio-economic bias? 
  
  
3/3 
  
  
Specifically in the 
Case of the Action 
Plan 
Consultation 
approach of the DG 
  
  
Technical Issues 
Contemplating 
Who decides whether a consolation 
is promoted via the 'Your Voice in 
Europe' website? 
How does the process work? Does 
it depend on definition of 
interested parties? 
Who is in charge of communicating 
with the Webmaster Team of DG 
Market – they take care of the Your 
Voice site? 
  
Do you use the IPM framework 
provided for gathering feedback? In 
which cases? What is your experience 
with the IPM? 
  
How do you assess the design of the 
online consultation site in terms of 
“Citizens can play an active role in the policy 
making process” - what is your view? 
  
Critical factors for a successful usage of online 
consultation? (political, legal, cultural, 
economic cost factors?) 
  
In the 2005 survey, 2/3 of the respondents 
believed that the level of animal welfare 
within the EU was poor or very poor? Did 
you agree then? Do you think that 
publishing the Action Plan has changed this 
perception? 
You hardly use what???in your official 
documents...s 
  
Generally, what's the difference between online 
and offline consultations 
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“usability”? 
  
If you go to the Your Voice in Europe 
Webpage you find a section of open 
consultation. Then there is a section 
for closed consultations. So the site 
suggests that there is a succession 
from a open consultation to a closed 
consultation. But then there are 
consultations that were once open and 
they disappeared altogether from the 
website. One reason for this is 
communication between the DG and 
Webmaster of DG market who take 
care of the webpage. But the 
webmaster also told me that the DGs 
sometimes ask to remove the link of 
their consultation. I am wondering 
why a DG intentionally doesn't want 
that the results of consultation are 
interlinked to the YViE page? 
  
Generally, what's the difference between 
consultation contribution by CSO and citizens 
  
Does participation need to have impact on a 
policy? Or is it more important that the 
participant feels her or his input matters? 
  
Is the responsiveness of the agency more 
important than the information processing and 
policy impact)? 
  
How far do online consultations address “hot 
issues” which supposedly play an important role 
for the EU’s policy making? 
  
Do you see contestation over policies taking 
place in consultations? 
  
How would you define a “successful” online 
consultation? 
  
I have here this statement by an US college of 
mine on the subject of civil participation and he 
says: ‘It's not about inclusion and participation, 
but primarily about securing consensus for 
policies and delivering them effectively.' - what 
is your view? 
  
How far have online consultations influenced 
your personal work? What was/is the “added-
value” of online consultations? 
  
Any good questions I should ask Mr Rhein or Mr Horgan? 
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Appendix II: Participants interview 
Email/Letter Version 
University of Portsmouth
Centre for European and International
Studies Research
Park Building
King Henry I Street
Portsmouth PO1 2DZ
United Kingdom
Dear Interviewee
The following questions aim to shed light into the EU Commission's consultation 
process from the participant's side in the context of my research project outlined in 
the accompanying information sheet. This interview is particularly interested in your 
involvement  of  the  2006 DG  Enterprise  consultation  for  the  regulation  on 
'Requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of  
products'. The questions are divided into thee sections: The first one deals with the 
motivational  issues before the submission of an contribution, the second with the 
content of the consultation and the last section is concerned with the process after  
the submission ('follow-ups').
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Researcher: Julian Weller
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Centre for European and International Studies Research
Before
How  did  you/your  organisation  know  that  the  Commission  launched  the 
Consultation on Product Harmonisation ('Requirements for accreditation and market 
surveillance relating to the marketing of products')? For Instance were you included 
in their mailing list, did you learn about it via another organisation or do you have 
personal ties with the DG?
What was your/your organisation's motivation for participation?
Did you/your organisation expect to gain any benefits from participation?
Was there anything remarkable about how the DG dealt with consultation? How do 
you/your organisation feel about the mode of Communication with the DG Enterprise 
(in general/specific to this consultation)?
Apart  from  the  professional  issue  did  you  have  any  personal  stake  in  the 
consultation? 
Content
From  your  perspective  which  where  the  most  relevant  points  raised  by  the 
Commission's documents?
How many people were involved in drafting the reply to the Commission?
Was this a one-off participation? Or do you/does your organisation regularly take 
part in consultation procedures of the Commission (such as other forms of “offline-
consultations” and hearings)?
Did you read contributions by other participants?
How important are consultations for your work?
Follow-ups 
269
Did you follow the course of the consultation after the submission of your position 
to the Commission? 
Do you frequently refer to the Commission's 'Your Voice in Europe'  web-portal 
which is listing many of the EU Commission's consultations?
From your perspective, what is a successful online consultation? Do you have an 
opinion on critical factors for a successful usage of online consultation? (eg political,  
legal, cultural, economic, cost factors?)
Do you believe your contribution was relevant for the DG? Why?
Anything you would like to comment further, criticise or add?
Thank you very much for your time and for answering these questions. Your 
help is greatly appreciated.
    Julian Weller
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Appendix III: Overview Interviewees
271
# Name Interview Alias Type
###
###
###
###
###
###
### DG Environment 
###
### Cornelius Rhein 
###
###
### Nicolas Dietrich
###
###
###
###
###
### Sascha Leib 
###
###
### Johanna Jäger
###
Overview Interviews
Group
Claudia Schöler xx
Participant 
Enterprise email
Birgit Weidel xx DG Enterprise face-to-face
Andrea Gavinelli xx DG Sanco face-to-face
Vessela Karloukovska xx DG Sanco face-to-face
Antonio Rebelo-Martinho xx DG Enterprise face-to-face
Alessandro Gomarasca xx DG Market email
Horgan Rex xx email
Carol Humphrey-Wright xx DG Sanco face-to-face
xx DG Enterprise email
Hugo Córdova González-Castillo xx DG Enterprise email
Alexia Tsapidou xx DG Sanco email
xx
Participant 
Sanco face-to-face
Anne Grässer xx
Participant 
Sanco email
Bertram Chandelle xx
Participant 
Enterprise email
Daniel van Lerberghe xx Outside face-to-face
Roberto Ferrigno xx Outside face-to-face
Anita Haase xx DG Market email
xx DG Market email
Simon O’Connor xx
Participant 
Enterprise face-to-face
Maria Laura Franciosi xx
Participant 
Enterprise face-to-face
xx
Participant 
Sanco telephone
Michael Wilderspin xx
Outside/DG 
Legal face-to-face
Appendix IV: Screenshot - Your Voice in Europe consultation portal before Sept 2009
Appendix V: Screenshot - Your Voice in Europe consultation portal after Sept 2009
The End
